The political economy of shallow lakes

Shallow lakes display hysteresis in their response to phosphorous loading. Gradual increases in the nutrient content of the lake can appear to have little effect on the oligotrophic state of the lake until a point at which the lake suddenly flips to a eutrophic state. Ecotaxes on phosphorous loading have been suggested as means to maintain the lake in the socially desirable state - oligotrophic or not - when society can agree on a common welfare function. In this paper, we consider the case where society is divided into two interest groups and is thus unable to agree. In particular, the communities that share the use of the lake disagree on the relative importance of the shallow lake acting as a waste sink for phosphorous run-off as opposed to other ecosystem service. A dynamic game in which communities maximize their use of the lake results in a Nash equilibrium where the lake is in a eutrophic state when in fact the Pareto-optimum would be for the lake to be in an oligotrophic state. The tax that would induce, in a non-cooperative context, all of society's members to behave in such a way as to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome is derived. Further, both types of communities lobby to have their preferred level of tax applied based on their relative preferences for a clean lake and phosphorous loading. The effects of the lobbying on the application of the optimal tax are investigated for particular values of relative preferences and the relative size of each group.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Rent Seeking Behavior and Optimal Taxation of Pollution in Shallow Lakes

In this paper we extend earlier work on the economics of shallow lakes by M\"aler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (2003) to the case where two communities have incommensurable preferences about lake eutrophication. In the case of incommensurable preferences interest group behavior arises, we therefore consider the case where society is divided into two interest groups and is thus unable to agree on a single management objective. In particular, the communities that share the use of the lake disagree on the relative importance of the shallow lake acting as a waste sink for phosphorus run-off as opposed to other ecosystem services. A dynamic game in which communities maximize their use of the lake results in a Nash equilibrium where the lake is in a eutrophic state when in fact the Pareto optimum would be for the lake to be in an oligotrophic state. Our paper differs from previous work by considering two communities or interest groups with different preferences for environmental services. The tax that would induce, in a noncooperative context, all of society's members to behave in such a way as to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome is derived under the assumption that a social planner does not favor one community or another. We then ask whether or not such a tax rate would in fact be implemented if each community were able to bear political pressure on the social planner and the social planner were a public representative seeking re-election. In this case both types of communities lobby to have their preferred level of tax applied based on their relative preferences for a clean lake and phosphorus loading. The effects of the lobbying on the application of the optimal tax are investigated numerically for particular values of relative preferences and the relative size of each group. The representative seeking election proposes a different tax rate in order to maximize their probability of electoral success. This problem is solved numerically assuming that the lake is in a eutrophic equilibrium. It is shown that political representatives have an incentive to propose tax rates that are insufficient to achieve a return to an oligotrophic steady-statePollution of shallow lakes; optimal eco-taxation; dynamic rent seeking

Corporate Governance & Regulation: Panacea or Pandora's Box

Dr Stuart Gillan presented Corporate Governance & Regulation: Panacea or Pandora's Box at an ISCR seminar in May 2006

Letter. On the activation of [CrCl3{R-SN(H)S-R}] catalysts for selective trimerization of ethene: a freeze-quench Cr K-edge XAFS study

Homogeneous chromium catalysts for the selective conversion of ethene to hex-1-ene are formed from Cr(III) reagents, amino-thioether ligands of the type HN(CH2CH2SR)2, and aluminum reagents. In this study the early activation steps are investigated by EPR, UV-visible and Cr K-edge XAFS spectroscopy; rapid stopped-flow mixing and a freeze-quench allows good quality EXAFS analysis of a species formed in ~ 1 second of reaction. This is shown to involve reduction to Cr(II) and deprotonation of a NH group of the auxiliary ligand. This 4-coordinate metal-center may act as precursor for the coordination of ethene and subsequent selective oligomerization

A novel small molecule TLR4 antagonist (IAXO-102) negatively regulates non-hematopoietic toll like receptor 4 signalling and inhibits aortic aneurysms development

Objectives: The toll-like receptors (TLRs), including TLR4, have been shown to play a crucial role in vascular inflammatory diseases, such as atherosclerosis and aneurysm. The main goal of this study was to determine the potential of IAXO-102 (Innaxon, Tewkesbury), a novel small molecule TLR4 antagonist, to modulate non-hematopoietic TLR4 proinflammatory signalling and inhibit experimental abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) development. Methods: Human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVEC) and Angiotensin II-induced experimental AAA development were our in vitro and in vivo models respectively. Western blotting, antibody array and ELISA approaches were used to explore the effect of IAXO-102 on TLR4 functional activity on two levels: modulation of TLR4-induced mitogen activated protein kinases (MAPK) and p65 NF-kB phosphorylation and expression of TLR4 dependent proinflammatory proteins. Results: Following activation of TLR4, in vitro/in vivo data revealed that IAXO-102 inhibited MAPK and p65 NF-kB phosphorylation associated with down regulation of the expression of TLR4 and TLR4 dependent proinflammatory proteins. Furthermore, IAXO-102 decreased Angiotensin II-induced aortic expansion, rupture and incidence of AAA. Conclusions: These results demonstrate the ability of IAXO-102 to negatively regulate TLR4 signalling and to inhibit experimental AAA development, suggesting the potential therapeutic use of this TLR4 antagonist for pharmacological intervention of AAA

Sexual selection, automata and ethics in George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss and Olive Schreiner's Undine and From Man to Man

This paper brings together two related areas of debate in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The first concerns how the courtship plot of the nineteenth-century novel responded to, and helped to shape, scientific ideas of sexual competition and selection. In The Mill on the Floss (1860), George Eliot strikingly prefigures Darwin's later work on sexual selection, drawing from her own extensive knowledge of the wider debates within which evolutionary theory developed. Maggie Tulliver's characterisation allows Eliot to explore the ethical complexities raised by an increasingly powerful scientific naturalism, where biology is seen to be embedded within morality in newly specific ways. The second strand of the paper examines the extension of scientific method to human mind and motivation which constituted the new psychology. It argues that there are crucial continuities of long-established ethical and religious ideas within this increasingly naturalistic view of human mind and motivation. The contention that such ideas persist and are transformed, rather than simply jettisoned, is illustrated through the example of Thomas Henry Huxley's 1874 essay on automata. Turning finally to focus on Olive Schreiner's Undine (1929) and From Man to Man (1926), the paper explores the importance of these persistent ethical and religious ideas in two novels which remained unpublished during her lifetime. It argues that they produce both difficulty and opportunity for imagining love plots within the context of increasingly assertive biological and naturalistic accounts of human beings

Prevalence of liver fluke (Fasciola hepatica) in wild Red Deer (Cervus elaphus): coproantigen ELISA is a practicable alternative to faecal egg counting for surveillance in remote populations

Red deer (Cervus elaphus) are hosts of liver fluke (Fasciola hepatica); yet, prevalence is rarely quantified in wild populations. Testing fresh samples from remote regions by faecal examination (FE) can be logistically challenging; hence, we appraise frozen storage and the use of a coproantigen ELISA (cELISA) for F. hepatica surveillance. We also present cELISA surveillance data for red deer from the Highlands of Scotland. Diagnoses in faecal samples (207 frozen, 146 fresh) were compared using a cELISA and by FE. For each storage method (frozen or fresh), agreement between the two diagnostics was estimated at individual and population levels, where population prevalence was stratified into cohorts (e.g., by sampling location). To approximate sensitivity and specificity, 65 post-slaughter whole liver examinations were used as a reference. At the individual level, FE and cELISA diagnoses agreed moderately (κfrozen = 0.46; κfresh = 0.51), a likely reflection of their underlying principles. At the population level, FE and cELISA cohort prevalence correlated strongly (Pearson’s R = 0.89, p < 0.0001), reflecting good agreement on relative differences between cohort prevalence. In frozen samples, prevalence by cELISA exceeded FE overall (42.8% vs. 25.8%) and in 9/12 cohorts, alluding to differences in sensitivity; though, in fresh samples, no significant difference was found. In 959 deer tested by cELISA across the Scottish Highlands, infection prevalence ranged from 9.6% to 53% by sampling location. We highlight two key advantages of cELISA over FE: i) the ability to store samples long term (frozen) without apparent loss in diagnostic power; and ii) reduced labour and the ability to process large batches. Further evaluation of cELISA sensitivity in red deer, where a range of fluke burdens can be obtained, is desirable. In the interim, the cELISA is a practicable diagnostic for F. hepatica surveillance in red deer, and its application here has revealed considerable geographic, temporal, sex and age related differences in F. hepatica prevalence in wild Scottish Highland red deer

Rent Seeking Behavior and Optimal Taxation of Pollution in Shallow Lakes

In this paper we extend earlier work on the economics of shallow lakes by M\"aler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (2003) to the case where two communities have incommensurable preferences about lake eutrophication. In the case of incommensurable preferences interest group behavior arises, we therefore consider the case where society is divided into two interest groups and is thus unable to agree on a single management objective. In particular, the communities that share the use of the lake disagree on the relative importance of the shallow lake acting as a waste sink for phosphorus run-off as opposed to other ecosystem services. A dynamic game in which communities maximize their use of the lake results in a Nash equilibrium where the lake is in a eutrophic state when in fact the Pareto optimum would be for the lake to be in an oligotrophic state. Our paper differs from previous work by considering two communities or interest groups with different preferences for environmental services. The tax that would induce, in a noncooperative context, all of society's members to behave in such a way as to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome is derived under the assumption that a social planner does not favor one community or another. We then ask whether or not such a tax rate would in fact be implemented if each community were able to bear political pressure on the social planner and the social planner were a public representative seeking re-election. In this case both types of communities lobby to have their preferred level of tax applied based on their relative preferences for a clean lake and phosphorus loading. The effects of the lobbying on the application of the optimal tax are investigated numerically for particular values of relative preferences and the relative size of each group. The representative seeking election proposes a different tax rate in order to maximize their probability of electoral success. This problem is solved numerically assuming that the lake is in a eutrophic equilibrium. It is shown that political representatives have an incentive to propose tax rates that are insufficient to achieve a return to an oligotrophic steady-stat