Stock options as incentive contracts and dividend policy

Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs

Anreizwirkungen und Bewertung von Erfolgsbeteiligungen im Portefeuillemanagement

Performance fees for portfolio managers are designed to align the managers' goals with those of the investors and to motivate managers to aquire "superior" information and to make better investment decisions. A part of the literature analyzes performance fees on the basis of market valuation. In this article it is shown that market valuation faces a dilemma: on the one hand, the conditions which allow for market valuation imply that the portfolio manager perfectly hedges the performance fee. This in turn implies severe restrictions on the incentive effects of the performance fee. In particular, the fee does not motivate the manager to use superior information for investment decisions concerning the managed portfolio. On the other hand, better incentives can only be generated under conditions which exclude market valuation. In this case, the analysis has to be based on expected utility valuation. Keywords: performance fees, portfolio managers, "superior" information, market valuation, incentive effect

Die Bedeutung der Periodenerfolgsrechnung für die Investitionssteuerung : der Fall ungleicher Zeitpräferenzen

Der internen Unternehmensrechnung werden im allgemeinen zwei Funktionen zugeschrieben (Ewert/Wagenhofer (1997), S. 6): Sie soll einerseits Informationen für Planungszwecke bereitstellen, andererseits der Verhaltenssteuerung von Entscheidungsträgern in hierarchischen, dezentralen Organisationen dienen. In der jüngeren Vergangenheit ist die Verhaltenssteuerungsfunktion zunehmend in das Blickfeld theoretischer und praktischer Überlegungen gerückt. Gleichzeitig läßt sich eine verstärkte Marktwertorientierung deutscher Unternehmen in der Unternehmenspolitik wie auch in der internen Unternehmensrechnung beobachten. Die betriebswirtschaftliche Literatur hat darauf mit einer wachsenden Zahl von Beiträgen reagiert, die die Marktwertorientierung der internen Unternehmensrechnung vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Verhaltenssteuerungsfunktion diskutieren.1) Das Interesse dieses Beitrags gilt der Rolle der Periodenerfolgsrechnung als Teil der internen Unternehmensrechnung bei der marktwertorientierten Steuerung von Investitionsentscheidungen über Periodenerfolgsbeteiligungen. Zentrale Bedeutung kommt hierbei dem Residualgewinnkonzept aufgrund seiner Kompatibilität mit dem Marktwertkriterium (vgl. Abschnitt 5.1) zu. Dieses Konzept hat in der Praxis unter dem Namen Economic Value Added zunehmend an Popularität - insbesondere auch als Grundlage für Erfolgsbeteiligungen (vgl. z.B. Stewart (1991), Ehrbar (1998), O'Hanlon/Peasnell (1998) ) - gewonnen. Gezeigt werden soll, welche Vorteile die Periodisierung von Cash Flows im Rahmen einer Periodenerfolgsrechnung auf der Basis des Residualgewinnkonzepts gegenüber einer unbelassenen Cash Flow-Rechnung bei der Steuerung von Investitionsentscheidungen über finanzielle Anreizsysteme bietet. Betrachtet wird eine einfache bilaterale Principal-Agent-Beziehung: Eine delegierende Instanz (Prinzipal) beauftragt einen Entscheidungsträger (Agenten) mit Investitionsentscheidungen und versucht, dessen Investitionsverhalten über eine „Erfolgsbeteiligung“ in ihrem Sinne auf das Ziel der Maximierung des Barwertes aller Cash Flows gerichtet zu beeinflussen. Die Rolle des internen Rechnungswesens ist dabei auf die Bereitstellung der Bemessungsgrundlage für die Erfolgsbeteiligung beschränkt. Es wird gezeigt, daß die Periodisierung von Cash Flows und die Zugrundelegung periodisierter Größen bei der Investitionssteuerung zu besseren Lösungen des Steuerungsproblems des Prinzipals führt als eine reine Cash Flow- Beteiligung. ...This paper considers the role of accrual accounting in providing investment incentives. In a simple multiperiod principal-agent-framework, it is assumed that the agent is wealth constrained and that he discounts future cash flows at a higher discount rate than the principal. The principal designs a linear performance fee based on either cash flows or residual income. Conditions are analyzed under which accrual accounting improves the solution to the principal's problem in comparison with a cash flow based performance fee. The role of accounting lies in (i) improving cash flow-sharing between principal and agent over time and (ii) improving investment incentives. It is shown that the potential sources of conflict which are considered generally lead to „traditional“ accounting rules

Stock Options as Incentive Contract and Dividend Policy

Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs

Leistungsanreize durch Aktien oder Optionen? Eine Diskussion des State of the Art

Aktienoptionspläne für Vorstände sind in der jüngsten Vergangenheit stark in die öffentliche Kritik geraten. Parallel dazu wird eine intensive wissenschaftliche Diskussion über ihre Effizienz als Anreizinstrument geführt. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die (überwiegend numerischen) Ergebnisse jüngerer Beiträge zu den Leistungsanreizen aktienkursorientierter Vergütungsinstrumente. Die Ergebnisse der Beiträge werden vor dem Hintergrund des Grundmodells der Principal-Agent-Theorie diskutiert und interpretiert

Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry in Budget Negotiations

Participative budgeting processes are an important element of management control systems in many firms. The literature on participative budgeting has studied the role of information asymmetry. However, prior contributions do not differentiate between superior uncertainty about future profitability arising from information asymmetry between the superior and the subordinate (one-sided uncertainty) and superior uncertainty arising from a volatile environment in which even the subordinate does not know the future profitability (common uncertainty). While both kinds of superior uncertainty are equivalent from an economic perspective as the superior cannot expect the subordinate to convey private information under a slack-inducing bonus scheme, they may strongly differ with regard the psychological factors affecting behavior in these settings. We conduct a laboratory experiment to disentangle these effects. We find that the psychological effect, but not the economic effect, increases conflict in budget negotiations and hurts performance. Specifically, initial negotiation positions are more distant under one-sided than under common uncertainty, because superiors are more contending when information is asymmetric. As a consequence, negotiation failures are more frequent. Furthermore, when setting budgets following negotiation disagreement, we find that superiors account for the risk of losing the subordinate’s motivation under common uncertainty but not under one-sided uncertainty. Finally, after controlling for financial incentives, subordinates’ negative performance reactions to negotiation disagreement is particularly large under one-sided uncertainty

Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry in Budget Negotiations

Participative budgeting processes are an important element of management control systems in many firms. The literature on participative budgeting has studied the role of information asymmetry. However, prior contributions do not differentiate between superior uncertainty about future profitability arising from information asymmetry between the superior and the subordinate (one-sided uncertainty) and superior uncertainty arising from a volatile environment in which even the subordinate does not know the future profitability (common uncertainty). While both kinds of superior uncertainty are equivalent from an economic perspective as the superior cannot expect the subordinate to convey private information under a slack-inducing bonus scheme, they may strongly differ with regard the psychological factors affecting behavior in these settings. We conduct a laboratory experiment to disentangle these effects. We find that the psychological effect, but not the economic effect, increases conflict in budget negotiations and hurts performance. Specifically, initial negotiation positions are more distant under one-sided than under common uncertainty, because superiors are more contending when information is asymmetric. As a consequence, negotiation failures are more frequent. Furthermore, when setting budgets following negotiation disagreement, we find that superiors account for the risk of losing the subordinate’s motivation under common uncertainty but not under one-sided uncertainty. Finally, after controlling for financial incentives, subordinates’ negative performance reactions to negotiation disagreement is particularly large under one-sided uncertainty

After the Stock Options Boom: Changes in Equity-Based Pay Following the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS 2

This paper investigates the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard 2 (hereafter, IFRS 2) on firms' choices between alternative executive compensation instruments. With a unique, hand-collected dataset that contains design elements of stock option plans, we find that the adoption of IFRS 2 affects both the decision to keep or to give up stock options and the choice of alternative equity compensation instruments. In contrast to recent evidence from the United States, we find that the majority of firms replacing stock options by other equity instruments switched to performance shares, not to restricted stock. Our dataset allows us to relate firms' reactions to IFRS 2 to the three major rationales explaining stock option compensation practice, namely, optimal contracting, managerial rent extraction, and perceived cost. Our results suggest that all three rationales contribute to explaining changes in compensation design because firms with sophisticated option plans tend to keep their options, whereas design decisions by firms abandoning options are related to a lack of shareholder power

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant