International remittance flows and the economic and social consequences of COVID-19

One of the possible consequences of the tightening of international borders during and after pandemic COVID-19 is what the World Economic Forum refers to as the ‘throttling’ of international (labour) migration. While this will have a profound macroeconomic impact on the global economy, the potential impact on remittances on families, communities and national economies could be equally marked. We present a chord diagram to visualize the latest inter- (and intra-) regional global data on international remittances. This graphic shows the degree of the interconnectedness of the ‘global economy of work’ and the extent to which negative health, economic, social or political changes for migrants in one territory will have profound consequences far across the world

Measuring inequalities of development at the sub-national level: From the human development index to the human life indicator

Despite being one of the most common measures of development, the Human Development Index [HDI] has been much criticized for its consistency, data requirements, difficulty of interpretation and trade-offs between indicators. The ‘Human Life Indicator’ [HLI] has been proposed as a ‘simple effective means’ of measuring development and, more specifically, as a viable alternative to the HDI. Reducing inequalities within countries is a core component of the Sustainable Development Goals; yet sub-national HDIs are subject to the same criticisms as national level indices (potentially more so). Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate ‘proof of concept’ in terms of the systematic application of the HLI to measure development at the subnational level. Using life tables for the United States of America, we calculate, for the first time, HLIs for each state for the period 1959–2016. This country was chosen for the comparatively long run of available sub-national life tables. We also calculate the extent to which mortality is distributed across the life course—a further measure of inequality and the role of the social determinants of health. The HLI clearly shows how striking regional inequalities exist across the United States. We find that HLI and HDI for the most recent time period are strongly correlated. The analysis demonstrates that HLI represents an effective means of measuring development at the sub-national level. Compared to HDI, HLIs are characterized by simpler calculation and interpretation; fewer data requirements; less measurement error; more consistency over time; and no trade-offs between components. A current challenge of producing sub-national HLIs is the lack of comprehensive civil registration and vital statistics systems in many parts of the Global South from which sub-national life tables can be generated. However, as more and more countries develop these systems the potential to produce HLIs will inevitably increase

Better way to measure ageing in East Asia that takes life expectancy into account

Aim The aim of the study is to improve the measurement of ageing taking into account characteristics of populations and in particular changes in life expectancy. Method Using projected life tables, we calculate prospective old age dependency ratios (POADRs) to 2060, placing the boundary to old age at a moving point with a fixed remaining life expectancy (RLE) for all countries of East Asia. Results POADRs grow less rapidly than old age dependency ratios (OADRs). For example, in the Republic of Korea, the OADR is forecast to increase from around 0.1 in 1980 to around 0.8 in 2060, while the POADR is forecast to increase from around 0.1 to 0.4 over the same period. Conclusion Policy makers may wish to take into account the fact that the increases in measures of ageing will be slower when those measures are adjusted for changes in life expectancy

Prospective measures of aging for Central and South America

By conventional measures, it is often remarked that Central and South America is one of the fastest aging geographic regions in the world. In recent years, however, scholars have sought to problematize the orthodox measures and concepts employed in the aging literature. By not taking dynamic changes in life expectancy into account, measures which hold chronological age constant (e.g. defining a boundary to old age at 60 or 65) represent a very narrow view of population aging. Furthermore, such constant measures may misrepresent differences between territories when performing a comparative analysis. Prospective measures based on the number of years until death present an alternative approach which can adapt to dynamic changes in life expectancy and differences over time and space. The objective of this paper, then, is to apply the new ‘prospective’ measures of aging to the territories of Central and South America. We calculate prospective median age; an alternative old-age threshold based on the age at which remaining life expectancy is 15 years, and calculate prospective old-age dependency ratio for 1950–2100 using estimated and projected life tables from the latest iteration of the UN’s World Population Prospects. These new measures present a very different view of aging in Central and South America. While there are significant differences across countries, the pace and scale of aging are considerably slower and diminished when compared to standard, orthodox measures based on fixed chronological ages. Applying these new measures can not only serve to present a more realistic view of aging which maps onto demographic reality but can also serve to reconceptualize and reframe the issue as something which is far more manageable (e.g. through institutional reform) than is often perceived to be

Towards a reconceptualising of population ageing in emerging markets

Variously defined, the ‘emerging markets’ [EMs] are frequently held up as thecountries that will shape global economic development in the 21st century. However,it is also often said that population ageing could limit growth in many EMs. Inthis paper, we explore the conventional measurements employed to demonstratepopulation ageing in EMs, and then move on to discuss whether these measurementsare, indeed, ‘fit for purpose’ when studying EMs. Drawing on the literatureon ‘prospective ageing’ (pioneered by Sanderson and Scherbov), we present analternative set of ageing measurements based on a boundary for ‘dependency’drawn from remaining life expectancy rather than chronological age. Using thesemeasurements, population ageing – at least as defined here – can be seen as a muchmore manageable prospect for many EMs. We also examine the challenges andthe opportunities for EMs associated with population ageing, and consider theirpotential advantages relative to the EU and North America in managing this trend

Is half the world’s population really below ‘replacement-rate’?

A perennial activity of demographers is to estimate the percentage of the world’s population which is above or below the ‘replacement rate of fertility’ [RRF]. However, most attempts to do so have been based upon, at best, oversimplified, or at worst, simply incorrect assumptions about what RRF actually is. The objective of this paper is to calculate the proportion of the world’s population living in countries with observed period total fertility rates [TFR] below the respective calculated RRF, rather than the commonly used measure of 2.1. While the differences between comparing TFR to 2.1 or RRF are relatively modest in many periods when considering populations at the national level, a significant difference can be observed in the near future based upon India’s fertility and mortality trajectories. Our exercise represents a means of ‘correcting the record’ using the most up-to-date evidence and using the correct protocol

China's low fertility may not hinder future prosperity

China’s low fertility is often presented as a major factor which will hinder its prosperity in the medium to long term. This is based on the assumed negative consequences of an increasing old-age dependency ratio: a simplistic measure of relative changing age structures. Based on this view, policies to increase fertility are being proposed after decades of birth restriction policies. Here, we argue that a purely age structure–based reasoning which disregards labor force participation and education attainment may be highly misleading. While fertility has indeed fallen to low levels, human capital accumulation has been very strong—especially among younger cohorts. Factoring in the effects of labor force participation and educational attainment on productivity, a measure called “productivity-weighted labor force dependency ratio” can more accurately capture the economic implications of demographic change. When using this ratio, a much more optimistic picture of the economic (and social) future of China can be envisaged

Reframing policy responses to population aging in Iran

Iran is aging rapidly and is expected to see negative population growth rates later this century. This change is generating significant concern for policymakers, whose response is to seek ‘demographic solutions’ to these issues: raise the fertility rate, decrease the divorce rate, and promote marriage among young people. Part of these policies has entailed curtailing access to free family planning services. This ‘call and response’ approach is unlikely to succeed in its stated aim, as it over-simplifies the real challenges of population aging as well as the multiple dimensions of population change. Such policies derive from simple representations of demographic change, most notably using the old-age dependency ratio. Using a microsimulation model, this paper suggests that increasing Iran’s currently low female labor force participation and translating educational gains into rising productivity is a more effective means of responding to the challenges of population aging, even under low fertility conditions. The advancement on previous such microsimulation exercises lies in the fact that this study explicitly considers the comparison between raising fertility and increasing female economic empowerment to offset population aging in a setting characterized by an overt pronatalist policy system. In tandem with reforming stressed institutional systems (such as the pension system), releasing the full potential of Iran’s existing (and future) human capital—especially of its women—is a far more effective policy direction than fertility-promoting policies

COVID-19 and excess mortality in Russia: Regional estimates of life expectancy losses in 2020 and excess deaths in 2021

Accurately counting the human cost of the COVID-19 at both the national and regional level is a policy priority. The Russian Federation currently reports one of the higher COVID-19 mortality rates in the world; but estimates of mortality differ significantly. Using a statistical method accounting for changes in the population age structure, we present the first national and regional estimates of excess mortality for 2021; calculations of excess mortality by age, gender, and urban/rural status for 2020; and mean remaining years of life expectancy lost at the regional level. We estimate that there were 351,158 excess deaths in 2020 and 678,022 in 2021 in the Russian Federation; and, in 2020, around 2.0 years of life expectancy lost. While the Russian Federation exhibits very high levels of excess mortality compared to other countries, there is a wide degree of regional variation: in 2021, excess deaths expressed as a percentage of expected deaths at the regional level range from 27% to 52%. Life expectancy loss is generally greater for males; while excess mortality is greater in urban areas. For Russia as whole, an average person who died due to the pandemic in 2020 would have otherwise lived for a further 14 more years (and as high as 18 years in some regions), disproving the widely held view that excess mortality during the pandemic period was concentrated among those with few years of life remaining–especially for females. At a regional level, less densely populated, more remote regions, rural regions appear to have fared better regarding excess mortality and life expectancy loss–however, a part of this differential could be owing to measurement issues. The calculations demonstrate more clearly the true degree of the human cost of the pandemic in the Russian Federation

Measuring Human Capital with Productivity-Weighted Labor Force: Methodology and Projections for China, India, the United States, and the European Union

This working paper provides a comprehensive overview of the methodology used to calculate a standardized and internationally comparable productivity-weighted labor force (PWLF) measure that takes into account both the education structure of the population and the quality of the educational system. Education-specific weights are calculated with a Mincerian earnings function on pooled data from all IPUMS-I censuses containing information on education, labor force status, and income. The education parameters are interacted with the countries' average educational attainment to account for the dependence of returns to education on the number of workers sharing that education level. Country and time specific adjustment factors for education quality are derived from skills assessment surveys. To calculate the productivity-weighted labor force size, these adjusted weights are then applied to labor force estimates and projections. The analytical value of the PWLF is validated making use of prediction exercise for GDP growth applied to a panel dataset covering all countries of the world from 1970 to 2015 for which data are available. Finally, the paper provides a practical application by forecasting PWLF figures for China, India, the United States, and the European Union from 2020 to 2100. These forecasts are compared against other population indicators (total population size, working-age population, and labor force size), highlighting the importance of population heterogeneity in the analysis of demographic trends