When white working-class men feel society no longer values them

The Brexit referendum exposed deep political divisions within British society, and more than a year after that vote, those divisions show no signs of disappearing

Who Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies

While dislike of opposing parties, that is, affective polarization, is a defining feature of contemporary politics, research on this topic largely centers on the United States. We introduce an approach that analyzes affective polarization between pairs of parties, bridging the US two-party system and multiparty systems in other democracies. Analyzing survey data from twenty Western democracies since the mid-1990s, first, we show that partisans' dislike of out-parties is linked to elite policy disagreements on economic issues and, increasingly over time, also to cultural issues. Secondly, we argue and empirically demonstrate that governing coalition partners in parliamentary democracies display much warmer feelings toward each other than we would expect based on elite policy (dis)agreements. Third, we show that radical right parties are disliked much more intensely than we would expect based on policy disputes and coalition arrangements. These findings highlight the policy-based and institutional underpinnings of affective polarization

Can't We All Just Get Along? How Women MPs Can Ameliorate Affective Polarization in Western Publics

Concern over partisan resentment and hostility has increased across Western democracies. Despite growing attention to affective polarization, existing research fails to ask whether who serves in office affects mass-level interparty hostility. Drawing on scholarship on women's behavior as elected representatives and citizens' beliefs about women politicians, we posit the women MPs affective bonus hypothesis: all else being equal, partisans display warmer affect toward out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs. We evaluate this claim with an original dataset on women's presence in 125 political parties in 20 Western democracies from 1996 to 2017 combined with survey data on partisans' affective ratings of political opponents. We show that women's representation is associated with lower levels of partisan hostility and that both men and women partisans react positively to out-party women MPs. Increasing women's parliamentary presence could thus mitigate cross-party hostility

Modern American populism: Analyzing the economics behind the Silent Majority, the Tea Party and Trumpism

This article researches populism, more specifically, Modern American Populism (MAP), constructed of white, rural, and economically oppressed reactionarianism, which was borne out of the political upheaval of the 1960’s Civil Rights movement. The research looks to explain the causes of populism and what leads voters to support populist movements and politicians. The research focuses on economic anxiety as the main cause but also examines an alternative theory of racial resentment. In an effort to answer the question, what causes populist movements and motivations, I apply a research approach that utilizes qualitative and quantitative methods. There is an examination of literature that defines populism, its causes and a detailed discussion of the case studies, including the 1972 election of Richard Nixon; the Tea Party election of 2010; and the 2016 election of Donald Trump. In addition, statistical data analysis was run using American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys associated with each specific case study. These case studies were chosen because they most represent forms of populist movements in modern American history. While ample qualitative evidence suggested support for the hypothesis that economic anxiety is a necessary condition for populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, the Tea Party and Trump, the statistical data only supported the hypothesis in two cases, 2010 and 2016, with 1972 coming back inconclusive. The data also suggested that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in 2010 and 2016, while having no significant effect in 1972 in either case. This suggests that further research needs to be conducted into additional populist case studies, as well as an examination into the role economic anxiety and economic crises play on racial resentment and racially motivated voting behavior

Many Ways to Be Right: The Unbundling of European Mass Attitudes and Partisan Asymmetries Across the Ideological Divide

How do individuals with conflicting attitudes on different issues – those with conservative attitudes on some issues but progressive attitudes on other issues – form their partisan allegiances? In examining this question, my dissertation advances an argument about the asymmetry in European mass attitudes across the left-right divide. I argue that when individuals connect their political attitudes to left-right ideological labels they have many ways to be right – yet mostly one way to be left. The first section of the dissertation argues that the shift to the knowledge economy has driven a wedge between economic and cultural conservatism in mass attitudes. This is due to the increased linkage between income and education within the knowledge economy. These two factors push individual-level attitudes in opposite directions: while higher income is associated with economic conservatism, higher education is associated with progressive cultural values. The analysis of survey data from West European countries documents a decline in the correlations between economic and cultural attitudes during 1990-2008, with variations by the size of the knowledge-intensive sector. In the second section I develop the concept of right-wing multivocality, or the ability of the right to speak in multiple voices. I show that cross-pressured voters (those who are conservative on some issues but progressive on other issues) are more likely to support the right: while support for the left requires progressive attitudes on all issues, it is enough to be conservative on one issue to support the right. The third section zooms in on the mainstream center-right. I show that while cross-pressured voters are the most likely to support the right – they are the least likely to support the center-right. I then examine the implications of different center-right’s strategies to these parties’ share of the vote and support across demographic groups. I show that the center-right has more to gain by courting market cosmopolitans (economically conservative, culturally progressive voters) than by courting welfare chauvinists (economically progressive, culturally conservative voters). Interviews with party elites shed light on the considerations – such as time horizons – that may push center-right parties to prefer one strategy to the other.Governmen

Replication data for: The Unholy Trinity: Immigration, Unemployment and Extremism in Europe, 1980-2002

In this paper we focus on the ways in which immigration and unemployment interact and affect the probability of voting for an extreme right (ER) party in Europe. We begin by replicating the results from “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002” by Arzheimer (2009), which finds that immigration (measured by the number of asylum seekers) and unemployment have positive marginal effects and, counterintuitively, a negative interaction effect. We challenge Arzheimer’s (2009) employment of asylum seekers as a proxy for immigration and instead suggest two alternate, more direct measures: net migration and percent of foreign population. Using these new measures, we find a positive interaction effect between immigration and unemployment

Replication Data for: Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel

Replication files for Enos, Ryan D. and Noam Gidron. "Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel," American Political Science Review

Intergroup Behavioral Strategies as Contextually Determined: Experimental Evidence from Israel

replication files for Enos, Ryan D. and Noam Gidron. "Intergroup Behavioral Strategies as Contextually Determined: Experimental Evidence from Israel," The Journal of Politics

Do changes in material circumstances drive support for populist radical parties? Panel data evidence from the Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007–2015

Political developments since the 2008 financial crisis have sparked renewed interest in the electoral implications of economic downturns. Research describes a correlation between adverse economic conditions and support for radical parties campaigning on the populist promise to retake the country from a corrupt elite. But does the success of radical parties following economic crises rely on people who are directly affected? To answer this question, we examine whether individual-level changes in economic circumstances drive support for radical parties across the ideological divide. Analysing eight waves of panel data collected in the Netherlands, before, during, and after the Great Recession (2007-2015), we demonstrate that people who experienced an income loss became more supportive of the radical left but not of the radical right. Looking at these parties' core concerns, we find that income loss increased support for income redistribution championed by the radical left, but less so for the anti-immigration policies championed by the radical right. Our study establishes more directly than extant research the micro-foundations of support for radical parties across the ideological divide