Evolving Moral Knowledge

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2009, given by Allan Gibbard, an American philosopher

Reply to Hawthorne

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/74021/1/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00150.x.pd

Reasons to Reject Allowing

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73518/1/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00251.x.pd

Normative and Recognitional Concepts

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73386/1/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00148.x.pd

Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43408/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00990092.pd

Disparate goods and Rawls' difference principle: A social choice theoretic treatment

Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls says, but that makes use of no index. Instead of invoking an index of primary social goods, the principle formulated here invokes a partial ordering of prospects for opportunities.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43843/1/11238_2004_Article_BF00126381.pd

Weakly self-ratifying strategies: Comments on McClennen

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43407/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00571325.pd

Preference strength and two kinds of ordinalism

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47968/1/11406_2006_Article_BF02378813.pd