International Competition, Growth and Optimal R&D Subsidies

In this paper I examine the effects of international technological competition on innovation, growth, and optimal R&D subsidies. I focus on a particular dimension of competition: the share of industries where domestic and foreign research firms compete for innovation. In a version of the fully-endogenous quality-ladder growth model I show that the effect of competition on innovation and growth depends on the specification of the research technology. Secondly, I find that increases in foreign competition trigger a business-stealing effect that reduces income and welfare and, regardless of the innovation effect, raises the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Intuitively, the higher the threat of international competition the more instrumental innovation subsidies will be in helping domestic incumbent firms to retain their shares of the global market. Thirdly, I perform a quantitative exercise: I first build an empirical index of international technological competition and find that in the OECD countries the share of competitive sectors increased from 35 percent in 1973 to 70 percent in 1989. Then, I use this evidence to evaluate the optimality of the U.S. R&D subsidy response to observed competition in that period. I find a welfare loss of the observed policy, relative to the optimal, ranging between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption. Finally, I extend the model to account for strategic policy complementarities and show that the positive effect of competition on the optimal subsidy is robust to this set up. In addition, I find that competition increases the benefits from R&D policy cooperation.international competition, trade and gowth, endogenous technical change, strategic industrial policy

International Schumpeterian Competition and Optimal R&D subsidies

This paper studies the welfare effects of international competition in the market for innovations, and analyzes how competition affects the costs and the benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. I set up a two-country quality-ladder growth model where the leader, the home country, has R&D firms innovating in all sectors of the economy, and the follower, the foreign country, shows innovating firms only in a subset of industries. The measure of the set of sectors where R&D workers from both countries compete for innovation determines the scale of international Schumpeterian competition. Both governments engage in a strategic R&D subsidy game and respond optimally to changes in competition. For a given level of subsidies, increases in foreign competition raise the quality of goods available (growth effect) and lowers domestic profits (business-stealing effect); the overall effect of competition on domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting forces. When governments play a strategic subsidy game, increases in foreign competition trigger a defensive innovation policy mechanism that raises the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Cooperation in subsidies leads both countries to set higher subsidies. Finally, while cooperation is beneficial for the global economy, there exists a threshold level of competition below which the home country experiences welfare losses under cooperation.international competition, endogenous technical change, growth theory, strategic R&D subsidies, international policy cooperation

International Competition and U.S. R&D Subsidies: A Quantitative Welfare Analysis

The geographical distribution of R&D investment changes dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1970s U.S. firms are the uncontested world leaders in R&D investment in most manufacturing sectors. Later, led by Japan and Europe, foreign firms start challenging American R&D leadership in many sectors of the economy. In this period of increasing competition we also observe a substantial increase in the U.S. R&D subsidy. In a version of the multi-country quality ladder growth model I study the effects of foreign R&D competition on domestic welfare and on the optimal R&D subsidy. I build a new empirical index of international R&D rivalry that can be used to perform quantitative analysis in this type of frameworks. In a calibrated version of the model I focus on the period 1979-1991 and perform the following quantitative exercises: first, I evaluate the quantitative effects of the observed increase in foreign R&D competition on U.S. welfare. I find that the positive growth effect and the negative business-stealing effect of foreign competition on U.S. welfare substantially balance each other, and the overall welfare effect of competition is negligible - less then 1 percent of per-capita consumption. Moreover, using estimates of the effective U.S. R&D subsidy rate, I compute the distance from optimality of the observed subsidy at each level of competition. I find that international competition increases the optimal subsidy and that, surprisingly, the U.S. subsidy observed in the data is fairly close to the optimal subsidy.international competition, R&D-driven growth theory, strategic R&D policy, international trade and growth

Government spending composition, technical change and wage inequality

In this paper we argue that government spending played a significant role in stimulating the wave of innovation that hit the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, as well as the simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the late 1970’s U.S. policy makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by increasing the market-size of innovative firms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy tool. We build a quality-ladder non- scale growth model with heterogeneous industries and endogenous supply of skills, and show that increases in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raise the wage of skilled workers and, at the same time, stimulate human capital accumulation. A calibrated version of the model suggests that government policy explains between 12 and 15 percent of the observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1976-91.R&D-driven growth theory, heteregeneous industries, fiscal policy composition, innovation policy, wage inequality, educational choice.

Technology Policy and Wage Inequality

In this paper we argue that government procurement policy played a role in stimulating the wave of innovation that hit the US economy in the 1980s, as well as the simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the early 1980s U.S. policy makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by increasing the market-size of innovative …rms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy tool. We build a quality-ladders non-scale growth model with heterogeneous industries and endogenous supply of skills, and show both theoretically and empirically that increases in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raises the wage of skilled workers and, at the same time, stimulates human capital accumulation. A calibrated version of the model suggests that government policy explains up to 32 percent of the observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1978-91.R&D-driven growth theory, government procurement, wage inequality, educational choice, technology policy.

Globalization, Wage Polarization, and the Unstable Great Ratio

The US labour market has experienced a remarkable polarization in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, recent empirical work has documented a sharp increase in the wealth to income ratio in that period. Contemporary to these inequality trends, the US faced a fast technological catch-up as European countries and especially Japan drastically improved their global innovation and patenting activity. Is foreign technological convergence an important source of the recent evolution of the US wage and employment structure? Can it contribute shaping the dynamics of wealth-to-income ratio? To answer these questions, we set up a Schumpeterian model of endogenous technological progress with two asymmetric countries, heterogeneous workers, and endogenous skill formation. High ability people acquire education and become skilled, those with intermediate abilities work as unskilled workers in production jobs, and those at the bottom of the ability distribution work in service occupations. Service workers provide personal services allowing their employers to save working time. In equilibrium, only skilled workers buy personal services. Fiercer foreign competition triggered by technological catching up shifts production jobs abroad and forces domestic firms to innovate more. Hence, the employment share of production workers shrinks, while the demand for both high skilled and service sector workers rises, thus increasing polarization. Calibrating the model to match key facts of the US economy, we find that foreign technological catching-up observed between the late 1970s and early 1990s reproduces a non-negligible part of US wage polarization and substantial part of the increase in the wealth-to-income ratio in that period

Globalization and market power

Economic theory suggests that the markup is a key measure of market power and that its relationship with trade is rich and complex. Trade liberalisation can reduce markups via a decline in the residual domestic demand but also increase it via several channels. Trade-induced increases in competition leads to more concentrated markets via entry and exit, putting upward pressure on markups. Market shares reallocation toward larger, more powerful firms, increase the aggregate markup. We use a large episode of trade liberalisation in Spain to test this rich set of transmission mechanisms linking trade and markups. The overall effect of reductions in Spanish import tariffs on firm-level and aggregate markups is pro-competitive but we find evidence of offsetting effects via the other channels. In particular, we show that firms with high intangible investment experience a weaker reduction in markups. Sup-porting the theoretical insight that the feedback effect via concentration is stronger with higher barriers to entry. Increases in markups are also produced by reallocations effects but the results are weaker, suggesting that the link between trade and markups is mostly driven by changes at the intensive margin

Trade, Firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

JEL Classi.cation: F12, F13, O31, O41.-- Trabajo presentado a: "Kiel International Economics Meeting: Globalization, Finance and Firm Dynamics" celebrado en Alemania en 2010; "V REDg DGEM Workshop" celebrado en Madrid en 2010.The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.Spanish Ministry of Education (SEJ2007-65552)Peer reviewe

Global innovation races, offshoring and wage inequality

In the 1970s and 1980s the US position as the global technological leader was increasingly challenged by Japan and Europe. In those years the US skill premium and residual wage inequality increased substantially. This paper presents a two-region quality ladders growth model where the lagging economy progressively catches up with the leader. As the innovation gap closes, the advanced country experiences fiercer foreign technological competition which forces its firms to innovate more. Faster technical change increases the skill premium and residual inequality. Offshoring production and innovation plays a key role in shaping the link between international competition and inequality