Monetary policy and financial stability

We study optimal monetary policy under a constant policy rate mainly for simplicity. In our numerical simulations, optimal monetary policy calls for a departure from a Friedman rule.Esta tesis en PDF no tiene permisos por parte del autor para ser reproducida. Puedes venir a consultarla a la Biblioteca Di Tella pero recuerda que no podrás copiarla, ni grabarla en ningún dispositivo, ni enviarla, ni imprimirla. La consulta se hace solo bajo reserva escribiendo a [email protected] eres el autor de la tesis y quieres dar tu autorización para la reproducción, puedes ponerte en contacto con [email protected]

Essays on Monetary and Macro-prudential Policy

This dissertation comprises three essays that investigate the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the interaction between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. In Chapter 1, I examine the costs and benefits of coordinating monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. I obtain that the coordination between monetary and macro-prudential policies helps reducing the risk of entering into a financial crisis; helps also speeding up the exit from the crisis, if any; but implies further variability in inflation and in employment gap which is costly. In Chapter 2, I explore the interaction between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy in economies in which the natural rate of return occasionally attains negative values. In those economies, the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate occasionally prevents monetary policy from conducting its conventional task of replicating the natural rate of return with the nominal rate. I obtain that tighter macro-prudential policies, that restrict intermediary leverage more severely, mitigate the aggregate fluctuations resulting from frictions in financial markets; lift the natural rate of return; and whence facilitate the conventional task of monetary policy. In Chapter 3, I revisit the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the context of a financially developed economy in which the provisions of settlement services and of financial intermediary services are highly interrelated. To this end, I develop a framework in which the joint provision of settlement and financial intermediary services creates a liquidity management problem at the intermediary level, and a corresponding demand for liquid assets. I analyze the real effects of unconventional monetary policies that target the width of the corridor between the discount window rate and interest rate on excess reserves. I obtain that the real effects of a narrower corridor in general depend on how liquid the financial intermediary system is

Oligopolios mixtos: La firma pública como un instrumento para dificultar la colusión

Esta tesis solo está en formato papel por lo que se debe consultar en la propia Biblioteca Di Tella. La consulta se hace solo bajo reserva escribiendo a [email protected] tesis no tiene permisos por parte del autor para ser reproducida, por lo que no se puede fotocopiar, ni fotografiar ni reproducir con ningún medio. Si eres el autor de la tesis y quieres dar tu autorización para la reproducción, puedes ponerte en contacto con [email protected]

Sovereign Defaults and The Political Economy Of Market Reaccess

Following a sovereign default, governments are usually unable to borrow from international credit markets for some time. The period of "exclusion" has varied from more than twenty years following some default events to less than a year in others. Using a unique dataset on sovereign bond issuances and syndicated bank loans between 1980 and 2000, this paper studies empirically the determinants of the duration of exclusion following a sovereign default and presents a DSGE model of endogeneous sovereign borrowing that rationalizes our key empirical findings. In particular, we find that countries either reaccess the markets in the first years after a default or have to wait a much longer time to do it. We also find that political stability significantly increases the chances of reaccessing the market in any given period after the default. Our political economy model of market reaccess can match hese two features of the data.