Bildung als Werkzeug der Demokratisierung

Forderungen nach Demokratisierung sind ein Kennzeichen dieser Dekade geworden. In weiten Teilen des Nahen Ostens und Nordafrikas kam es zu Protesten und Revolutionen, die nach politischen Änderungen und demokratischen Reformen verlangen. Jedoch ist nach wie vor nur wenig über die Ursprünge und Erfolgsfaktoren dieser Bewegungen bekannt. Historisch betrachtet kann ein höherer Bildungsstand zweifellos mit einem hohen Demokratisierungsgrad assoziiert werden, doch die Kanäle und das Ausmaß dieses Zusammenhanges sind noch nicht hinreichend erforscht. Die Ergebnisse von Studien auf Basis länderübergreifender Paneldaten zeigen, dass Bildung die Demokratisierung effektiver beschleunigt, wenn das durchschnittliche Einkommen gering ist.Calls for democratization have become a hallmark of this decade. There have been protests and revolutions calling for political change and democratic reforms in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, little is actually known about the origins and success factors of these movements. Historically, a higher level of education can certainly be associated with a high degree of democratization, but the channels and extent of this correlation have not yet been fully researched. Findings based on transnational panel data show that the formation of democratization is more effectively accelerated when average income is low

Fragility exposure index: concepts, measurement, and application

Definitions of fragility are focused at the level of the state, but this should not be considered to suggest that individuals with heterogeneous endowments experience a state of fragility in the same way. Nor does it suggest that all subregions of a fragile country exist in this state. In turn, experience of fragility varies not just at national level but also between districts and between individuals. To test this idea, we develop a fragility exposure module, which was inserted into the standard house-hold survey. We consider three components of fragility: human security, economic inclusion, and social cohesion. We index data collected from a survey in Kenya. We show that experience of fragility in Kenya is in the midrange for most individuals, with notable heterogeneities. Those living in Nairobi experience higher levels of fragility than those in other areas. Young people experience higher levels of fragility than older individuals. We find no evidence of overall differences between men and women. These findings demonstrate the importance of capturing the experience of fragility at the individual level. More specifically, they also provide an important base to understanding which groups would benefit most from pro- stability interventions and for testing the performance of such interventions

Nudging children toward healthier food choices: An experiment combining school and home gardens

School gardens have become a widely used approach to influence children's food knowledge, preferences and choices in low- and high-income countries alike. However, evidence indicates that such programs are more effective at influencing food knowledge and preferences than actual food choices. Such finding may occur because school gardens insufficiently influence the food behavior of parents and because healthy food items are not always available in children's homes. We tested this hypothesis using a one-year cluster randomized controlled trial in Nepal with 15 treatment and 15 control schools and a matched sample of 779 schoolchildren (aged 8–12) and their caregivers. Data were collected before and after the intervention during the 2018–2019 school year. In addition, children's food consumption was monitored using a monthly food logbook. Average treatment effects were quantified with a double-difference estimator. For caregivers, the intervention led to a 26% increase in their food and nutrition knowledge (p < 0.001), a 5% increase in their agricultural knowledge (p = 0.022), a 10% increase in their liking for vegetables (p < 0.001), and a 15% increase in home garden productivity (p = 0.073). For children, the intervention had no discernible effect on food and nutrition knowledge (p = 0.666) but led to a 6% increase in their liking for vegetables (p = 0.070), healthy food practices (p < 0.001), and vegetable consumption (October–December +15%; p = 0.084; January–March +26%; p = 0.017; April–June +26%; p = 0.088). The results therefore indicate both schools and parents matter for nudging children toward healthier food choices

Drivers of food choice among children and caregivers in post-earthquake Nepal

Food systems in many countries are experiencing a shift from traditional foods towards processed foods high in sugar, fat and salt, but low in dietary fiber and micronutrients. There is an urgent need to better understand drivers of changing food behavior, particularly for lower-income countries. This study analyzes drivers of food choice among children and parents in rural Nepal. It uses qualitative data collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions with school children, parents and teachers. The study reveals substantial changes in food behavior during the past decade with increased consumption of rice, meat, and highly processed snack foods while an increased consumption of fruit and vegetables is not evident. It identifies cash availability is the main driver of increased rice, meat and snack food consumption. The second driver is the 2015 Nepal earthquake, which accelerated the transition from home-grown food to purchased food as people got habituated to eating more meat and snack foods while reconstruction tripled local wages and changed the food environment. This shows how humanitarian assistance in the wake of extreme shocks can unintentionally contribute to unhealthy eating habits. An integrated school and home garden intervention appears to contribute to healthier diets

Long-term behavioural impact of an integrated home garden intervention: evidence from Bangladesh

Integrated home garden interventions combine training in gardening practices with education about nutrition knowledge. Such interventions have been shown to improve nutrition behaviour in low income countries. However, to date rigorous evidence is lacking for their long-term impact. We test the impact of an integrated home garden intervention on vegetable production and consumption three years after the intervention ended. We analyse three rounds of survey data for 224 control and 395 intervention households in rural Bangladesh. Three years after the intervention, the average impact on vegetable production per household was 43 kg/year (+49% over baseline levels; p < 0.01), and the effect was not statistically different from the impact one year after the intervention, which demonstrates that impact was maintained in the long-term. The impact on the micronutrient supply for iron, zinc, folate and pro-vitamin A from home gardens was maintained in the long term. These impacts may have been driven by the long-term improvements in women’s nutrition knowledge and gardening practices, explaining the sustainability of the behavioural nutrition change. We also identify positive impacts on women’s empowerment and women’s output market participation, highlighting how integrated programs, even if modest in scope, can be drivers of social change

The Role of Visible Wealth for Deprivation

Motivated by the lack of literature linking actual to perceived relative deprivation, this paper assesses the role of visibility in the deprivation of goods and assets vis-à-vis income behind perceptions of relative deprivation. We rely on household survey data that includes unique information on reported perceived deprivation with a pre-specified reference group, namely others in the town or village. Based on a large number of asset and consumption items, we create an index of visible wealth by aggregating visible goods and assets using principal component weights. We find that relative deprivation in visible wealth has a ten percentage point higher explanatory power for reporting a high level of perceived deprivation than that of deprivation in income. The effect is robust under various sensitivity checks and for a number of controls. The finding sheds light on the importance of the visibility of the objects of comparison for an individual's assessment of his relative economic situation and proposes that future research should not solely rely on income-based deprivation measures

Empirical Advances in the Measurement and Analysis of Violent Conflict

Gewaltsamer Konflikt ist eine der hartnäckigsten Bedrohungen des Lebensunterhalts und der Nahrungssicherheit von Individuen weltweit. Trotz einer wachsenden Literatur, die die Ursachen und Folgen von Konflikten untersucht, bestehen nach wie vor erhebliche Verständnislücken, die zum Teil auf einen Mangel an qualitativ hochwertigen Konfliktereignisdaten zurückgehen. Mit Hilfe moderner ökonometrischer und statistischer Methoden trägt diese Monographie empirisch zur Literatur bei, indem sie sich mit drei miteinander verknüpften Themen befasst: (i) die Auswirkungen von Gewalterfahrungen auf Radikalisierung; (ii) das Ausmaß von Verzerrungen ("bias") in medienbasierten Konfliktereignisdaten; sowie (iii) die Rolle von Gewalt in benachbarten Gebieten für die Vorhersage von Ausbruch und Eskalation von Konflikten. Erstens zeigt eine Analyse des Gaza-Krieges von 2009, dass Menschen, die Gewalt direkt ausgesetzt sind, radikale Gruppen im Durchschnitt weniger unterstützen. Wenn frühere Wahlpräferenzen statistisch einbezogen werden, besitzt Gewalt jedoch eine polarisierende Wirkung im Wahlverhalten. Zweitens schätzt eine Auswertung syrischer Konfliktereignisdaten basierend auf internationalen und nationalen Quellen, dass Medien über nur knapp zehn Prozent der auftretenden Ereignisse berichten. Zudem ist die Berichterstattung stark räumlich und nach Konflikt-Akteuren verzerrt. Drittens stellt sich anhand von Paneldaten kleiner geographischer Zellen heraus, dass die räumliche und zeitliche Dynamik von Gewalt starken Einfluss auf sowohl den Ausbruch als auch die Eskalation von Konflikten an einem bestimmten Ort hat. In hochaufgelösten Analysen erhöht Gewalt in benachbarten Raumzellen jedoch nicht die Vorhersagekraft des Modells. Auf Grundlage der empirischen Befunde entwickelt diese Arbeit eine neue Methode zur Erhebung von Konfliktdaten, die auf direkte Informationsquellen vor Ort zurückgreift ("crowdseeding"), um Politik und Forschung verlässlichere Daten zu bieten.Violent conflict is one of the most persistent challenges affecting the economic livelihoods and food security of individuals worldwide. Despite the surge in literature studying the impacts and drivers of armed conflict, there remains notable knowledge and methodological gaps, particularly regarding the quality of conflict event data. Using various advanced econometric and statistical techniques, this monograph contributes empirically to this literature by studying three interrelated issues. (i) The impact of violence exposure on radicalization; (ii) the magnitude of selection and veracity biases in media-based conflict event data; and (iii) the significance of incorporating violence in nearby locations in predicting armed conflict onset and escalation. First, evidence from the 2009 war on Gaza shows that individuals who experienced violence directly are less likely, on average, to support radical groups. However, when controlling for past electoral preferences, the results reveal a polarization effect among voters exposed directly to violence. Second, by matching conflict event data from several international and national media sources on the Syrian war, media reports are found to capture less than 10\% of the estimated total number of events in the study period. Moreover, reported events across the sources exhibit a systematic spatial clustering and actor-specific biases. Third, using a grid-level panel dataset, the temporal and spatial dynamics of violence, among other geographic factors, are found to significantly drive both conflict onset and escalation. However, violence in neighbouring grids does not enhance the prediction of armed conflict when using high precision units of analysis. In addition to these main findings, I propose and discuss a novel methodology, namely crowdseeding, for collecting conflict event data which works directly with primary sources on the ground to provide reliable information for researchers and policy-makers alike

IFAD RESEARCH SERIES 54 Rural youth in the context of fragility and conflict

Despite accounting for only 7 per cent of the world’s population, rural youth account for more than 10 per cent of the world’s conflict-exposed population. In 2016, alone, over 350 million rural youth lived in conflict-affected countries. Despite conflict’s being defined as “development in reverse”, however, we find a general lack of research focusing specifically on young people living in rural areas. Yet, from wider literature, we know that conflict is a cause of adversities across a range of economic and non-economic indicators. When young people experience violence in consecutive life stages, adversities from one stage – such as weakened education – can be carried forward into subsequent life stages - such as transition to employment. In this background paper, we show that exposure to violence increases infant mortality, reduces birthweight, harms child health, damages human capital accumulation, restricts performance in education and interacts negatively with labour market opportunities. Despite this accumulated knowledge, however, we note that key knowledge gaps remain, especially when it comes to understanding the programmes that can mitigate the damage exposure to conflict causes. There is, therefore, an urgent need to understand how and why exposure to conflict harms the lives of rural youth, and perhaps more importantly, how it harms those lives differently from those of other socio-demographic groups. Given that rural youth are disproportionately affected by conflict, there is also a need for the design of, and learning from, programmes that are specifically targeted at protecting and empowering rural youth during the post-conflict phase

Micro-Foundations of Fragility: Concepts, Measurement and Application

We explore the micro-foundations of fragility by discussing how to measure the exposure to fragility at the individual level. We focus on two notions that are not covered by existing aggregate, state-centric indicators of fragility. First, different individuals may experience fragility very differently. Second, even though a country as a whole may not be "fragile", individuals may be exposed to fragility. This differentiation suggests that the experience of fragility varies not just at national levels but also between districts and between individuals. To test this idea, we propose a "Fragility Exposure Index", which accounts for human security, economic inclusion and social cohesion at the micro-level. We then derive a series of metrics that can be collected in typical household surveys. We test the performance of the Fragility Exposure Index by including a "Fragility Exposure Module" in a household survey in Kenya. Analysis of this data shows that individuals living in rural areas, as well as young and single individuals, exhibit greater exposure to fragility. These findings demonstrate the importance of understanding fragility at the individual level, particularly as it provides the basis to understanding which who would benefit most from pro-stability interventions and to how these interventions perform

Institutional trust in the time of corona: Evidence from countermeasures in Germany

We study how the stringency of policy measures to counter the COVID-19 pandemic affects individuals' trust in formal institutions. Drawing on micro-level panel data from Germany spanning an 18-month period from the onset of the pandemic, we show that, on average, there is a pronounced negative relationship between the stringency level of COVID-19 countermeasures and trust in institutions. We present empirical evidence to argue that the underlying mechanism is a perceived illegitimate attack on civil liberties, reducing trust in the judiciary in particular. This effect is concentrated in the period from October 2020, six months into the pandemic, when stringency measures in Germany started to increase again. For the early stage of the pandemic, we present evidence for competing, positive impacts of stringency responses on trust in government, consistent with other studies of pandemic onset, resulting in no significant net impact on institutional trust in that stage. In consequence, our findings suggest that hard lockdown measures beyond the initial stage of a pandemic are highly detrimental for institutional trust