Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria

In this two-parts paper we propose a decentralized strategy, based on a game-theoretic formulation, to find out the optimal precoding/multiplexing matrices for a multipoint-to-multipoint communication system composed of a set of wideband links sharing the same physical resources, i.e., time and bandwidth. We assume, as optimality criterion, the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and consider two alternative optimization problems: 1) the competitive maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and on the spectral mask imposed by the radio spectrum regulatory bodies; and 2) the competitive maximization of the transmission rate, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as above, plus a constraint on the average error probability. In Part I of the paper, we start by showing that the solution set of both noncooperative games is always nonempty and contains only pure strategies. Then, we prove that the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for both games leads to a channel diagonalizing structure, so that both matrix-valued problems can be recast in a simpler unified vector power control game, with no performance penalty. Thus, we study this simpler game and derive sufficient conditions ensuring the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, our uniqueness conditions have broader validity than previously known conditions. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed decentralized strategy by comparing its performance with the performance of a Pareto-optimal centralized scheme. To reach the Nash equilibria of the game, in Part II, we propose alternative distributed algorithms, along with their convergence conditions.Comment: Paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, September 22, 2005. Revised March 14, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007. To be published on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2007. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 200

Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part II: Algorithms

In this two-part paper, we address the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for a set of non-cooperative links sharing the same physical resources, e.g., time and bandwidth. We consider two alternative optimization problems: P.1) the maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and spectral mask; and P.2) the maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as in P.1, plus a constraint on the maximum average error probability on each link. Aiming at finding decentralized strategies, we adopted as optimality criterion the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and thus we formulated both problems P.1 and P.2 as strategic noncooperative (matrix-valued) games. In Part I of this two-part paper, after deriving the optimal structure of the linear transceivers for both games, we provided a unified set of sufficient conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In this Part II, we focus on the achievement of the equilibrium and propose alternative distributed iterative algorithms that solve both games. Specifically, the new proposed algorithms are the following: 1) the sequential and simultaneous iterative waterfilling based algorithms, incorporating spectral mask constraints; 2) the sequential and simultaneous gradient projection based algorithms, establishing an interesting link with variational inequality problems. Our main contribution is to provide sufficient conditions for the global convergence of all the proposed algorithms which, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, have a broader validity than the convergence conditions known in the current literature for the sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm.Comment: Paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, February 22, 2006. Revised March 26, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 200

The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm

This paper considers the non-cooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general MIMO case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for arbitrary channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for arbitrary channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing (accepted

Real and Complex Monotone Communication Games

Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of convex Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEPs), where each player aims to solve an arbitrary smooth convex optimization problem. Differently from most of current works, we do not assume any specific structure for the players' problems, and we allow the optimization variables of the players to be matrices in the complex domain. Our main contribution is the design of a novel class of distributed (asynchronous) best-response- algorithms suitable for solving the proposed NEPs, even in the presence of multiple solutions. The new methods, whose convergence analysis is based on Variational Inequality (VI) techniques, can select, among all the equilibria of a game, those that optimize a given performance criterion, at the cost of limited signaling among the players. This is a major departure from existing best-response algorithms, whose convergence conditions imply the uniqueness of the NE. Some of our results hinge on the use of VI problems directly in the complex domain; the study of these new kind of VIs also represents a noteworthy innovative contribution. We then apply the developed methods to solve some new generalizations of SISO and MIMO games in cognitive radios and femtocell systems, showing a considerable performance improvement over classical pure noncooperative schemes.Comment: to appear on IEEE Transactions in Information Theor

Decomposition by Partial Linearization: Parallel Optimization of Multi-Agent Systems

We propose a novel decomposition framework for the distributed optimization of general nonconvex sum-utility functions arising naturally in the system design of wireless multiuser interfering systems. Our main contributions are: i) the development of the first class of (inexact) Jacobi best-response algorithms with provable convergence, where all the users simultaneously and iteratively solve a suitably convexified version of the original sum-utility optimization problem; ii) the derivation of a general dynamic pricing mechanism that provides a unified view of existing pricing schemes that are based, instead, on heuristics; and iii) a framework that can be easily particularized to well-known applications, giving rise to very efficient practical (Jacobi or Gauss-Seidel) algorithms that outperform existing adhoc methods proposed for very specific problems. Interestingly, our framework contains as special cases well-known gradient algorithms for nonconvex sum-utility problems, and many blockcoordinate descent schemes for convex functions.Comment: submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin

Inclusion of a Parental Component in a Sports-Based HIV Prevention Program for Dominican Youth

Background: Underprivileged youth in the Dominican Republic (DR) are at high risk of acquiring the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Protective parenting practices may inhibit sexual risk-taking. Objective: We investigated whether parental involvement in a sports-based HIV prevention program increased self-efficacy to prevent HIV and safe sex behavior among Dominican youth. Method: The study had a quasi-experimental design with repeated measures. N = 90 participants between 13 and 24 years of age participated in the program through two different trainings, UNICA and A Ganar, both of which had an experimental (i.e., program with parental component) and a control (i.e., program without parental component) condition. Results: Self-efficacy to prevent HIV significantly increased among participants in the experimental condition of UNICA. Self-efficacy for safe sex increased among sexually active participants in the experimental condition of A Ganar. Implications for Impact: These findings are important to meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal of good health and wellbeing, as they suggest that parental involvement in sports-based HIV prevention programs can enhance their positive effects for increasing youth’s self-efficacy to practice HIV-preventive behaviors. Randomized control trials and longitudinal studies are needed.</p

Asynchronous Iterative Waterfilling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Interference Channels

This paper considers the maximization of information rates for the Gaussian frequency-selective interference channel, subject to power and spectral mask constraints on each link. To derive decentralized solutions that do not require any cooperation among the users, the optimization problem is formulated as a static noncooperative game of complete information. To achieve the so-called Nash equilibria of the game, we propose a new distributed algorithm called asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm. In this algorithm, the users update their power spectral density in a completely distributed and asynchronous way: some users may update their power allocation more frequently than others and they may even use outdated measurements of the received interference. The proposed algorithm represents a unified framework that encompasses and generalizes all known iterative waterfilling algorithms, e.g., sequential and simultaneous versions. The main result of the paper consists of a unified set of conditions that guarantee the global converge of the proposed algorithm to the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, August 22, 2006. Revised September 25, 2007. Accepted January 14, 2008. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 200

Cognitive MIMO Radio: A Competitive Optimality Design Based on Subspace Projections

Cognitive MIMO Radio: A Competitive Optimality Design Based on Subspace Projection

Competitive Design of Multiuser MIMO Systems based on Game Theory: A Unified View

This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been studied in a number of papers during the past decade for the case of frequency-selective channels. A variety of conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and convergence of many different distributed algorithms have been derived. In this paper we provide a unified view of the state-of-the-art results, showing that most of the techniques proposed in the literature to study the game, even though apparently different, can be unified using our recent interpretation of the waterfilling operator as a projection onto a proper polyhedral set. Based on this interpretation, we then provide a mathematical framework, useful to derive a unified set of sufficient conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE and the global convergence of waterfilling based asynchronous distributed algorithms. The proposed mathematical framework is also instrumental to study the extension of the game to the more general MIMO case, for which only few results are available in the current literature. The resulting algorithm is, similarly to the frequency-selective case, an iterative asynchronous MIMO waterfilling algorithm. The proof of convergence hinges again on the interpretation of the MIMO waterfilling as a matrix projection, which is the natural generalization of our results obtained for the waterfilling mapping in the frequency-selective case.Comment: To appear on IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), September 200