From Public to Private: Privatization in 1920's Fascist Italy

Italy’s first Fascist government applied a large-scale privatization policy between 1922 and 1925. The government privatized the state monopoly of match sale, eliminated the State monopoly on life insurances, sold most of the State-owned telephone networks and services to private firms, reprivatized the largest metal machinery producer, and awarded concessions to private firms to build and operate motorways. While ideological considerations may have had a certain influence, privatization was used mainly as a political tool to build confidence among industrialists and to increase support for the government and the Partito Nazionale Fascista. Privatization also contributed to balancing the budget, which was the core objective of Fascist economic policy in its first phase.Privatization,Public Enterprise,Government,Fascist Economy,Italy

THE FIRST PRIVATIZATION: SELLING SOEs AND PRIVATIZING PUBLIC MONOPOLIES IN FASCIST ITALY (1922-1925)

Italys first Fascist government applied a large-scale privatization policy between 1922 and 1925. The government privatized the state monopoly of match sale, eliminated the State monopoly on life insurances, sold most of the State-owned telephone networks and services to private firms, reprivatized the largest metal machinery producer, and awarded concessions to private firms to build and operate motorways. While ideological considerations may have had a certain influence, privatization was used mainly as a political tool to build confidence among industrialists and to increase support for the government and the Partito Nazionale Fascista. Privatization also contributed to balancing the budget, which was the core objective of Fascist economic policy in its first phase.fascist economy, privatization, government, italy, public enterprise

Motorways, tolls and road safety.Evidence from European Panel Data.

The use of tolls is being widespread around the world. Its ability to fund infrastructure projects and to solve budget constraints have been the main rationale behind its renewed interest. However, less attention has been payed to the safety effects derived from this policy in a moment of increasing concern on road fatalities. Pricing best infrastructures shifts some drivers onto worse alternative roads usually not prepared to receive high traffic in comparable safety standards. In this paper we provide evidence of the existence of this perverse consequence by using an international European panel in a two way fixed effects estimation.Road Safety, Tolls, Motorways and Transportation.

Privatization, Corporate Control and Regulatory Reform: The case of Telefonica

This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a disperse ownership and give managers a high level of discretion in running the company. By this, the government effectively created an agency problem inside the firm. There were no powerful shareholders to constrain the managers, and the threat of a takeover was not a credible one, since the government kept a golden share. There is no overall evidence of capture of politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although evidence suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. We interpret the political interference with the firm’s control (a well documented phenomenon both in this study and in the cross-country literature on privatization; e.g. political ends in privatization, influence in appointments, golden shares) as the most visible part of such collusion. Liberalization and multi-level regulation will likely make any type of collusion or capture more difficult in the future.Governance, Privatization, Regulation, Deregulation, Capture

Shaping urban traffic patterns through congestion charging: What factors drive success or failure?.

Congestion costs are emerging as one of the most important challenges faced by metropolitan planners and transport authorities in first world economies. In US these costs were as high as 78 million dollars in 2005 and are growing due to fast increases in travel delays. In order to solve the current and severe levels of congestion the US department of transportation have recently started a program to initiate congestion pricing in five metropolitan areas. In this context it is important to determine those factors helping its implementation and success, but also the problems or difficulties associated with charging projects. In this article we analyze worldwide experiences with urban road charging in order to extract interesting and helpful lessons for policy makers engaged in congestion pricing projects and for those interested in the introduction of traffic management tools to regulate the entrance to big cities.Congestion, Road Pricing, Urban Transportation, Traffic Demand Management.

Choosing hybrid organizations for local servicesdelivery: An empirical analysis of partial privatization

The empirical literature about factors explaining local government delivery choices has traditionally focused the attention on the public or private production dilemma. However, hybrid organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms are increasingly used in several European countries. This paper makes use of survey data from Spanish municipalities to examine motivations of local governments for engaging in hybrid organizational forms. Data refer to two very relevant local services: water distribution and solid waste collection. The empirical analysis indicates that the use of mixed firms emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private production. Indeed, local governments make use of mixed firms when cost considerations (scale economies, transaction costs and so on), financial constraints and private interests exert contradictory pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not play any significant role on the local government decision of engaging or not in joint ventures with private partners.Partial privatization, local governments

Do public sector reforms get rusty? An empirical analysis on privatization of solid waste collection

Recent empirical evidence, from countries in the European Union in particular, are much more ambiguous on the costs savings from private production of local public services than previous literature used to be. In this paper, an explanatory model of factors driving costs in solid waste collection is specified and estimated, using a sample on Spanish municipalities. Indeed, this paper presents some first empirical parametrical evidence on this issue for this country. Results obtained in the estimation indicate no significant effects of the mode of production (public/private) on costs borne by municipalities. As we find no effect of the mode of production on costs, we put forward two hypotheses. On one hand, progressive concentration and bidding competition decrease in the privatized sector may have outweighed eventual gains coming from privatization. On the other hand, the threat that privatization may represent for public unit managers may have stimulated them to search for alternative management reforms. In this sense, this paper introduces for the first time in the empirical literature factors such as (1) the existence of inter-municipal cooperation; and (2) whether the reform is old or new when analyzing the factors explaining the municipal costs for this service. The results suggest the inter-municipal cooperation and recent privatization are associated with lower costs. Instead, old privatization is not associated with lower costs.privatization, contracting-out, local government

Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts.

Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.Toll motorways, privatization, concessions, regulation.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.nazi economy, public enterprise, germany, privatization

What shapes local public transportation in Europe? Economics, Mobility, Institutions, and Geography

This paper analyzes the factors that explain supply and demand of local public transportation. Together with variables related to economics and mobility, we consider variables reflecting institutional characteristics and geographical patterns. Being a political capital increases supply and demand of local public transportation, inequality is associated with higher supply, and contracting out reduces supply. Furthermore, our regional analysis allows us capturing the effect of geographical characteristics and different traditions of government intervention. In all, we provide first evidence on the role played by institutional and regional characteristics useful to achieve a better understanding of local public transportation supply and demand.Urban transportation,Local government,Mobility,Institutions and Geography