Compliance and Imperfect Intertemporal Carbon Trading

This paper examines three compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: (i) the restoration rate, (ii) the commitment period reserve rule, and (iii) the suspension mechanism, all potentially constraining greenhouse gas emissions trading across time and space. The joint effect of these mechanisms on prices and costs is studied in a twoperiod model under various assumptions about the competitiveness of the permit market and US participation. The analytical results indicate that the restoration rate can make discounted permit prices decrease over time. With the commitment period reserve, marginal costs may not only be lower, but also higher than the permit prices. The suspension rule will under quite general circumstances not affect prices and costs; only shift non-compliance from future sellers to future buyers. The numerical results suggest that with imperfect permit markets and non-participation of the US in the Kyoto Protocol in 2010, none of the three rules becomes binding.compliance; market power; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol

Trade-offs in sulfur emission trading in Europe

How to implement emission trading is one question in the current negotiations on a new sulfur protocol in Europe. Whereas the current protocol stipulates a 30 percent uniform reduction, national emission ceilings included in the proposed new protocol imply differentiated reductions. In addition, emission and fuel standards are proposed. This paper examines the costs and environmental impacts of emission trading. Emission trading combined with regulations is a new element in the paper. Calculations using the RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation) model suggest that overlaying emission trading on regulations not only reduces the cost savings but has beneficial impacts as well: ecosystem protection is not changed and significant decreases in environmental benefits for countries are largely avoided. Emission trading can also be used to decrease emissions and increase ecosystem protection. If combined with existing legislation, emission trading minimizes losses in expected environmental benefits for some countries, and most countries gain. However, the initial distribution of emission ceilings has to be used so that some countries are not confronted with higher costs. Trade-offs appear to exist between the use of emission trading to achieve cost savings on the one hand, and ecosystem protection and distributional equity on the other. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995Emission trading, sulfur, acid rain, costs, Europe,

On the quality of compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol

In this paper we evaluate the compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol as agreed at the seventh Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakech. We differ from the literature since we concentrate on the complete set of compliance rules agreed in Marrakech and, as a new element, we systematically discuss these compliance incentives in conjunction with the implicit compliance incentives: reputation protection, emission trading and banking. We conclude that effectiveness and efficiency go hand in hand for all explicit and implicit compliance incentives except one -- emission trading. Trading improves efficiency but this can also occur at the cost of increasing non-compliance

Economic Impacts of the 1997 EU Energy Tax: Simulations with Three EU-Wide Models

In March 1997 the European Commission adopted aproposal that increases existing minimum levels oftaxation on mineral oils by around 10 to 25% andintroduces excises for other energy products. Thispaper analyses the macroeconomic impacts of theproposal. It employs three models: HERMES, GEM-E3, andE3ME. All models confirm that the proposal will havepositive macroeconomic impacts when the tax revenuesare used to reduce social security contributions paidby employers. For the EU as a whole, both GDP andemployment are expected to be higher and CO 2emissions are 0.9 to 1.6 percent lower. The positiveEU-wide effects can be observed in practically allmember states. The sector impacts are modest, with theenergy sector expected to face the most negativeimpacts. Differences between model results are due tothe model type (general equilibrium ormacro-econometric), the EU countries covered and theway tax exemptions were handled. Crucial assumptionsto obtain the ``double dividend'' are the modelling ofthe labour market and the impacts on EU externaltrade. The sensitivity of the results for the use oftax revenues, tax exemptions and tax rate increases isassessed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000carbon dioxide, double dividend, employment, energy tax, EU, environmental policy,

Creating Markets for Air Pollution Control in Europe and the USA

This paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in Europe and the USA. European policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes. Emission trading has been limited to intra-firm solutions for various reasons: industry structure, absence of real scarcity, and too restrictive trading rules. Bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems. By contrast, the sulphur allowance program in the USA has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions. Problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls. Europe can learn from the USA that regular national permit markets could be installed, preferably for homogenous sectors. In designing the permit system, the differences between the USA and Europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity, stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997emission trading, bubbles, Europe, USA, air pollution,