The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule

voting rules, Condorcet efficieny, single-peaked preferences, D7,

Strong measures of group coherence and the probability that a pairwise majority rule winner exists

Condorcet winner, Majority rule winner, Coherent preferences,

Coincidence of Agreement between Probabilistic and Algebraic Choosers

individual choice, probabilistic chooser, algebraic chooser, May’s model, transitivity, rationality,

Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)). Copyright Springer 2005Condorcet efficiency, scoring systems, Borda count, impartial anonymous culture, voting, C67,

Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

Majority decisiveness, Condorcet criterion, Erosion of majority principle, The Borda method of counts,