Regulation and proinflammatory properties of the chemotactic protein CP-10

Newsletter of the University Hospital Nursing Department Boston University Medical Cente

Financial Market Assumptions & Models for Pension Plans: A Technical Comment on the PIMS Model Assumptions for Asset Markets

The financial market assumptions of the PBGC’s PIMS model are critical inputs to simulations for most apparent uses of the system. They currently appear to be based on a reduced form, “classical” approach to assessing and forecasting the distribution of returns on various classes of input assets, allowing for a fairly sophisticated and useful approach to understanding simulated distributions of potential pension insurance outcomes as well as the net financial status of the PBGC. This technical note discusses some of the capital market side assumptions utilized in the model. It also comments on important related assumptions including the assumed asset allocations of insured plans, making suggestion for possible modification of input assumptions of the model to reflect time variation in financial market return behavior as well as time variation in observed plan allocations

The Effects of Grace on Self-Forgiveness with a Religious Community

Genuine self-forgiveness entails accepting responsibility for wrongdoing while experiencing a continued sense of self-worth (Enright & Human Development Study Group, 1996; Fisher & Exline, 2006; Hall & Fincham, 2005; Martin, 2008; Szablowinski, 2012; Vitz & Meade, 2011; Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Hedrick, 2012; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013a; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013b). Previous research has demonstrated that a benevolent concept of God and a personal sense of God’s forgiveness facilitate self-forgiveness (Exline, Yali, & Lobel,1999; Hall & Fincham, 2008; Martin, 2008; McConnell & Dixon, 2012), suggesting that those who accept responsibility for the offense and believe God can forgive that offense will not become stuck in self-condemnation. The theological concept of grace is closely related to self-forgiveness; people must acknowledge that they have sinned while accepting God’s unmerited favor (McMinn, Ruiz, Marx, Wright, & Gilbert, 2006; Sells, Bechenbach, & Patrick, 2009). This study examined the effects of a grace intervention on self-forgiveness within two Friends (Quaker) churches. The grace intervention was developed in collaboration with church leaders and psychological researchers and included a 9-week sermon series, group Bible studies, and weekly grace practices. All church attendees were asked to complete a trait self-forgiveness scale, while a smaller portion of each church completed a more extensive battery of questionnaires, which were completed before and after each church experienced the grace intervention they developed. The study utilized a quasi-experimental crossover design for statistical analyses. Both congregations were assessed again at the conclusion of the second congregation’s grace intervention. Significant changes over time and an interaction effect were found in trait self-forgiveness, intrinsic religiosity, and daily spiritual experiences. Changes over time without interaction effects were found with spiritual wellbeing, grace to self, selfforgiveness feelings and actions, and self-forgiveness beliefs. Group differences were found with daily spiritual experiences, authoritarian God concept, grace to others, and genuine selfforgiveness. This study suggests that an intervention focused on the theological concept of grace may increase people’s ability to forgive themselves for offenses they have committed against other people. Future research should look at the implications this could have for those experiencing psychological distress

Do Shareholders' Preferences Affect their Funds' Management? Evidence from the Cross Section of Shareholders and Funds

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies, and we find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors. We find additional evidence in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds' portfolio weights. Nous étudions comment les gestionnaires de fonds réagissent aux préférences contradictoires de leurs investisseurs. Notre étude se concentre principalement sur les conflits entre les comptes taxés et les comptes de retraite des fonds internationaux qui font l'objet de compromis différents entre les gains en dividendes et les gains de capital. En théorie, les gestionnaires peuvent résoudre ces conflits par des opérations d'arbitrage sur les dividendes, mais une base de données privée d'opérations d'arbitrage fait apparaître qu'en pratique ils ne peuvent pas. Les gestionnaires doivent alors résoudre ces conflits à travers leurs politiques d'investissement, et nous trouvons des résultats significatifs montrant que ceux dont le capital est issu majoritairement des retraites favorisent les investisseurs de fonds de pension. Nous trouvons également des différences entre les poids des portefeuilles de fonds américains et canadiens.Dividend arbitrage, tax efficiency, agency issues, mutual funds, arbitrage sur les dividendes, taxes sur les rendements, placements pour compte, fonds commun de placement

How and Why do Investors Trade Votes, and What Does it Mean?

The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders vote in the ratios that they themselves choose. We document an active market for votes within the equity-loan market, where we find that the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates these vote reallocations, and we find support for this view in the cross section of votes: there is more trade for higher-spread firms and more for poor performers, especially when the vote is close. We also find that the vote reallocations correspond to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals. L'analyse classique de la gouvernance d'entreprise suppose que les actionnaires votent selon les modalités choisies par la firme, par exemple un vote par action. Mais si les coûts associés à la séparation et à l'échange des votes sont suffisamment faibles, alors les actionnaires votent selon les modalités qu'ils ont eux-mêmes choisies. Nous présentons le cas d'un marché actif de votes au sein du marché des mises de fonds sous forme d'emprunts (equity loans), où nous constatons qu'en moyenne les votes se vendent pour rien. Nous supposons que l'asymétrie d'information provoque cette réallocation des votes, et nous étayons cette hypothèse à travers l'étude transversale des votes : le nombre d'opérations est plus important pour les compagnies dont l'écart acheteur-vendeur est plus élevé ainsi que pour celles dont les résultats sont plus faibles, particulièrement lorsque le vote est clos. Cette étude montre aussi que la réallocation des votes permet de soutenir les propositions des actionnaires et de s'opposer à celles des gestionnaires.vote trading, corporate governance, equity lending, information asymmetry, transaction de votes, gouvernance d'entreprise, prêt d'actions, asymétrie d'information

Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds

We construct optimal portfolios of mutual funds whose objectives include socially responsible investment (SRI). Comparing portfolios of these funds to those constructed from the broader fund universe reveals the cost of imposing the SRI constraint on investors seeking the highest Sharpe ratio. This SRI cost depends crucially on the investor\u27s views about asset pricing models and stock-picking skill by fund managers. To an investor who believes strongly in the CAPM and rules out managerial skill, i.e. a market-index investor, the cost of the SRI constraint is typically just a few basis points per month, measured in certainly-equivalent loss. To an investor who still disallows skill but instead believes to some degree in pricing models that associate higher returns with exposures to size, value, and momentum factors, the SRI constraint is much costlier, typically by at least 30 basis points per month. The SRI constraint imposes large costs on investors whose beliefs allow a substantial amount of fund-manager skill, i.e., investors who rely heavily on individual funds\u27 track records to predict future performance