What Might Democratic Self-Governance in a Complex Social World Look Like?

The crisis facing democratic self-government is first and foremost a crisis of self-governance, not of democracy. Section II reviews the nature of complex systems and why our contemporary social and economic order qualifies as technically complexindeed, increasingly so—and why explicit overall, directed reform of our social world is hopeless. But hope is not easily abandoned: Section III critically looks at two continuing sources of hope. Section IV then turns to a critical issue: If not by central direction, how do such complex systems achieve orderliness and functionality? Section V turns to the heart of the matter: is democratic self-governance viable in our increasingly complex systems—or, more subtly, what form of self-governance seems the most viable? Section VI argues that effective self-governance is not a freestanding exercise of a general will but must be embedded in the deontic principles of a liberal order

Rational Choice and the Original Position: The (Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi

Rawls proclaims that \u27the theory of justice is part, perhaps the nwst significant part, of the theory of rational choice\u27 (T]R, p. 15, emphasis added; see section 2.2.3 below). Many have refused to take this claim literally (or even seriously), by, for example, interpreting the original position analysis as a heuristic for identifying independently true moral principles (see Dworkin, Original Position, p. 19 and Barry, Theories, pp. 271-82). In this chapter we take this fundamental claim of Rawls at face value. We thus shall defend: The Fundamental Derivation Thesis: the justification of a principle of justice J derives from the conclusion that, under conditions C, J is the rational choice of chooser(s) P.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_books/1016/thumbnail.jp

Social Evolution

It is a mater of dispute how far back evolutionary explanations of social order should be traced. Evolutionary ideas certainly appear in the work of the ancient Greek philosophers, but it seems reasonable to identify the origins of modern evolutionary thinking in the eighteenth century natural histories of civil society such as Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1750, Part III), Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776, Book III). In these eighteenth century works, the explanation of current social institutions as an unplanned and generally adaptive development out of earlier and simpler arrangements gained traction. Germany too had a tradition of Naturphilosophie employing general evolutionary ideas, as well as Hegelian-influenced thinking on the development of societies. In 1863, four years after Darwin’s Origins of the Species August Schleicher’s Die Darwinscbe Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaf, drew on these traditions as well as Darwin’s Origins of the Species to present an evolutionary account of the development of families of languages (Taub, 1993), an endeavor that was carried on by a number of scholars in the later part of the nineteenth century.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_books/1012/thumbnail.jp

The Calculus of Consent

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a groundbreaking work in democratic theory. This chapter argues that it is of continued relevance today, due both to its methodological innovations and its use of those innovative techniques to solve the fundamental problem of democratic justification. In Calculus, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock fuse economic methods, political theory, and the normative project of showing how democratic institutions of a particular sort can be justified contractually, creating a unique form of democratic contractualism that came to be known as “Constitutional Political Economy” and the more general research program of “Public Choice Theory.” Although these pioneering techniques have been integrated into mainstream political theory, the interest of their normative project has not been similarly appreciated.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_books/1014/thumbnail.jp

On Theorizing about Public Reason

This essay responds to the thoughtful essays on the Order of Public Reason (OPR) by Elvio Baccarini, Giulia Bistagnino and Nenad Miscevic. All three essays interrogate OPR’s understanding of moral theory - “meta” matters about the nature of morality, reasons and modeling within moral theories. I first turn to the general understanding of the moral enterprise underlying OPR, explaining why it takes a view at odds with the contemporary mainstream in moral philosophy. I then explain the idea of moral truth in OPR: when it comes to social morality, moral truth is necessarily a function of what can be endorsed by some collectivity. This leads to a fundamental worry about theories of public reason: why is the endorsement of the public so important? And if some sort of public endorsement is really so terribly important, how can a theory of public reason withstand the fact that it advances its own controversial claims that cannot be publicly endorsed? After considering when public endorsement is necessary, and when public reason theories can make controversial claims, I close by considering in what way OPR does, and in what way it does not, employ a thought experiment, and the complexities of that experiment

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: a Critique

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, i.e., reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of the reasonable that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive and a duty of justification to meet RGA fails to be agent transparent. This negative result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I then suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires to downgrade RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have