An Arab NATO in the Making? Middle Eastern Military Cooperation Since 2011

Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether the Arab League’s Defence Pact or the Middle East Command, ideas for collective security in the region all failed to move beyond the state of declarations. Most of the time, Arab states were either at open war or in cold peace. Since the Arab Spring has toppled not only regimes but also brought insecurity, new momentum has come into regional security. From joint exercises to the announcement of first an Arab and more recently an Islamic military alliance, states begin to move further into cooperation. As this Letort Paper shows, several obstacles will have to be overcome before collective security in the Middle East and North Africa can become a reality.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1299/thumbnail.jp

After the Spring: Reforming Arab Armies

View the Executive SummaryAs the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Arab armed forces, reform—rather than mere assistance—is crucial. In this monograph, the author focuses on the structural aspects of reform from which the Arab Spring forces would benefit. Seven features are identified which need to be addressed when attempting Arab military reform in the countries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011: an unclear mandate, over-politicization, a challenging ongoing security situation, limited resources, lack of civilian oversight, pockets of paramilitary activity, and, in parts, as well as the lack of an institutional perception of reform need. Their origins are elaborated as much as recommendations for what outside assistance can achieve.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1483/thumbnail.jp

The Gulf Moment: Arab Relations Since 2011

This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to each other post-regime change and post-Islamist electoral victory. It shows that the region is undergoing a profound change as some traditional regional policy actors are paralyzed by internal turmoil (such as Syria and Egypt), while others do not have a regional ambition (such as Algeria and Morocco). The region has therefore entered a Gulf moment where key decisions pertaining to the region’s future are now taken in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. From having once been mere bystanders of regional politics, the Gulf States have moved to become players with both the ambition and capability to shape regional dynamics. As the ripple effects of their 2014 rift show, these dynamics will have a wider Arab impact.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1453/thumbnail.jp

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

View the Executive SummaryOn March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to 2,000 civilians dead, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22, 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a “war of choice” rather than a “war of necessity,” NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of “no boots on the ground” might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive—that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate—the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of “Responsibility to Protect.” On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi’s departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO’s Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, even UN observers. As the regime’s security forces had virtually imploded, Libya’s security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1322/thumbnail.jp

Against All Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region

While NATO was created with a primary outlook to the East, its Southern rim was neglected strategically until the end of the Cold War. Since then, the Alliance has undertaken a number of efforts to build strategic relationships with the Middle East and North Africa, recognizing the region’s importance for Allied security. However, looming obstacles may well interfer with NATO\u27s efforts to enhance relations with the region. Geostrategic realities are not in NATO’s favor: it is a region of crisis; suspicious of the West in general; riddled with internal instability; and is a difficult to build ties with. This monograph examines the existing relationships as well as the remaining obstacles, and proposes solutions to the latter.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1546/thumbnail.jp

Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon

Security Force Assistance becomes more and more important not only in the post-conflict reconstruction process, but also in a more general way in the foreign policy of the United States. Looking into the experience of both Iraq and Lebanon, this monograph offers useful insights for future military assistance programs and reconstruction efforts. While current assistance programs are certainly of high quality in technical terms, this publication sheds light on the equally important, yet often overlooked social dimension. Elements such as ethnic composition, exclusion of politically compromised personnel, and the armed forces’ image in society will determine the military’s future success just as much as technical training. How to improve these aspects is explained in this analysis.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1578/thumbnail.jp