Dispute Settlement at the WTO and the Dole Commission: USTR Resources and Success

At the time the Uruguay Round Agreements were passed by Congress, particular concern was expressed about their implications for U.S. national sovereignty. Concern was sufficiently great that the Clinton Administration committed its support to the creation of a commission that would review each adverse decision against the United States by the WTO. The commission was designed such that the outcome of its review process might trigger a serious Congressional consideration of U.S. withdrawal from the WTO. While the so-called Dole Commission was never created, the Congressional controversy surrounding the ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreement has led to particular concern with USTR performance at the WTO. Curiously, enhanced Congressional concern has not gone hand in hand with more resources for USTR. Over the 1990s, USTR has rarely asked for, and, until 2000 has not received additional resources for its work. The analysis here shows that if the USTR is concerned not only about the number of cases it wins but also about its rate of success, having more resources may have an ambiguous impact on the USTR's rate of success. Depending on how relatively promising are the additional cases that may yet be brought by USTR to the WTO, and how usefully additional resources may be applied to existing cases, it is possible that more resources can lower USTR's success rate. This is true, though for different reasons, when explicit allowance is made for the response by the other party to the dispute to a USTR commitment of additional resources. More resources cannot explain the increased use that the USTR has made since the WTO was established, because until recently USTR has received no additional resources. Rather, a more predictable DSM may have encouraged more rather than fewer cases to be brought to the WTO in preference to further efforts at extra-WTO bilateral settlements.

Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale and Access to the Japanese Market

For much of the past thirty-face years Japan has imported a remarkably small share of the manufactured goods it consumes. This distinctive trade structure is regularly cited by policy makes as evidence that, despite the absence of formal barriers, foreign manufacturers are systemically denied access to the Japanese market. Alternative explanations of Japan's distinctive trade structure are possible. Using specifications directly derived from traditional models of comparative advantage, Japan's distinctive inter-industry trade structure can be largely explained by Japan's equally distinctive pattern of factor endowments. Scarcely any reference needs to be made at all to distinctive Japanese government trade policies. Japan's participation in intra-industry trade in manufactures is also distinctively low. Traditional models of comparative advantage do not explain intra-industry trade. Such trade can be explained, however, if allowance is made for product differentiation and economies of scale. While traditional models of comparative advantage explain net trade as a linear function of factor endowments, with intra-industry trade models gross trade in imports and exports can still be a function of factor endowments. Indeed, if expressed as a share of GNP, gross imports are still a linear function of factor endowments. Using this framework, it can be shown that Japan's intra-industry trade, like Japan's inter-industry trade, does conform to international patterns. The removal of the remaining distinctive Japanese barriers, both formal and informal, to the import of manufactures, while highly desirable from a diplomatic standpoint, may have little impact on Japanese trade structure.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100950/1/ECON396.pd

How Open is Japan?: Comment

Saxonhouse comments on a paper written by Robert Z. Lawrence.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100951/1/ECON397.pd

Japan's Lost Decade: Origins, Consequences, and Prospects For Recovery

Chapter Abstracts

Do Japanese Firms Price Discriminate in North America?

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73255/1/j.1467-9701.1994.tb00811.x.pd

Japan and the Bigness Mystique

Walter Adams and James Brock are correct. There is little overseas evidence to support the proposition that there is a close link between international competitiveness and firm size. As Adams and Brock point out, the Japanese experience, in particular, highlights the absence of any intimate connection between these variables. The distinctive vitality of Japan\u27s small-scale sector is a very old story. Whether it is the last decades of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), the Meiji period (1868-1912), the Taisho period (1912-1926), or the Showa (1926-1989) period, commentators have invariably noted the surprising persistence of Japan\u27s smaller-scale enterprises. Where once they were treated as curious survivals from Japan\u27s feudal past, these small units have long been recognized as an essential element in Japan\u27s modern economic growth