A New Generation of International Adjudication

This Article challenges the conventional view of contemporary international adjudication. It identifies a new generation of international tribunals, which has been largely ignored by commentators, and argues that these tribunals offer a highly successful, alternative model to traditional public-international-law adjudicatory bodies. The proliferation of international tribunals is widely regarded as one of the most significant developments in international law over the past century. The subject has given rise to an extensive and robust body of academic commentary. Although commentators reach widely divergent conclusions about many aspects of international law and adjudication, they all agree that international tribunals differ fundamentally from national courts. In particular, according to the commentary, international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice lack the power to render enforceable decisions or to exercise compulsory jurisdiction. This Article argues that commentators have proceeded from a flawed and incomplete understanding of contemporary international adjudication. Virtually all commentary on the subject ignores the development of a second generation of international tribunals, best represented by international commercial and investment tribunals, World Trade Organization panels, and claims-settlement mechanisms. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about international adjudication, this new generation of international tribunals has the power to exercise what is effectively compulsory jurisdiction and to render enforceable decisions that can often be coercively executed against states and their commercial assets. These second-generation tribunals have been the most frequently used and, in many respects, the most successful form of international adjudication in recent decades. The caseloads of these tribunals have grown rapidly over the past forty years and now substantially exceed those of traditional public-international-law tribunals. Moreover, an analysis of state treatymaking practice over recent decades shows that states have virtually never concluded treaties accepting the jurisdiction of traditional first-generation tribunals—concluding less than one treaty per year—whereas they have frequently accepted the jurisdiction of second-generation tribunals capable of rendering enforceable decisions—accepting some fifty treaties per year. More fundamentally, second-generation tribunals have played an essential role in facilitating international trade, finance, and investment; have contributed to the development of important fields of international law; and have provided leading contemporary examples of international law working in practice. Although largely ignored by the commentary, the success and frequent use of second-generation tribunals have important implications for conventional analysis of international adjudication. The success of these tribunals flatly contradicts the claims, advanced by a number of academic commentators, that international adjudication is unimportant in contemporary international affairs and that states do not use international tribunals—particularly tribunals that would be effective. In reality, second-generation tribunals have been frequently and successfully used in vitally important fields, in part because they issue effective and enforceable decisions. At the same time, the success of second-generation tribunals also contradicts prescriptions, offered by a number of commentators, that future international tribunals be modeled on “independent” first-generation tribunals or, alternatively, on entirely “dependent” adjudicative mechanisms. Successful second-generation tribunals exhibit a blend of structural characteristics that defy blanket prescriptions for either “independence” or “dependence” and that counsel for more tailored, nuanced institutional designs

The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure

A reworking of the basic terms of the Hague Evidence Convention is proposed. Under current law, US courts typically do not employ the Convention\u27s evidence-taking mechanisms when ordering discovery from either a litigant or a witness subject to the court\u27s subpoena power

Customary International Law in United States Courts

Over the past two decades, the status of customary international law in U.S. courts has been the subject of vigorous debate. On the one hand, proponents of the “modernist” position contend that rules of customary international law are presumptively rules of federal law, which apply directly in U.S. courts and preempt inconsistent state law even in the absence of federal legislative or executive authorization. On the other hand, the “revisionists” argue that, in the absence of congressional legislation or a U.S. treaty, rules of customary international law are generally not matters of federal law, and will therefore generally be governed by state law. This Article argues for an approach that rejects central elements of both the modernist and revisionist positions, while also adopting other aspects of both positions. The Article contends that the text, structure, and objectives of the Constitution, and the weight of judicial authority, require treating all rules of customary international law as rules of federal law, but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S. courts only when the federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for judicial application of a particular rule. This approach would mirror the way in which courts apply U.S. treaties and other international agreements—treating them as matters of federal law but applying their provisions in U.S. courts only to the extent authorized by the political branches. The intentions of the political branches regarding application of particular rules of customary international law by U.S. courts can be deduced from a number of indicia, analogous to those applied to determine whether particular treaty provisions are self-executing; these include the content and character of the relevant rule of international law, statements by the Executive or Legislative branch, and the content, character, and historical treatment of related rules of international law. The position proposed in this Article produces materially different results from either the modernist or the revisionist approaches. In many cases, the analysis proposed in this Article will lead to the conclusion that particular customary international law rules—such as head of state or consular immunity and attribution of state responsibility—are directly applicable in U.S. courts, notwithstanding the absence of express authorization by the political branches. In other cases, including many emerging human rights protections, this analysis will lead to a conclusion that particular rules of customary international law are not applicable in U.S. courts

The New York Convention: A Self-Executing Treaty

The thesis of this Article is that uncertainty regarding the Convention’s status as a self-executing treaty of the United States is unwarranted and unfortunate. Instead, both the Convention’s provisions for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements (in Article II) and of arbitral awards (in Articles III, IV, V, and VI) should be regarded as self-executing and directly applicable in U.S. (and other national) courts. As discussed in detail below, this is because Article II establishes mandatory, complete, and comprehensive substantive rules, directed specifically to national courts, for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements. Likewise, the history and purposes of the Convention, the language and legislative history of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA” or “Act”), and the practices of other Contracting States support the conclusion that Article II is directly applicable in American courts

United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, The Symposium

This Essay describes and critiques the U.S. Supreme Court\u27s recent misadventures with class arbitration. First, the Essay reviews the origins and rise of class arbitration under the FAA, particularly following the Supreme Court\u27s Bazzle decision. In Part II, the Essay discusses application of the unconscionability doctrine to class action waivers, under the California courts\u27 Discover Bank doctrine. In Part III, the Essay recounts the Supreme Court\u27s retrenchment from class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen and, more fully, in Concepcion. It also critiques the Court\u27s apparent analysis in Concepcion and offers an alternative analysis for the Concepcion result that is more consistent with the FAA and its purposes