Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson

The law of habeas corpus has changed again. This time it was the law of harmless error. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson, the courts applied the same harmless error rule on direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus. Under that rule, embraced for constitutional errors in Chapman v. California, a conviction tainted by a constitutional error susceptible to harmless error analysis could be upheld only if the state demonstrated that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After Brecht, the venerable Chapman rule still applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on direct appeal, but an ostensibly less onerous standard applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on federal habeas corpus. Under this standard, derived from Kotteakos v. United States, and once used only for nonconstitutional errors, a conviction tainted by constitutional error “requires reversal only if it \u27had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u27s verdict.’” The Court was sharply divided in Brecht. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens, who provided the critical fifth vote, wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize that the [Brecht] standard is appropriately demanding. Justice Stevens\u27 separate concurring opinion deserves careful attention because it diverges from that of the Chief Justice in several ways, making Justice Stevens\u27 version of the Brecht-Kotteakos test much more favorable to habeas petitioners than that advanced by the Chief Justice. The following Article provides a concise overview and analysis of Brecht, focusing especially on the opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens. It explores the structure of the Brecht-Kotteakos rule, both as articulated in the Brecht opinion and as interpreted thus far by the lower federal courts. Its principal conclusion is that on careful analysis the Brecht-Kotteakos rule and the Chapman rule, though doubtlessly different, turn out not to be that different. Finally, this Article examines various exceptions to the Brecht-Kotteakos rule, as well as the limited authority of the federal habeas courts to apply harmless error analysis to errors infecting the penalty phase of a capital trial

Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always at Issue

Under Simmons v. South Carolina, a capital defendant who, if not sentenced to death, will remain in prison with no chance of parole is constitutionally entitled to an instruction informing the jury of the fact, but only if the prosecution engages in conduct that places the defendant\u27s future dangerousness at issue. Based on data collected from interviews with South Carolina capital jurors, Professors Blume, Garvey and Johnson argue that future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors, and is thus at issue in virtually all capital trials, regardless of the prosecution\u27s conduct. Accordingly, the authors argue that the at issue requirement of Simmons serves no real purpose and should be eliminated

Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always At Issue

Under Simmons v. South Carolina, a capital defendant who, if not sentenced to death, will remain in prison with no chance of parole is constitutionally entitled to an instruction informing the jury of the fact, but only if the prosecution engages in conduct that places the defendant\u27s future dangerousness at issue. Based on data collected from interviews with South Carolina capital jurors, Professors Blume, Garvey and Johnson argue that future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors, and is thus at issue in virtually all capital trials, regardless of the prosecution\u27s conduct. Accordingly, the authors argue that the at issue requirement of Simmons serves no real purpose and should be eliminated

Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is a multi-state research effort designed to improve the understanding of the dynamics of juror decision-making in capital cases. South Carolina data (n = 214) were used to investigate the impact of expert testimony on the mitigating factor of mental illness and the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Ordered logit regression analyses revealed significant correlations (p \u3c .005) between the presence of a defense psychiatrist or psychologist expert witness during the sentencing phase and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant was mentally disturbed. Similar analyses revealed no significant relationship between the presence of state-introduced psychiatric testimony and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant, if not executed, would be violent in the future. These findings seem to contradict the view that psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in death penalty cases has a powerful impact on jurors. The jurors in this study were significantly influenced, however, by psychiatric/psychologic testimony in the area of a defendant’s mitigating mental abnormality

Optimal internal pressurisation of cylindrical shells for maximising their critical bending load

AbstractThe paper studies the influence of internal pressure on circular thin-walled pipes (D/t>150) subjected to pure bending. Both straight pipes and curved pipes are analysed. Both yield and buckling failures are considered. It is shown that internal pressure decreases the limiting load for yield but increases the limiting load for buckling.The study is mainly FEA-based. A formula to predict critical moment given by linear buckling analysis is proposed. Comments on difference between linear and non-linear analysis results are given. It is shown that a pipe curvature opposite to the bending moment can increase the critical load. It is shown that cylindrical thin-walled shells have an optimal value of internal pressure to which limiting load for yield and critical buckling moment are equal, corresponding to an optimal use of material

Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is a multi-state research effort designed to improve the understanding of the dynamics of juror decision-making in capital cases. South Carolina data (n = 214) were used to investigate the impact of expert testimony on the mitigating factor of mental illness and the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Ordered logit regression analyses revealed significant correlations (p \u3c .005) between the presence of a defense psychiatrist or psychologist expert witness during the sentencing phase and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant was mentally disturbed. Similar analyses revealed no significant relationship between the presence of state-introduced psychiatric testimony and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant, if not executed, would be violent in the future. These findings seem to contradict the view that psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in death penalty cases has a powerful impact on jurors. The jurors in this study were significantly influenced, however, by psychiatric/psychologic testimony in the area of a defendant’s mitigating mental abnormality

Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is a multi-state research effort designed to improve the understanding of the dynamics of juror decision-making in capital cases. South Carolina data (n = 214) were used to investigate the impact of expert testimony on the mitigating factor of mental illness and the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Ordered logit regression analyses revealed significant correlations (p \u3c .005) between the presence of a defense psychiatrist or psychologist expert witness during the sentencing phase and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant was mentally disturbed. Similar analyses revealed no significant relationship between the presence of state-introduced psychiatric testimony and jurors’ having the impression that the defendant, if not executed, would be violent in the future. These findings seem to contradict the view that psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in death penalty cases has a powerful impact on jurors. The jurors in this study were significantly influenced, however, by psychiatric/psychologic testimony in the area of a defendant’s mitigating mental abnormality