Free Zone Incentives in MERCOSUR Countries and WTO Law

Published source: Gabriel Gari, 'Free Zone Incentives in MERCOSUR Countries and WTO Law' (2011) 6 Global Trade and Customs Journal, Issue 5, pp. 223–244 ID: GTCJ2011031This article examines the consistency of the incentives offered by free zone regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay with World Trade Organization (WTO) law. It suggests that some of the incentives offered to free zone users are inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) because they constitute a ‘subsidy’ within the meaning of the ASCM, subject de iure or de facto to export performance, most notably, exemptions of direct taxes, exemptions of custom duties on the import of capital goods, exemptions of payment of social welfare charges, unqualified exemptions on payment of indirect taxes, and the possibility to supply goods or services to free zone users at promotional rates. By contrast, this article suggests that there are no significant inconsistencies between free zone incentives and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) but warns that the situation could change in the future if, as a result of multilateral negotiations, MERCOSUR countries opt for extending their GATS commitments to new sectors and modes of supply

Winners and losers in Luxembourg: A statistical analysis of judicial review before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)

Reproduced with permission of the publisher

Open-source software for generating electrocardiogram signals

ECGSYN, a dynamical model that faithfully reproduces the main features of the human electrocardiogram (ECG), including heart rate variability, RR intervals and QT intervals is presented. Details of the underlying algorithm and an open-source software implementation in Matlab, C and Java are described. An example of how this model will facilitate comparisons of signal processing techniques is provided.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure

Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons

This paper investigates the impact of game presentation dependent on ethnical affiliation. Two games representing the same logical and strategical problem are introduced. Presented games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. In the first condition, a positive transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second condition, this externality is negative. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation, presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research

On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game

In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.framing of decision problems, methodology, subject-pool differences

The Janus Face of Cooperation - An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review

This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for   studies on cooperation based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner's   dilemma games with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured   decision problem. Decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a   given range of possible actions. Within a cross-cultural experimental study involving   Palestinian and Israeli subjects we test for a strategic presentation bias applying our   framework. Palestinians show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality   treatment. In Israel no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings,   we argue that cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if   only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary   application and consideration of different presentations of identical   decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation , presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research