Product Market Competition, Information and Earnings Management

Abstract: We study the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation and we find that they crucially depend on the level of visibility of firm real activity in the marketplace. If investors can perfectly observe real firm output and sales, then CEOs are forced to act in the marketplace in a consistent manner with the earnings they are reporting. We show in a simple model how this is too expensive in more competitive markets and therefore competition should reduce rather than increase earnings manipulation. On the contrary, if investors and analysts cannot observe firm real output in the marketplace we show how manipulating earnings might be particu

The role of Irving Fisher in the development of fair value accounting thought

Cardao-Pito and Ferreira do a marvellous job in putting Irving Fisher front and centre in the development of fair value accounting thought, expanding our understanding of one of history’s most respected economists. Fisher’s theories played an important role in defeating early socialists’ intellectual arguments, and yet US corporations of today pay as much tax as their foreign counterparts. The world has, voluntarily and democratically, become more Fisherian. The unwarranted one-sided criticism of Cardao-Pito and Ferreira of the current capitalist systems does little to diminish Irving Fisher’s stature as the first celebrity economist who had access to presidents and helped shape twentieth-century economic policy, including accounting

Crisis and fair values: Echoes of early twentieth century debates?

The recent global financial crisis has led to extensive criticism of the role of accounting and its use of fair value measurement in causing and spreading the crisis. This paper argues that the debate surrounding fair value vs. historic cost, and relevance versus reliability, is nothing new; it was at the center of early accounting discussions in the AAA (especially by A.C. Littleton and W.A. Paton), the AICPA (especially G.O. May), and the SEC. Although prominent accounting scholars and practitioners in postdepression 1929 focused on the use of historic cost, the paper discusses the decision of the IASB/FASB to move reliability to a secondary characteristic in its recent conceptual framework. This action ignores lessons learned from a century of research, teaching, and practice of accounting

Crisis and fair values: Echoes of early twentieth century debates?

The recent global financial crisis has led to extensive criticism of the role of accounting and its use of fair value measurement in causing and spreading the crisis. This paper argues that the debate surrounding fair value vs. historic cost, and relevance versus reliability, is nothing new; it was at the center of early accounting discussions in the AAA (especially by A.C. Littleton and W.A. Paton), the AICPA (especially G.O. May), and the SEC. Although prominent accounting scholars and practitioners in postdepression 1929 focused on the use of historic cost, the paper discusses the decision of the IASB/FASB to move reliability to a secondary characteristic in its recent conceptual framework. This action ignores lessons learned from a century of research, teaching, and practice of accounting

Tail Risks and Private Equity Performance

We examine the drivers of private equity in response to the fully exogenous Covid-19 shock, employing listed private equity as a proxy for traditional non-listed private equity. This approach enables us to reliably measure firm characteristics and performance in real-time. Listed private equity firms, on average, underperformed significantly during the crisis, with a performance drop ranging from 9.2% to 43.6%, depending on the model used. However, there is substantial crosssectional variation driven by unique firm-level attributes including access to capital, liquidity, transparency, and ownership structure. Listed private equity with better access to capital and higher transparency shows resilience during the crisis, while higher illiquidity and opacity exacerbate the negative effects. This study offers early evidence on Covid-19's impact on private equity firms, highlighting value drivers and performance dynamics of this alternative asset class during a period of extreme tail risk

Corporate investment and earnings surprises

We find that firm-level investment is negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ short-term EPS forecasts. In a 35-year panel dataset of US based companies, we find evidence that suggests firms with the best growth opportunities, opaque firms, and firms with higher than usual bonus compensation, are the ones to alter investment in order to beat benchmarks. Utilizing the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as a natural experiment we find that firms trade off accruals-based earnings management in lieu of investment cuts. Results are robust to a number of covariates, and endogeneity or reverse causality does not seem to drive our inferences. This study suggests that, consistent with survey results from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005. “The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73], managers may reduce or delay corporate investment to meet or beat short-term earnings benchmarks

The Risk and Performance of Listed Private Equity

Private equity (PE) risk and performance is a black box for investors, as information is quasi-private during a fund’s life. To overcome this issue, the authors use the universe of listed PEs (LPEs) in US exchanges, which permits the measurement of financial fundamentals based on audited quarterly reports, and the observation of share price performance and volatility on a real-time basis. They first show that LPE performance and valuations are highly correlated to that of unlisted PEs, and hence are a good proxy. LPEs constantly exhibit leverage double that of the broader market while showing no distinctive share price performance. Controlling for standard determinants of returns, LPE firms do not outperform market benchmarks. Using COVID-19 as an exogenous increase in tail risk, PE firms grossly underperformed as markets penalized the riskiness and lack of transparency inherent in PE investments. The problems are likely greater in privately held PEs, where performance is self-reported, not audited, and illiquidity periods last up to 10 or 12 years