4 research outputs found

    Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

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    This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

    Quantifying the influence of rainfall, vegetation and animals on soil erosion and hillslope connectivity in the monsoonal tropics of northern Australia

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