An Exploration of the Gendered Racial Microaggression Experiences of Black Girls

The purpose of this study is to extend research on gendered racial microaggressions by using an intersectional approach to develop a taxonomy of gendered racial microaggressions experienced by Black adolescent girls. This study seeks to answer the following research question: What are the gendered racial microaggression experiences of Black adolescent girls? The current study uses a Black feminist and intersectionality theoretical lens to illuminate the gendered racial microaggression experiences of Black girls. A community sample of 33 high school Black adolescent girls between the ages of 13 – 17 (M = 15, SD = .92) were recruited through schools, community organizations, and churches in East Tennessee. Data was collected through four semi-structured focus group interviews. Using dimensional analysis, findings of this study uncovered several gendered racial microaggression themes, which expanded the existing taxonomy of gendered racial microaggressions (Lewis et al., 2016). The findings yielded three core themes with three subthemes each: Standards of Beauty (Standards of Aesthetics, Devaluation, Hair Exoticism), Silenced and Marginalized ((In)visibility, Overdisciplined/Under Protected, Assumption of Intelligence & Communication Styles), and Projected Stereotypes (Expectation of the Angry Black Girl, Expectation of the Ghetto Black Girl, Expectation of the Jezebel). The findings uncovered several themes that map onto the taxonomy of gendered racial microaggressions experienced by adult Black women; new themes unique to Black adolescent girls also emerged. The three core themes provided a multidimensional narrative of how controlling images and negative stereotypes operate to narrowly define Black girls within a cycle of oppression. The current study addresses several gaps in the literature on intersectional microaggressions, particularly among youth. Clinical, education, and policy implications are discussed

Art Imitates Life: The Representation (Or Lack Thereof) of Black Women in Video Games

The key focus of this essay is to compare the representation of black women in media, primarily in television and film, to the representation of black female characters in video games. Using black feminist theory, this essay illustrates the treatment of black female characters in gaming. The particular and deliberate methods of writing black female characters in video games are used to highlight white video game characters and their narratives, instead of giving life and dimension to the black female characters themselves. The hostile and unsafe environments in gaming spaces are cultivated through upholding these harmful stereotypes of black women, and they directly harm black women who enjoy gaming

Federal Pleading Standards in State Court

Most state courts cannot follow both their state constitutions and federal pleading standards. Even if they could, policy considerations unique to states compel state courts to reject federal pleading standards. This is because federal courts have changed pleading standards to allow judges to make factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and to require more factual detail in complaints. While scholars have vigorously debated whether these changes are wise, just, and permissible under the federal rules and the Constitution, they have ignored the even more important questions of whether state courts can and should adopt those pleading standards. The oversight is particularly worrisome because so many state courts are currently struggling with those questions while hearing fifty times as many cases a year as federal courts do. Indeed, questions about pleading standards that deserve the most scholarly attention have received the least. This Article answers these questions with a definitive “no.” First, federal pleading standards violate the “inviolate” right to a jury trial contained in most state constitutions. This Article describes states as generally falling into one of four categories as it relates to the scope of their jury trial rights: (1) those following English common law practice from when the United States became an independent nation, (2) those whose constitutions enshrine distinctively American attitudes toward juries prevalent during the eighteenth century, (3) those who codified the right to a jury trial at the same time they wrote the first civil procedure codes in the nineteenth century, and (4) hybrids. It demonstrates that in all four cases, federal pleading standards are unconstitutional because they allow judges to decide factual questions that must be left to a jury. In some cases, the requirement to provide heightened factual detail is a constitutionally impermissible procedural barrier between a litigant and a jury. Furthermore, this Article makes the original claim that states should reject federal pleading standards for different reasons than those typically invoked by critics of changes in federal pleading standards. Instead of treating state courts as satellites revolving around federal courts, this Article puts state courts at the center of the debate. It explains that states must consider different policy concerns than federal courts do when formulating pleading standards. First, states generally guarantee litigants the right to a remedy and that their courts will be open to all who wish to remediate an injury. Second, states claim to make it easier than it is in federal courts for litigants to get a jury trial and are supposed to and do hear the vast majority of cases in this country. Third, states elect judges, which necessitates juries serving as a check on politicized decisionmaking. Fourth, states should not consider pleading standards in a vacuum. They should consider their own pleading standards in light of how federal pleading standards threaten to close the courthouse door on many vulnerable litigants. If state courts use the same pleading standards as federal courts now do, those litigants will have nowhere to go and will be shut out of court entirely. These policy concerns do not just justify states using different pleading standards than federal courts do; they require states to do so

State Constitutional Provisions Allowing Juries to Interpret the Law Are Not As Crazy As They Sound

(Excerpt) This Article questions that consensus. Joining a larger debate about the jury’s proper role, it argues that, even today, these provisions are a defensible component of a criminal justice system. First, this Article argues that the jury is the entity in the justice system most incentivized to approach legal questions with an eye to what the best interpretation is and not the most politically palatable result. Second, this Article argues that the jury’s ability to deliberate and consider opinions from individuals hailing from a wider variety of backgrounds than those who typically become judges may provide advantages over a single trial court judge in interpreting the law. Third, it acknowledges practical difficulties that allowing juries to interpret the law could cause, but argues that they are not so insurmountable as to make it unreasonable for state constitutional provisions like Indiana’s, Maryland’s, and Georgia’s to allow juries to interpret the law. Finally, this Article contemplates ways such provisions could dramatically change plea bargaining

Federal Pleadings Standards in State Court

Most state courts cannot follow both their state constitutions and federal pleading standards. Even if they could, policy considerations unique to states compel state courts to reject federal pleading standards. This is because federal courts have changed pleading standards to allow judges to make factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and to require more factual detail in complaints. While scholars have vigorously debated whether these changes are wise, just, and permissible under the federal rules and the Constitution, they have ignored the even more important questions of whether state courts can and should adopt those pleading standards. The oversight is particularly worrisome because so many state courts are currently struggling with those questions while hearing fifty times as many cases a year as federal courts do. Indeed, questions about pleading standards that deserve the most scholarly attention have received the least. This Article answers these questions with a definitive no. First, federal pleading standards violate the inviolate right to a jury trial contained in most state constitutions. This Article describes states as generally falling into one of four categories as it relates to the scope of their jury trial rights: (1) those following English common law practice from when the United States became an independent nation, (2) those whose constitutions enshrine distinctively American attitudes toward juries prevalent during the eighteenth century, (3) those who codified the right to a jury trial at the same time they wrote the first civil procedure codes in the nineteenth century, and (4) hybrids. It demonstrates that in allfour cases, federal pleading standards are unconstitutional because they allow judges to decide factual questions that must be left to a jury. In some cases, the requirement to provide heightened factual detail is a constitutionally impermissible procedural barrier between a litigant and a jury. Furthermore, this Article makes the original claim that states should reject federal pleading standards for different reasons than those typically invoked by critics of changes in federal pleading standards. Instead of treating state courts as satellites revolving around federal courts, this Article puts state courts at the center of the debate. It explains that states must consider different policy concerns than federal courts do when formulating pleading standards. First, states generally guarantee litigants the right to a remedy and that their courts will be open to all who wish to remediate an injury. Second, states claim to make it easier than it is in federal courts for litigants to get a jury trial and are supposed to and do hear the vast majority of cases in this country. Third, states elect judges, which necessitates juries serving as a check on politicized decision-making. Fourth, states should not consider pleading standards in a vacuum. They should consider their own pleading standards in light of how federal pleading standards threaten to close the courthouse door on many vulnerable litigants. If state courts use the same pleading standards as federal courts now do, those litigants will have nowhere to go and will be shut out of court entirely. These policy concerns do not just justify states using different pleading standards than federal courts do; they require states to do so

State Constitutions and Summary Judgment

Is summary judgment constitutional? Scholars have passionately debated the question in recent years. But they have made an important oversight. State courts hear more than fifty times as many cases a year as federal courts do. Whatever state courts decide with regard to summary judgment will affect vastly more litigants than what federal courts do. At the same time, states have largely adopted federal summary judgment standards and cases interpreting them. Yet scholars considering whether summary judgment is constitutional have focused all of their attention on the Seventh Amendment. They have entirely failed to consider state constitutional jury trial guarantees. This matters doctrinally because state constitutions use different language to enshrine the right to a jury trial than the Seventh Amendment, and those provisions have a different history than the Seventh Amendment. Ironically, the issue surrounding summary judgment\u27s constitutionality that is the most important-whether it violates state constitutions has received the least scholarly attention

Reevaluating the Importance of Civics Education

In the effort to reform American education, civics has received little attention. To spur efforts to improve the civics education that students receive, four congressmen introduced the Sandra Day O\u27Connor Civics Education Act. This article argues that while the legislation may provide some marginal benefits, it is unlikely to have a great impact on civics education. The article then proposes ideas on what additional measures such legislation might take to genuinely improve civics instruction for students around the country. The article concludes by explaining the necessity of reforming civics education and laying out the benefits of implementing the proposed changes