Short-run vs. long-run cooperation among the G-20 countries

In a model of repeated games, we determine the conditions under which cooperation is an equilibrium outcome among the G-20 countries. We consider first, that members are uncertain about the lifespan of the G-20. Second, the nature of member countries and their interrelations can change because of shifts in government regimes. Monitoring and peer pressure to comply with the agreements made are necessary if the goals are to achieve cooperation and thereby attain desirable common goals. If member countries are prone to shifting government regimes and governments are not concerned about their countries' reputations, continuous cooperation becomes more difficult.Repeated games, Prisoners’ Dilemma, cooperation, monitoring, reputation

Monitoring, Liquidity and Financial Crises

This paper analyzes central bank policies on the monitoring of banks in distress in which liquidity provisions are conditional on performance when a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: the first one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The results show that banks exert less effort and take higher risks with a discretionary monitoring policy. With public information about monitoring rules, there is more central bank monitoring and less need to provide emergency funding. Public information about monitoring resolves the multiple equilibria that arise with discretion in fact, a unique equilibrium emerges in which the probability of a banking crisis is reduced.monitoring liquidity provision financial crises conditionality

Exchange rate uncertainty and optimal participation in international trade

Instead of just focusing on the effect of exchange rate levels (undervalued or overvalued exchange rates) on trade, this paper provides an analysis of the effects of exchange rate volatility levels on international trade. Intuitively, an increase in exchange rate volatility leads to uncertainty for agents participating in international trade, and such uncertainty might have a negative impact on international trade flows and participation, thereby reducing the advantages of world-wide specialization. This is especially crucial for countries where exchange rate derivatives markets are not yet well developed and the costs of hedging exchange rate risk are very high. The model here considers optimal decisions about participation in international trade under uncertainty about the exchange rate. The main conclusion is that a high level of exchange rate volatility can deter entrepreneurs from becoming exporters, even though exporting can be highly profitable. For those already participating in international trade, it is opposite: they may, optimally, choose not to leave the market even though staying in this market is highly unprofitable in the short run.Trade Law,Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Markets and Market Access

How does public information on central bank intervention strategies affect exchange rate volatility ? the case of Peru

Intervention operations in the foreign exchange market are used by the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru to manage both the level and volatility of their exchange rates. The Banco Central de Reserva del Peru provides information to the market about the specific hours of the day interventions would take place and the total amount of intervention. It consistently buys and sells on the foreign exchange market to avoid large appreciations and depreciations of the Peruvian nuevo sol against the U.S. dollar (Sol/USD), respectively. The estimates in this paper indicate that past information on interventions has moved the sol in the intended direction but only during the time the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru has announced it would be active in the foreign exchange market. The authors also find that the expectation of future interventions by the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru decreases the volatility of the sol when it intervenes to avoid an appreciation of the sol; however, the opposite occurs when the intervention takes place to defend the sol from depreciation. Indeed, the sol has been less volatile during periods when the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru has intervened than otherwise.Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Economic Stabilization,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Macroeconomic Management

Moral Hazard Effects of Bailing out under Asymmetric Information

With a four-stage sequential game model, we study how bailouts ameliorate the effects of liquidation on fundamentals, reduce the likelihood of currency crises and affect the financial sector's (non-observable) effort. In stage 1, exchange rate regime is announced and all agents receive probabilistic information that a shock may occur in stage 4. Here, the government can commit to an optimal bailout or may wait until stage 4 when a bad shock may occur. The private sector in stage 2 forms exchange rate expectations, and decides on investments and effort. In stage 3, the government faces costs due to expectations of devaluation and liquidation, and may decide to pre-emptively abandon its exchange rate policy. We show that commitment decisions have very important implications for the agents' optimal decisions.

A Risk Allocation Approach to Optimal Exchange Rate Policy

We derive the optimal exchange rate policy for a small open economy subject to terms-of-trade shocks. Firm owners and workers are risk averse but workers more so. Wages are given or partially indexed in the short run, and capital markets are imperfect. The government sets the exchange rate to allocate risk between workers and owners. With less risk-averse firms, and greater difference in risk aversion between workers and firms, the optimal exchange rate should vary little with pure terms-of-trade shocks but more with general shocks to prices. Optimal exchange rate variation is greater with indexed wages, but is smaller when firms behave monopolistically and when wage taxes (profit taxes) change procyclically (countercyclically) with export prices (import prices). The model gives policy rules for determining optimal variations of the exchange rate, and indicates when it is, and is not, optimal to join a currency union with trading partners, implying zero exchange rate variation.currency band, monetary union, price volatility, optimal risk allocation

“Corporate investment, cash flow level and market imperfections”

We analyze firms’ investment behavior, differentiating firms according to the cash flow levels they experience during their lifecycles. We consequently consider the firm as the basic unit and not firm-year observations. Firms with persistent positive cash flow show higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms with persistent negative cash flow. Independent of the industry they belong to, older firms with positive cash flow show a weaker sensitivity than younger firms with positive cash flow. Firms with persistent negative cash flow are neither younger nor smaller than their counterparts, and their cash flow coefficient can be positive, negative or statistically insignificant. Thus, classifying firms by age or size may not yield a group of firms with similar financial structures.Financial constraints; internal funds; investment

Energy subsidies, public investment and endogenous growth

We consider impacts of fossil fuel subsidy reforms on economic growth, focusing mostly on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The main empirical result is that a country that initially subsidizes its fossil fuels, and then eliminates or reduces these subsidies, will as a result experience higher economic GDP per capita growth, and higher levels of employment and labor force participation, especially among the young. These effects are strongest in countries whose fuel subsidies are high at the outset, such as in the MENA region. Our model predicts that a 20 US$ cents average increase in the gasoline and diesel prices per liter, through removal of subsidies, increase the GDP per capita growth rate by about 0.48% and 0.30%, respectively. In the MENA countries, governments’ savings from reduced subsidies seem to be earmarked mainly to health expenditures, education expenditures and public investment in infrastructure. These channels appear to be strong contributing factors to higher long-run growth when fuel subsidies are reduced

Carbon pricing of international transport fuels: Impacts on carbon emissions and trade activity

We study impacts of carbon pricing to international transport fuels on fuel consumption and carbon emissions, trade activity, focusing on sea freight which constitutes the most important international trade transport activity. We use the WITS global dataset for international trade for the years 2009-2017 to estimate the impacts of changes in the global average bunker fuel price on the weight times distance for goods transported and carbon emission from international shipping. We find quite strong but variable negative effects of fuel cost increases on weight times distance for traded goods, and on carbon emissions from sea freight, for the heaviest goods categories at the 6-digit HS levels of aggregation in global trade, with bunker-price elasticities ranging from -0.03 up to -0.52. Considering an increase in the bunker fuel price as a proxy for a fuel tax, our results then indicate substantial impacts of bunker fuel taxes on the volume of sea transport, on bunker fuel consumption, and on carbon emissions from the international shipping sector. Our results indicate that, for the current level of international trade, a global tax of $40 per ton CO2 tax will reduce carbon emissions from global shipping fleet by about 7% for the heaviest traded products; and by most so for goods with particularly high weight-to-value ratios such as fossil fuels and ores