The Shocking Impact of Corporate Scandal on Directors\u27 and Officers\u27 Liability

Directors and officers liability (hereinafter D&O) serves as a deterrent to corporate wrongdoing. Recent cycles of corporate scandal have impacted the tools used to manage the risk that D&O liability creates. The impact of these scandals is a shock, which is a sudden event that alters the market profoundly. Market alteration has counter intuitively resulted in increased availability of D&O insurance at a lower price, despite an increase in D&O liability. With increased D&O coverage offerings at lower costs, the market has become soft, making coverage readily available. Carriers are competing for insureds and there is now a risk of undermining the deterrent effect that D&O liability provides. This paper explores whether D&O liability\u27s deterrent effect has been jeopardized in this soft D&O insurance marke

Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the Implications for D&O Liability: The United States and Australia

This Article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms may be more effective as new scandals emerge

The Emerging Bad Faith Cause of Action Takes on the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine

The Georgia Workers\u27 Compensation Act ( the Act ) and the related regulations establish a system of comprehensive medical coverage and income benefits for employees who suffer work-related injuries. Workers\u27 compensation is a statutory scheme that grants the injured employee a sure remedy of scheduled income benefits and medical coverage without regard to fault; in exchange, the employer and insurer escape the high costs of litigation and the threat of compensatory and punitive damages. Under this quid pro quo, employees injured at work have as their exclusive remedy the workers\u27 compensation system, thereby giving rise to the exclusive remedy doctrine. The integrity of the exclusive remedy doctrine is the key to maintaining a fundamentally sound and equitable workers\u27 compensation system. The exclusive remedy doctrine, however, is facing a formidable challenge in Georgia. In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Dicks, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a physical injury caused by willful and wanton cessation of workers\u27 compensation benefits circumvents the exclusive remedy doctrine and gives rise to a tort action. The court found that a new or exacerbated physical injury that arises from the actions of the insurer is outside the scope of the Workers\u27 Compensation Act. This ruling enables similarly situated plaintiffs to pursue recovery through the workers\u27 compensation system and through traditional civil litigation. The holding in Dicks exposes employers and insurers to the very risk the quid pro quo originally prevented: compensatory and punitive damages