Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Emotions

This article explores the nature of Aristotelian emotions and the body-soul metaphysics required to undergird them. The point of departure is an oft-cited argument that appeals to our experience of fear and anger to show the inseparability of the soul. My claim is that this argument is commonly misunderstood: that the intended target is not a separable soul, but an embodied soul. Reinterpreted, we find that Aristotle is driven by an interest to integrate the sentient body with the intellect. And while, on this interpretation, the argument does not support a functionalist reading of Aristotle on the soul, it does suggest that Aristotle shares key intuitions with embodied cognition theorists and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, in particular, who demonstrates the dependence of reason on the body

Theophrastus and the Intellect as Mixture

De Anima III 5 introduces one of Aristotle’s most perplexing doctrines. In this short and obscure chapter, Aristotle distinguishes between an intellect that becomes all things, the so-called potential intellect, and an intellect that makes all things, the so-called productive intellect (430a14-15). It is generally held that the intellect that becomes all things is described in De Anima III 4, since Aristotle there tells us that the intellect knows by becoming its objects (429a15-18). This intellect has acquired the title “potential intellect” since it must be potentially the objects of thought in order to become and think the objects of thought (429a18-24). But scholars do not agree on what these intellects are, what they do or how they relate to each other. The main point of contention arises with respect to the productive intellect’s mode of existence – in particular, whether it is transcendent or immanent. This paper concerns Theophrastus’ interpretation of De Anima III 4 and 5, because those familiar with his writings tend to agree that he holds the key to resolving this 2,300-year-old debate

Themistius as a Commentator on Aristotle: Understanding and Appreciating His Conception of \u27Nous Pathetikos\u27 and \u27Phantasia\u27

Themistius is not only a commentator on Aristotle; he is also one of our main sources of Theophrastus on the intellect. Hence, it is important to understand how he approaches and reads texts. It is my view that care and rigor are reflected in his treatment of nous pathêtikos. In this paper, I argue that Themistius postulates a third intellect whose job is to discern enmattered forms-i.e., sensible particulars-on the reasonable assumption that the productive and potential intellects are responsible solely for our contemplation of un-enmattered forms. As such, the passive intellect is responsible for what Aristotle calls incidental perception and, thereby, plays an important role in nearly all of our affections (pathê). It is a mistake, however, to regard Themistius\u27s nous pathêtikos as a distinct third intellect that stands alongside its productive and potential counterparts. This intellect, I contend, emerges as part of a larger effort to explain the intellect\u27s relation to the rest of the soul in light of the unique way that humans experience the world

Commentary on Ward’s Interpretation of \u27De Anima\u27 III 3

Any interpretation of Aristotle’s phantasia should aim to account for the unusual presentation he gives of it in De Anima III 3. The procedure of this chapter is not typical to his investigations into the soul’s faculties. His accounts usually proceed from an examination of its objects, since they determine the nature and character of its activities. But Aristotle does not clearly state what the objects of fantasiva are, leading some scholars to conclude that it has no objects of its own and, hence, is not a genuine or full faculty. Instead of detailing its objects, he begins the chapter with the argument that his predecessors cannot account for the possibility of error because they take sense-perceiving (aijsqavnesqai) to be identical to understanding (fronei`n, 427a21-22). Phantasia is abruptly introduced in the course of this discussion. After distinguishing sense-perception from understanding (fronei`n) and thinking (noei`n), Aristotle writes, “For phantasia is different from sense-perception and discursive thought” (427b14-15). He then turns his attention to phantasia, but to specify, at least initially, what it is not. The negative analysis effectively provides a list of features phantasia can have; however, we are left to wonder which of these features are essential to it, if any. It is only in the last section of the chapter beginning at 428b10 that Aristotle provides something of a positive account. Phantasia, he there explains, is a motion that occurs as the result of actual sense-perceiving (428b13, b25-26), is similar to sense-perception (428b14), and is that in virtue of which its possessor can do and be affected by many things (428b16-17)

Aristotle on the Good of Reproduction

This paper discusses Aristotle’s theory of reproduction: specifically, the good that he thinks organisms attain by reproducing. The aim of this paper is to refute the widespread theory that Aristotle believes plants and animals reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality. This interpretive claim plays an important role in supporting one leading interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology: the theory that Aristotelian nature is teleologically oriented with a view solely to what benefits individual organisms, and what benefits the organism is its survival and well–being. This paper challenges the theories that Aristotle takes plants and animals to reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality, and that he believes survival to be the most basic of goods. It is argued that Aristotle believes reproduction is detrimental to organisms’ health and longevity but nonetheless is central to plant and animal flourishing. It is claimed that, to explain the fundamentality of the reproductive soul function, Aristotle appeals to the eternal and divine