The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability

This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly decentralized middle-income democracy, Argentina. The Argentine political system makes subnational political power structures very influential in national politics. Moreover, most Argentine provinces are local bastions of power dominated by entrenched elites, characterized by scarce political competition, weak division of powers, and clientelistic political linkages. Political dominance in the provinces and political importance at the national level reinforce each other, dragging the Argentine political and policymaking system towards the practices and features of its most politically backward regions

The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

This paper investigates the political economy of fiscal reform activism in Argentina since the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions sixteen times. Tax and budgetary reforms moved from centralizing revenue sources and spending authority in the federal government to mild decentralization lately. Fiscal federal rules combined centralization of revenues and management in the federal government with short-term compensations for the provinces. This paper contends that reform activism can be explained by the recurrence of economic and policy shocks while reform patterns may be accounted for as consequences of the decreasing political integration of national parties in a polity whose decisionmaking rules encourage the formation of oversized coalitions. The decrease in political integration weakened the national party leaderships ability to coordinate intergovernmental bargaining, and strengthened the local bosses and factions needed to form oversized coalitions

A novel visualization tool for art history and conservation: automated colorization of black and white archival photographs of works of art

This paper describes the use of a customized algorithm for the colorization of historical black and white photographs documenting earlier states of paintings. This study specifically focuses on Pablo Picasso's mid-century Mediterranean masterpiece La Joie de Vivre, 1946 (Musée Picasso, Antibes, France). The custom-designed algorithm allows computer-controlled spreading of color information on a digital image of black and white historical photographs to obtain accurate color renditions. Expert observation of the present state of the painting, coupled with stratigraphic information from cross sections allows the attribution of color information to selected pixels in the digitized images. The algorithm uses the localized color information and the grayscale intensities of the black and white historical photographs to formulate a set of equations for the missing color values of the remaining pixels. The computational resolution of such equations allows an accurate colorization that preserves brushwork and shading. This new method is proposed as a valuable alternative to the use of commercial software to apply flat areas of color, which is currently the most common practice for colorization efforts in the conservation community. Availability of such colorized images enhances the art-historical understanding of the works and might lead to better-informed treatment

Challenges to Democracy in Developing Countries

This chapter explores the diverse challenges that democracy faces in developing countries. Developing countries include the vast majority of political regimes in the world, many of which are countries that transitioned to democracy in the last four decades or so. They include all of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Eurasia, and most of Asia. Democracy varies within this large subset of countries, and developing countries face distinct challenges, as opposed to developed democracies in North America and Western Europe that include, namely, the heterogeneity of democratic practices, the uneven reach of the state and the rule of law, state capture by economic and private interests, and political violence.The three components of a democratic regime ? free and fair elections, participatory rights of voting and being elected, and a set of surrounding freedoms that support the likelihood of these elections and citizens? participatory rights (O?Donnell 2010) ? presuppose the concept of citizenship, on the one hand, and the existence of the state, on the other. Citizenship rights and a consolidated state are often taken for granted in democracies in the developed world. But many of the tensions that democracies in developing countries face are often related to the uneven extension of citizenship rights and the incapacity of the state to enforce the rule of law homogeneously throughout its territory. Democracies in the developing world are often uneven democracies, where there is an economic center and a periphery, where not all citizens enjoy the same rights in practice, where parts of the state may be captured by private interests, and where the state?s monopoly of the use of force may be disputed by armed groups, among others. The challenges faced by democracies in developing countries are manifold and this is the focus of this chapter.Fil: Behrend, Jacqueline Mariela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentin