Tropospheric water vapour observations by ground-based lidar

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A principled information valuation for communications during multi-agent coordination

Decentralised coordination in multi-agent systems is typically achieved using communication. However, in many cases, communication is expensive to utilise because there is limited bandwidth, it may be dangerous to communicate, or communication may simply be unavailable at times. In this context, we argue for a rational approach to communication --- if it has a cost, the agents should be able to calculate a value of communicating. By doing this, the agents can balance the need to communicate with the cost of doing so. In this research, we present a novel model of rational communication that uses information theory to value communications, and employ this valuation in a decision theoretic coordination mechanism. A preliminary empirical evaluation of the benefits of this approach is presented in the context of the RoboCupRescue simulator

Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a One­ to ­Many Setting

Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion. In this setting, "fairness", which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral

Catching Cheats: Detecting Strategic Manipulation in Distributed Optimisation of Electric Vehicle Aggregators

Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets set for the near future, the management of large EV fleets must be seen as a priority. Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested EV aggregators who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity needed to meet their clients' requirements. With the aim of reducing electricity costs and lowering the impact on electricity markets, a centralised bidding coordination framework has been proposed in the literature employing a coordinator. In order to improve privacy and limit the need for the coordinator, we propose a reformulation of the coordination framework as a decentralised algorithm, employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). However, given the self-interested nature of the aggregators, they can deviate from the algorithm in order to reduce their energy costs. Hence, we study the strategic manipulation of the ADMM algorithm and, in doing so, describe and analyse different possible attack vectors and propose a mathematical framework to quantify and detect manipulation. Importantly, this detection framework is not limited the considered EV scenario and can be applied to general ADMM algorithms. Finally, we test the proposed decentralised coordination and manipulation detection algorithms in realistic scenarios using real market and driver data from Spain. Our empirical results show that the decentralised algorithm's convergence to the optimal solution can be effectively disrupted by manipulative attacks achieving convergence to a different non-optimal solution which benefits the attacker. With respect to the detection algorithm, results indicate that it achieves very high accuracies and significantly outperforms a naive benchmark

Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others

Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others

Optimal bidding strategies for simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes

In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single auction. For this case, we prove that, assuming free disposal, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, irrespective of the local bidders’ valuation distribution. Furthermore, for nondecreasing valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions. These results hold both in the case where the number of local bidders is known and when this number is determined by a Poisson distribution. In addition, by combining analytical and simulation results, we demonstrate that similar results hold in the case of several global bidders, provided that the market consists of both global and local bidders. Finally, we address the efficiency of the overall market, and show that information about the number of local bidders is an important determinant for the way in which a global bidder affects efficiency

Métodos de análisis foliar aplicados bosques naturales y exóticos de interés comercial: características, ventajas y desventajas.

El presente trabajo, corresponde a una síntesis bibliográfica cuyo objetivo radica en la descripción de las principales características de tres de los métodos más utilizados en los análisis de tejido foliar de origen vegetal. Para ello, se analizaron los estudios relacionados  la temática expuesta, desde los cuales se extrajeron los principales resultados y discusiones sobre las ventajas del uso de cada uno de ellos. Los métodos aquí presentados corresponden al método de los valores críticos (VC), método DRIS (diagnosis and recommendation integrated system), y método a través del análisis de vectores. Las principales conclusiones indican que los tres métodos permiten abordar en general las distintas condiciones en las cuales crecen los bosques naturales y exóticos de interés comercial, no destacándose ningún método sobre otro, sin embargo, cada uno posee sus ventajas dependiendo de la especie tratada y el sitio. Lo anterior permite su recomendación con base a características de la especie analizada y las condiciones de sitio en las cuales crece y se desarrollan las especies forestales. Palabras clave: foliar, macro-elementos, micro-elemento

Torts - Mental Distress - Recovery Against Original Wrongdoer for Fear of Cancer Caused by Subsequent Medical Advice

Plaintiff, suffering from bursitis in the right shoulder, received X-ray treatments from defendant physicians. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff\u27s shoulder began to itch, scab, and blister for several years, a condition diagnosed as chronic radiodermatitis caused by the X-ray therapy. Approximately two years after the treatments, plaintiff was examined by a dermatologist who advised her to have her shoulder checked every six months because the area might become cancerous. Plaintiff then developed a severe cancerphobia, an apprehension that she would ultimately develop cancer from the radiation burn. Plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against defendant physicians, seeking recovery for the physical injury and the mental distress caused by her later-developed fear of cancer. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff and the appellate division affirmed. On appeal, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting in part. Plaintiff can recover for the mental suffering which resulted from information she received from a third party to whom she had gone for treatment of the original physical injury. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. (2d) 16, 152 N.E. (2d) 249 (1958)

Setting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces: An Equilibrium Analysis

In this paper, we analyse competing double auction marketplaces that vie for traders and need to set appropriate fees to make a profit. Specifically, we show how competing marketplaces should set their fees by analysing the equilibrium behaviour of two competing marketplaces. In doing so, we focus on two different types of market fees: registration fees charged to traders when they enter the marketplace, and profit fees charged to traders when they make transactions. In more detail, given the market fees, we first derive equations to calculate the marketplaces' expected profits. Then we analyse the equilibrium charging behaviour of marketplaces in two different cases: where competing marketplaces can only charge the same type of fees and where competing marketplaces can charge different types of fees. This analysis provides insights which can be used to guide the charging behaviour of competing marketplaces. We also analyse whether two marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. We find that, when both marketplaces are limited to charging the same type of fees, traders will eventually converge to one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed, traders may converge to different marketplaces (i.e. multiple marketplaces can co-exist)