A specialized inventory problem in banks: optimizing retail sweeps

Deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks are an essential input to the business activity of most depository institutions in the United States. Managing these deposits is an important and complex inventory problem, for two reasons. First, Federal Reserve regulations require that depository institutions hold certain amounts of such deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks to satisfy statutory reserve requirements against customers* transaction accounts (demand deposits and other checkable deposits). Second, some inventory of such deposits is essential for banks to operate one of their core lines of business: furnishing payment services to households and firms. including wire transfers, ACH payments, and check clearing settlement. Because the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on such deposits used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements, banks seek to minimize their inventory of such deposits. In 1994, the banking industry introduced a new inventory management tool for such deposits, the retail deposit sweep program, which avoids the statutory requirement by reclassifying transaction deposits as savings deposits. In this analysis, we examine two algorithms for operating such sweeps programs within the limits of Federal Reserve regulations.Banks and banking ; Retail trade

The Real Interest Differential Model after Twenty Years

It has been twenty years since Frankel (1979) offered the classic empirical support for the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model against the simple monetary approach model, and almost that long since Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) uncovered some important inconsistencies between Frankel’s theoretical framework and his empirical implementation. Frankel’s RID model nevertheless spawned a huge lit-erature in international monetary economics. In this paper, we replicate and update the Frankel (1979) and Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) results, in order to offer a retrospective and a reëvaluation of this lit-erature. We also explain why the model estimated by Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) cannot underpin a critique of Frankel (1979), a point which is not generally recognized. While specialists in international finance generally recognize that the initial promise of Frankel’s research has not been kept, we believe that many will be surprised nevertheless by our stark findings. JEL: F31, F40, C13exchange rates, real interest differential model