Randomized crossover comparison of proportional assist ventilation and patient-triggered ventilation in extremely low birth weight infants with evolving chronic lung disease

Background: Refinement of ventilatory techniques remains a challenge given the persistence of chronic lung disease of preterm infants. Objective: To test the hypothesis that proportional assist ventilation ( PAV) will allow to lower the ventilator pressure at equivalent fractions of inspiratory oxygen (FiO(2)) and arterial hemoglobin oxygen saturation in ventilator-dependent extremely low birth weight infants in comparison with standard patient-triggered ventilation ( PTV). Methods: Design: Randomized crossover design. Setting: Two level-3 university perinatal centers. Patients: 22 infants ( mean (SD): birth weight, 705 g ( 215); gestational age, 25.6 weeks ( 2.0); age at study, 22.9 days ( 15.6)). Interventions: One 4- hour period of PAV was applied on each of 2 consecutive days and compared with epochs of standard PTV. Results: Mean airway pressure was 5.64 ( SD, 0.81) cm H2O during PAV and 6.59 ( SD, 1.26) cm H2O during PTV ( p < 0.0001), the mean peak inspiratory pressure was 10.3 ( SD, 2.48) cm H2O and 15.1 ( SD, 3.64) cm H2O ( p < 0.001), respectively. The FiO(2) ( 0.34 (0.13) vs. 0.34 ( 0.14)) and pulse oximetry readings were not significantly different. The incidence of arterial oxygen desaturations was not different ( 3.48 ( 3.2) vs. 3.34 ( 3.0) episodes/ h) but desaturations lasted longer during PAV ( 2.60 ( 2.8) vs. 1.85 ( 2.2) min of desaturation/ h, p = 0.049). PaCO2 measured transcutaneously in a subgroup of 12 infants was similar. One infant met prespecified PAV failure criteria. No adverse events occurred during the 164 cumulative hours of PAV application. Conclusions: PAV safely maintains gas exchange at lower mean airway pressures compared with PTV without adverse effects in this population. Backup conventional ventilation breaths must be provided to prevent apnea-related desaturations. Copyright (c) 2007 S. Karger AG, Base

Acceptance and Motivational Impact of the Organic Certification System

In recent years the institutional framework of the organic certification system has step by step become a more formal and state run system. Our research shows that al-though the majority of the farmers accept the system, they are not convinced of its cost-benefit relationship. Farmers prefer a more association- and advice-oriented control of the organic certification process

On the Channels of Pro-Social Behavior Evidence from a natural field experiment

We conduct a natural field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms for small donations. Charitable contributions are significantly higher if made indirectly, i.e. if they are tied to the purchase of a good sold at a premium, than if they are made directly. Donations are signficantly higher under both transfer mechanisms if people are given a suggested reference donatioTied versus untied transfers, charitable donations, charity, willingness to give, pro social behavior

Inefficient but Effective? A field experiment on the effectiveness of direct and indirect transfer mechanisms

We conduct a field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. It shows that people are willing to donate significantly more if the donation is indirect, i.e., it is tied to the purchase of a good with a price premium, rather than made directly. This points to an efficiency–effectiveness trade–off: even though indirect donations are less efficient than direct donations, they are more effective in mobilizing resources. Our findings hold for ‘Fair Trade’ coffee as well as for ‘normal’ coffee. However, the strength of the efficiency–effectiveness trade–off is higher in the case of ‘Fair Trade’.Tied transfers, donations, charity, efficiency versus effectiveness, ‘fair trade’

Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.Political economy, environmental policy, transboundary pollution, common agency, strategic interaction

Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.Political economy, environmental policy, transboundary pollution, common agency, strategic interaction

On the Channels of Pro-Social Behavior-Evidence from a natural field experiment

We conduct a natural field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms for small donations. Charitable contributions are significantly higher if made indirectly, i.e. if they are tied to the purchase of a good sold at a premium, than if they are made directly. Donations are significantly higher under both transfer mechanisms if people are given a suggested reference donation.Tied versus untied transfers, charitable donations, charity, willingness to give, pro social behavior

Inefficient but effective? A field experiment on the effectiveness of direct and indirect transfer mechanisms

We conduct a field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. It shows that people are willing to donate significantly more if the donation is indirect, i.e., it is tied to the purchase of a good with a price premium, rather than made directly. This points to an efficiency–effectiveness trade–off: even though indirect donations are less efficient than direct donations, they are more effective in mobilizing resources. Our findings hold for ‘Fair Trade’ coffee as well as for ‘normal’ coffee. However, the strength of the efficiency–effectiveness trade–off is higher in the case of ‘Fair Trade’.Tied transfers, donations, charity, efficiency versus effectiveness, ‘fair trade’