9 research outputs found
Book reviews
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45784/1/11153_2004_Article_BF00140614.pd
Hick and Radhakrishnan on Religious Diversity: Back to the Kantian Noumenon
We shall examine some conceptual tensions in Hickâs âpluralismâ in the light of S. Radhakrishnanâs reformulation of classical Advaita. Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnanâs translations from the Hindu scriptures in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative experience and religious pluralism. However, while Hick developed these themes partly through an adaptation of Kantian epistemology, Radhakrishnan derived them ultimately from Ĺaáškara (c.800 CE), and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of reconstruction of the diversity of world religions. Our argument will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a âpluralistâ in terms of Hickâs understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hickâs Real cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitic tradition, are more accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that they differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. In turn, we will be able to revisit, through this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of whether Hickâs version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-015-0459-
Normative objections to Atheism
[Excerpt] What might a normative objection to atheism be? There are a number of possibilities. One kind of normative objection to atheism would consist of arguments against atheism that take normativity in general or some particular kind of normativity or even particular normative facts as their starting point. Such arguments would try to show that atheism cannot adequately explain this starting point, or at least show that atheism seems less probable on the basis of these features. In many cases such argument would be combined with arguments that the features in question can be explained if theism is true. What are commonly called moral arguments for theism would be arguments of this kind. (In general any positive argument for theism can also be construed as an objection to atheism, although there could be objections to atheism that are not arguments for theism.)
A second possible thing one might mean by a normative objection to atheism would be an argument that atheism is itself practically bad in some way. Perhaps atheism is bad for the atheist, or perhaps atheism produces bad consequences for others. A good example, which will be discussed later, might be Immanuel Kantâs wellâknown argument that atheism leads to a kind of moral despair, which is incompatible with the moral faith needed to live as one ought. Another example could be the common claim that atheism undermines moral character in some way, and thus that atheists are more likely to be morally inferior in some respect. Interestingly, there is quite a bit of empirical support for something in the neighborhood of this claim. A good deal of research shows that serious religious believers, who regularly attend a church, synagogue, or mosque, are significantly more likely to help others in a variety of ways. Religious people on average give more to charity than nonâreligious people, and they also give more of their time to helping others. This is true not just of gifts made to religious institutions. Religious people are also more likely than nonâbelievers to give to nonâreligious charities.1 However, since these are obviously empirical claims and not deeply philosophical, I shall not give these findings any further consideration.
It is clearly not possible in a single article to give a comprehensive treatment of such arguments. What I shall attempt to do in this chapter is describe a number of arguments of both of these two kinds that I regard as among the more promising ones, analyzing both their strengths and possible weak points