Chinese Enterprise Reform as a Market Process

The reform of China's enterprise system increasingly reflects the outcome of China's emerging property rights market. We distinguish between a centrally-directed reform strategy, with characteristics similar to those of a Pigouvian tax, and a market-driven reform process, which captures the essential features of a Coasian approach to social cost. The Coase Theorem postulates that eliminating transaction costs and attaching well specified property rights to public goods that generate externalities will allow uncoordinated economic agents to negotiate institutional arrangements that produce socially efficient allocation of resources. Extending Coase's reasoning to the case of socialist transition ' we argue that reforms that expand competition, move toward well-specified assignment of ownership rights to public enterprises, and reduce transaction costs will motivate the "ultimate" owners, including officials of national and sub-national government agencies, to reconfigure their assets or to combine their assets with those of other jurisdictions and/or private investors to create more efficient ownership arrangements. We review the extent to which China's reforms have established the conditions for an effective market in ownership rights to industrial property. We tabulate progress from 1 980 to present along the three major analytic dimensions inherent in Coase's analysis: competition, property rights, and transaction costs. We conclude that the sheer size and diversity of China's industrial economy will motivate a continuation of decentralized reform initiatives. To support this Coasian reform process, central and provincial governments need to expand initiatives to clarify property rights, particularly the right of alienation, reduce impediments to competition, and facilitate the reduction of transaction costs.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39466/3/wp76.pd

Economic determinants of global mobile telephony growth

This study examines the substitution effect between fixed-line and mobile telephony while controlling for the consumption externality associated with telephone networks. A dynamic demand model is estimated using a global telecommunications panel dataset comprised of 56 countries from 1995–2000. Estimation results show the presence of a substantial substitution effect. Additionally income and own-price elasticities are reported. Analysis of impulse responses for price, income and network size indicate substantial mobile telephone growth is yet to be realised. However, price ceilings imposed in the fixed-line network can retard the growth of the mobile network.