Policies And International Integration: Influences On Trade And Foreign Direct Investment

This paper assesses the importance of border and non-border policies for global economic integration. The focus is on four widely-advocated policies: removing explicit restrictions to trade and FDI; promoting domestic competition; improving the adaptability of labour markets; and ensuring adequate levels of infrastructure capital. The analysis covers FDI and trade in both goods and services, thus aiming to account for the most important channels of globalisation and dealing with most modes of cross-border services supply. It first describes trends in trade, FDI and the four sets of policies using a large set of structural policy indicators recently constructed by the OECD, including the new summary indicators for FDI-specific regulations described in Golub (2003). It then estimates the impact of policies on bilateral trade and bilateral and multilateral FDI. The results highlight that, despite extensive liberalisation over the past two decades, there is scope for further reducing policy barriers to integration of OECD markets. Remaining barriers have a significant impact on trade and FDI, with anticompetitive domestic regulations and restrictive labour market arrangements estimated to curb integration as much as explicit trade and FDI restrictions. Simulating the removal of such barriers suggests that the quantitative effects of further liberalisation of trade, FDI and domestic product and labour markets on global integration could be substantial

Stabilizing the forming process in unipolar resistance switching using an improved compliance current limiter

The high reset current IR in unipolar resistance switching now poses major obstacles to practical applications in memory devices. In particular, the first IR-value after the forming process is so high that the capacitors sometimes do not exhibit reliable unipolar resistance switching. We found that the compliance current Icomp is a critical parameter for reducing IR-values. We therefore introduced an improved, simple, easy to use Icomp-limiter that stabilizes the forming process by drastically decreasing current overflow, in order to precisely control the Icomp- and subsequent IR-values.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2001

The impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress\u27s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President\u27s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a constitutional moment that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. Still others have argued that the increased policymaking functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to impose greater limits on presidential control over the execution of the law. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has yet to appear

The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a “constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has yet to appear. This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law in historical perspective. It reviews the period between 1789 and 1837, beginning with the Administration of George Washington, ending with the Administration of Andrew Jackson. It pays particular attention to one of the defining moments in the history of the unitary executive: Jackson\u27s removal of Treasury Secretary William Duane during his battle with the second Bank of the United States. The record reveals that these Presidents during this period consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the issue from being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive

The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a “constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has yet to appear. This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law in historical perspective. It reviews the period between 1789 and 1837, beginning with the Administration of George Washington, ending with the Administration of Andrew Jackson. It pays particular attention to one of the defining moments in the history of the unitary executive: Jackson\u27s removal of Treasury Secretary William Duane during his battle with the second Bank of the United States. The record reveals that these Presidents during this period consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the issue from being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive

Erlang Code Evolution Control

During the software lifecycle, a program can evolve several times for different reasons such as the optimisation of a bottle-neck, the refactoring of an obscure function, etc. These code changes often involve several functions or modules, so it can be difficult to know whether the correct behaviour of the previous releases has been preserved in the new release. Most developers rely on a previously defined test suite to check this behaviour preservation. We propose here an alternative approach to automatically obtain a test suite that specifically focusses on comparing the old and new versions of the code. Our test case generation is directed by a sophisticated combination of several already existing tools such as TypEr, CutEr, and PropEr; and other ideas such as allowing the programmer to chose an expression of interest that must preserve the behaviour, or the recording of the sequences of values to which this expression is evaluated. All the presented work has been implemented in an open-source tool that is publicly available on GitHub.Comment: Pre-proceedings paper presented at the 27th International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2017), Namur, Belgium, 10-12 October 2017 (arXiv:1708.07854

Cost effectiveness of school-located influenza vaccination programs for elementary and secondary school children.

BackgroundStudies have noted variations in the cost-effectiveness of school-located influenza vaccination (SLIV), but little is known about how SLIV's cost-effectiveness may vary by targeted age group (e.g., elementary or secondary school students), or vaccine consent process (paper-based or web-based). Further, SLIV's cost-effectiveness may be impacted by its spillover effect on practice-based vaccination; prior studies have not addressed this issue.MethodsWe performed a cost-effectiveness analysis on two SLIV programs in upstate New York in 2015-2016: (a) elementary school SLIV using a stepped wedge design with schools as clusters (24 suburban and 18 urban schools) and (b) secondary school SLIV using a cluster randomized trial (16 suburban and 4 urban schools). The cost-per-additionally-vaccinated child (i.e., incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)) was estimated by dividing the incremental SLIV intervention cost by the incremental effectiveness (i.e., the additional number of vaccinated students in intervention schools compared to control schools). We performed deterministic analyses, one-way sensitivity analyses, and probabilistic analyses.ResultsThe overall effectiveness measure (proportion of children vaccinated) was 5.7 and 5.5 percentage points higher, respectively, in intervention elementary (52.8%) and secondary schools (48.2%) than grade-matched control schools. SLIV programs vaccinated a small proportion of children in intervention elementary (5.2%) and secondary schools (2.5%). In elementary and secondary schools, the ICER excluding vaccine purchase was $85.71 and$86.51 per-additionally-vaccinated-child, respectively. When additionally accounting for observed spillover impact on practice-based vaccination, the ICER decreased to $80.53 in elementary schools -- decreasing substantially in secondary schools. (to$53.40). These estimates were higher than the published practice-based vaccination cost (median = $25.50, mean =$45.48). Also, these estimates were higher than our 2009-2011 urban SLIV program mean costs ($65) due to additional costs for use of a new web-based consent system ($12.97 per-additionally-vaccinated-child) and higher project coordination costs in 2015-2016. One-way sensitivity analyses showed that ICER estimates were most sensitive to the SLIV effectiveness.ConclusionsSLIV raises vaccination rates and may increase practice-based vaccination in primary care practices. While these SLIV programs are effective, to be as cost-effective as practice-based vaccination our SLIV programs would need to vaccinate more students and/or lower the costs for consent systems and project coordination.Trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov NCT02227186 (August 25, 2014), updated NCT03137667 (May 2, 2017)

The Unitary Executive during the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress\u27s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President\u27s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a constitutional moment that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has yet to appear. This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law in historical perspective. It reviews the period between 1889 and 1945, beginning with the Administration of Benjamin Harrison, ending with the Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and paying particular attention to FDR\u27s failed attempt to reorganized the executive branch. The record reveals that these Presidents during this period consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the issue from being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive

The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress\u27s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President\u27s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a constitutional moment that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal government. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has yet to appear. This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law in historical perspective. It reviews the period between 1889 and 1945, beginning with the Administration of Benjamin Harrison, ending with the Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and paying particular attention to FDR\u27s failed attempt to reorganized the executive branch. The record reveals that these Presidents during this period consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the issue from being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive