The workings of the single member plurality electoral system in India and the need for reform

India uses single member plurality system (SMPS) to elect the members of the lower house of its national parliament and the state assemblies. Under SMPS, elections are conducted for separate geographical areas, known as constituencies or districts, and the electors cast one vote each for a candidate with the winner being the candidate who gets the plurality of votes. SMPS is traditionally defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity and its tendency to produce winning candidates, which promotes a link between constituents and their representatives. It tends to provide a clear-cut choice for voters between two main parties, and is expected to gives rise to single-party rather than coalition governments. It also has the benefit of excluding extremist parties from gaining representation, unless their support is geographically concentrated

Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3DK6JAGrievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.Funding: Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 105511- 143213; PI: Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig), the National Science Foundation (Grant No. Q2 SES-081950766b; PI: Strøom), and the Norwegian Research Council (196850/F10; PI: Gates)

Corruption and support for decentralisation

Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national‐level corruption decreases satisfaction with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly, information on regional‐level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey experiment in Spain and confirm its cross‐national generalisability with data from the European Values Study

American political affiliation, 2003–43: a cohort component projection

The recent rise and stability in American party identification has focused interest on the long-term dynamics of party bases. Liberal commentators cite immigration and youth as forces which will produce a natural Democratic advantage in the future while conservative writers highlight the importance of high Republican fertility in securing Republican growth. These concerns foreground the neglect of demography within political science. This paper addresses this omission by conducting the first ever cohort component projection of American partisan populations to 2043 based on survey and census data. A number of scenarios are modeled, but, on current trends, we predict that American partisanship will shift much less than the nation’s ethnic composition because the parties’ age structures are similar. Still, our projections find that the Democrats gain two to three percentage points from the Republicans by 2043, mainly through immigration, though Republican fertility may redress the balance in the very long term

Policy instruments and welfare state reform

A core, but so far untested, proposition of the new politics perspective, originally introduced by Paul Pierson, is that welfare state cutbacks will be implemented using so-called ‘invisible’ policy instruments, for example, a change in indexation rules. Expansion should, by implication, mainly happen using ‘visible’ policy instruments, for example, a change in nominal benefits. We have coded 1030 legislative reforms of old-age pensions and unemployment protection in Britain, Denmark, Finland and Germany from 1974 to 2014. With this unique data at hand, we find substantial support for this crucial new politics proposition

Authentication with Weaker Trust Assumptions for Voting Systems

Some voting systems are reliant on external authentication services. Others use cryptography to implement their own. We combine digital signatures and non-interactive proofs to derive a generic construction for voting systems with their own authentication mechanisms, from systems that rely on external authentication services. We prove that our construction produces systems satisfying ballot secrecy and election verifiability, assuming the underlying voting system does. Moreover, we observe that works based on similar ideas provide neither ballot secrecy nor election verifiability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability of our results by applying our construction to the Helios voting system

Institutions, policies, and arguments:context and strategy in EU policy framing

Studies of framing in the EU political system are still a rarity and they suffer from a lack of systematic empirical analysis. Addressing this gap, we ask if institutional and policy contexts intertwined with the strategic side of framing can explain the number and types of frames employed by different stakeholders. We use a computer-assisted manual content analysis and develop a fourfold typology of frames to study the frames that were prevalent in the debates on four EU policy proposals within financial market regulation and environmental policy at the EU level and in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The main empirical finding is that both contexts and strategies exert a significant impact on the number and types of frames in EU policy debates. In conceptual terms, the article contributes to developing more fine-grained tools for studying frames and their underlying dimensions

Does co-creation impact public service delivery?:The importance of state and governance traditions

Co-creation in public service delivery requires partnerships between citizens and civil servants. The authors argue that whether or not these partnerships will be successful depends on state and governance traditions (for example a tradition of authority sharing or consultation). These traditions determine the extent to which co-creation can become institutionalized in a country’s governance framework