Religion and the shadow economy

Religion is increasingly acknowledged to be a cultural dimension which affects economic outcomes in different regards. This contribution focuses on religion's possible impact on the shadow economy. Different dimensions of the religious markets are taken into account. These dimensions refer to the overall degree of religiosity, the specific impact of different religions, religious competition or the proximity between religion and the state. The empirical test makes use of the largest available cross-section on the size of the shadow economy and matches this dataset with numerous religious indicators. Summary measures of general religiosity or indicators of religious competition do not have a measurable impact. However, robust differences emerge across religions. Countries dominated by Islam or Eastern religions are associated with smaller shadow economies compared to Christian countries. Furthermore, the proximity between state and religion matters. Close ties between both are typical for smaller shadow economies. This is in line with the view that religion uses its normative influence to protect state interests if there is a mutually beneficial relationship. --Economics of religion,tax morale,shadow economy

Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?

Economists have studied many aspects of tax evasion. The vast literature has concentrated on the individual taxpayer’s decision on avoiding taxes by underreporting income. However no comprehensive investigation of the individual taxpayer’s decision on claiming unjustified subsidies (e. g. by underreporting income) exists so far. Employing Austrian survey data we show that the basic attitude towards avoiding taxes (tax morale) and claiming unjustified subsidies (benefit morale) have different determinants. Our applied econometric framework relaxes the often stated assumption of the exogeneity of income as an explaining variable of tax morale. Furthermore we find empirical evidence that tax morale and benefit morale have different impact on actual behavior: Whereas a low benefit morale leads indeed to unjustified claims on benefits and therefore to higher income, we find no statistically significant effect of tax morale on tax evasion. These different determinants and effects of tax morale and benefit morale can be explained by differences in the deterrence factors from the traditional economic approach, by alternative theories or simply by more opportunities to cheat on the state by unjustified subsidies in contrast to avoiding taxes.tax; subsidies; tax morale; benefit morale; tax evasion; benefit fraud

Tax compliance under tax regime changes

In this paper we focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under a progressive than under a proportionate regime.tax reforms; tax compliance; experiment

Tax compliance under tax regime changes

In this paper we focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under a progressive than under a proportionate regime. --tax reforms,tax compliance,experiment

Corruption and the shadow economy: An empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2002. Our results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. We also find that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy.corruption; shadow economy; regulation; tax burden

Estimating the underground economy by using MIMIC models: A response to T. Breusch´s critique

Breusch (2005b) critically addresses an important and challenging question: Is it reliable to use the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model to estimate Shadow Economy? Breusch concludes that this approach is not suitable for the purpose. Breusch’s paper highlights the different procedures and hypotheses about the estimation of the size and development of the shadow economy in three papers: Giles and Tedds (2002a), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) and Bajada and Schneider (2005). In this paper, we will react and provide some answers to Breusch’s criticisms with special reference to the criticisms of the Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) paper. According with us, the MIMIC model is still one of the best approaches to this purpose.shadow economy; MIMIC model; structural modelling.

What determines informal hiring? Evidence from the Turkish textile sector

Most studies about the shadow economy focus on the estimation of the aggregate size. However, this study aims to address the sectoral or micro aspects of this phenomenon using the data from the textile sector in Turkey. It uses discriminant analysis and ordered and logistic regression models to unveil the determinants of the informal hiring in Turkey. It concludes that high competition, the skill structure of the employees, perceived penalty scheme, and the size of the firms in the sector are important factors of the textile firms hiring informally.informal hiring in Turkish textile sector; discriminant analysis; logistic regression model; ordered regression