Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games

Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is affected by a realization of a common shock and where each player gets noisy private information of the shock. For n -person symmetric games with two possible actions characterized by strategic complementarity, they showed that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise is uniquely determined. The concept of global games is important not only as a theory of the most refined notion of equilibrium but also as a theory of coordination failures under private information. From this viewpoint, this paper makes the theory of global games more general and more applicable to such problems. The implications of the theory of global games are investigated in two specific models: a speculative attack model and a network externality model. It is shown that both the monetary authority in the speculative attack model and the central planner in the network externality model will prefer the equilibrium in a global game with small noise to the worst equilibrium in the corresponding complete information game. Therefore, they will welcome the existence of small noise, if they apply mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems.global game, coordination failure, speculative attack, network externality

Why Has the Border Effect in the Japanese Market Declined?

This paper analyzes the causes of the decline in Japan’s border effect by estimating gravity equations for Japan’s international and interregional trade in four machinery industries (electrical, general, precision, and transportation machinery). In the estimation, we explicitly take account of firms’ networks. We find that ownership relations usually enhance trade between two regions (countries), and also find that we can explain 35% of the decline in Japan’s border effect from 1980 to 1995 in the electrical machinery industry by the increase of international networks. JEL Classification numbers: F14; F17; F21; L14.Gravity Model; Border Effect; Networks.

Financial Sector Profitability and Double-Gearing

In this paper, I show that Japan will not be able to have a viable banking sector without stopping deflation. The banking industry has not shown a profit since fiscal 1993 (ended March 1994) if one excludes capital gains from stock and real estate portfolios. I quantify the financial condition of the sector and show that interest margins have been too low to cover the increase in loan losses brought about by the weak economy. Banks cannot raise margins for several reasons: competition with subsidized government sponsored financial institutions (GFIs); intense political pressure, backed by the Financial Services Agency (FSA), to make new loans to small and medium companies; and deflation-weakened borrowers. I expect that the Japanese government will have to nationalize most of the banking sector by 2005. Capital injections will not solve the problems. Established Japanese life insurance companies are also troubled because they over-promised the amount that they could pay. This can be corrected through a reorganization where the promised interest rates are cut. But this is complicated because Japanese banks and life insurance companies are providing each other capital a practice called double-gearing. Weakened banks ask insurance companies to provide equity capital and subordinated loans. In return, the mutual life insurers ask banks to subscribe their surplus notes (similar to non-voting redeemable preferred shares) and subordinated debt. The risks of double-gearing are analyzed.

The Effects of 'Gesell' (Currency) Taxes in Promoting Japan's Economic Recovery

The traditional interest rate policy has lost its potency due to the zero-lower bound of nominal interest rates and the gradual accelerating deflation in Japan. Without stopping deflation, the Japanese government may face a rapid erosion of credit worthiness due to an uncontrolled budget deficit. In order to cope with this unusual situation, a non-traditional monetary policy measure is proposed. A negative nominal interest rate is needed to clear Japanese markets and can be achieved by levying a tax on all the government-guaranteed yen financial assets. This is a modified version of Gesell's stamp duty on currency for actual implementation in the contemporary context. The benefits and side effects of this tax for Japan are analyzed here.