The strong Prikry property

I isolate a combinatorial property of a poset $\mathbb{P}$ that I call the strong Prikry property, which implies the existence of an ultrafilter on the complete Boolean algebra $\mathbb{B}$ of $\mathbb{P}$ such that one inclusion of the Boolean ultrapower version of the so-called \Bukovsky-Dehornoy phenomenon holds with respect to $\mathbb{B}$ and $U$. I show that in all cases that were previously studied, and for which it was shown that they come with a canonical iterated ultrapower construction whose limit can be described as a single Boolean ultrapower, the posets in question satisfy this property: Prikry forcing, Magidor forcing and generalized Prikry forcing

Subcomplete forcing principles and definable well-orders

It is shown that the boldface maximality principle for subcomplete forcing, together with the assumption that the universe has only set-many grounds, implies the existence of a (parameter-free) definable well-ordering of $\mathcal{P}(\omega_1)$. The same conclusion follows from the boldface maximality for subcomplete forcing, assuming there is no inner model with an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Similarly, the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom, together with the assumption that $x^\#$ does not exist, for some $x\subseteq\omega_1$, implies the existence of a well-order of $\mathcal{P}(\omega_1)$ which is $\Delta_1$-definable without parameters, and $\Delta_1(H_{\omega_2})$-definable using a subset of $\omega_1$ as a parameter. This well-order is in $L(\mathcal{P}(\omega_1))$. Enhanced version of bounded forcing axioms are introduced that are strong enough to have the implications of the maximality principles mentioned above.Comment: 23 pages, sections on "more reflection" and enhanced bounded forcing axioms adde

Subcomplete forcing, trees and generic absoluteness

We investigate properties of trees of height $\omega_1$ and their preservation under subcomplete forcing. We show that subcomplete forcing cannot add a new branch to an $\omega_1$-tree. We introduce fragments of subcompleteness which are preserved by subcomplete forcing, and use these in order to show that certain strong forms of rigidity of Suslin trees are preserved by subcomplete forcings. Finally, we explore under what circumstances subcomplete forcing preserves Aronszajn trees of height and width $\omega_1$. We show that this is the case if CH fails, and if CH holds, then this is the case iff the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom holds. Finally, we explore the relationships between bounded forcing axioms, preservation of Aronszajn trees of height and width $\omega_1$ and generic absoluteness of $\Sigma^1_1$-statements over first order structures of size $\omega_1$, also for other canonical classes of forcing.Comment: Some results were added and some arguments streamline

Weak square and stationary reflection

It is well-known that the square principle $\square_\lambda$ entails the existence of a non-reflecting stationary subset of $\lambda^+$, whereas the weak square principle $\square^*_\lambda$ does not. Here we show that if $\mu^{\mathrm{cf}(\lambda)} < \lambda$ for all $\mu < \lambda$, then $\square^*_\lambda$ entails the existence of a non-reflecting stationary subset of $E^{\lambda^+}_{\mathrm{cf}(\lambda)}$ in the forcing extension for adding a single Cohen subset of $\lambda^+$. It follows that indestructible forms of simultaneous stationary reflection entail the failure of weak square. We demonstrate this by settling a question concerning the subcomplete forcing axiom (SCFA), proving that SCFA entails the failure of $\square^*_\lambda$ for every singular cardinal $\lambda$ of countable cofinality.Comment: 11 page

Boolean ultrapowers, the Bukovsky-Dehornoy phenomenon, and iterated ultrapowers

We show that while the length $\omega$ iterated ultrapower by a normal ultrafilter is a Boolean ultrapower by the Boolean algebra of Prikry forcing, it is consistent that no iteration of length greater than $\omega$ (of the same ultrafilter and its images) is a Boolean ultrapower. For longer iterations, where different ultrafilters are used, this is possible, though, and we give Magidor forcing and a generalization of Prikry forcing as examples. We refer to the discovery that the intersection of the finite iterates of the universe by a normal measure is the same as the generic extension of the direct limit model by the critical sequence as the Bukovsky-Dehornoy phenomenon, and we develop a sufficient criterion (the existence of a simple skeleton) for when a version of this phenomenon holds in the context of Boolean ultrapowers. Assuming that the canonical generic filter over the Boolean ultrapower model has what we call a continuous representation, we show that the Boolean model consists precisely of those members of the intersection model that have continuously and eventually uniformly represented codes

Degrees of rigidity for Souslin trees

We investigate various strong notions of rigidity for Souslin trees, separating them under Diamond into a hierarchy. Applying our methods to the automorphism tower problem in group theory, we show under Diamond that there is a group whose automorphism tower is highly malleable by forcing.Comment: 33 page

Changing the Heights of Automorphism Towers by Forcing with Souslin Trees over L

We prove that there are groups in the constructible universe whose automorphism towers are highly malleable by forcing. This is a consequence of the fact that, under a suitable diamond hypothesis, there are sufficiently many highly rigid non-isomorphic Souslin trees whose isomorphism relation can be precisely controlled by forcing.Comment: 23 page

Aronszajn tree preservation and bounded forcing axioms

I investigate the relationships between three hierarchies of reflection principles for a forcing class $\Gamma$: the hierarchy of bounded forcing axioms, of $\Sigma^1_1$-absoluteness and of Aronszajn tree preservation principles. The latter principle at level $\kappa$ says that whenever $T$ is a tree of height $\omega_1$ and width $\kappa$ that does not have a branch of order type $\omega_1$, and whenever $P$ is a forcing notion in $\Gamma$, then it is not the case that $P$ forces that $T$ has such a branch. $\Sigma^1_1$-absoluteness serves as an intermediary between these principles and the bounded forcing axioms. A special case of the main result is that for forcing classes that don't add reals, the three principles at level $2^\omega$ are equivalent. Special attention is paid to certain subclasses of subcomplete forcing, since these are natural forcing classes that don't add reals

Incomparable ω1\omega_1-like models of set theory

We show that the analogues of the Hamkins embedding theorems, proved for the countable models of set theory, do not hold when extended to the uncountable realm of $\omega_1$-like models of set theory. Specifically, under the $\diamondsuit$ hypothesis and suitable consistency assumptions, we show that there is a family of $2^{\omega_1}$ many $\omega_1$-like models of ZFC, all with the same ordinals, that are pairwise incomparable under embeddability; there can be a transitive $\omega_1$-like model of ZFC that does not embed into its own constructible universe; and there can be an $\omega_1$-like model of PA whose structure of hereditarily finite sets is not universal for the $\omega_1$-like models of set theory.Comment: 15 pages. Commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/incomparable-omega-one-like-models-of-set-theor

Ehrenfeucht's lemma in set theory

Ehrenfeucht's lemma (1973) asserts that whenever one element of a model of Peano arithmetic is definable from another, then they satisfy different types. We consider here the analogue of Ehrenfeucht's lemma for models of set theory. The original argument applies directly to the ordinal-definable elements of any model of set theory, and in particular, Ehrenfeucht's lemma holds fully for models of set theory satisfying $V=HOD$. We show that the lemma can fail, however, in models of set theory with $V\neq HOD$, and it necessarily fails in the forcing extension to add a generic Cohen real. We go on to formulate a scheme of natural parametric generalizations of Ehrenfeucht's lemma, namely, the principles of the form $EL(A,P,Q)$, which asserts that whenever an object $b$ is definable from some $a\in A$ using parameters in $P$, with $b\neq a$, then the types of $a$ and $b$ over $Q$ are different. We also consider various analogues of Ehrenfeucht's lemma obtained by using algebraicity in place of definability, where a set $b$ is algebraic in $a$ if it is a member of a finite set definable from $a$ (as in Hamkins, Leahy arXiv:1305.5953). Ehrenfeucht's lemma holds for the ordinal-algebraic sets, we prove, if and only if the ordinal-algebraic and ordinal-definable sets coincide. Using similar analysis, we answer two open questions posed by Hamkins and Leahy, by showing that (i) algebraicity and definability need not coincide in models of set theory and (ii) the internal and external notions of being ordinal algebraic need not coincide.Comment: 13 pages. Commentary concerning this paper can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/ehrenfeuchts-lemma-in-set-theor