Itinerant Ferromagnetism in the electronic localization limit

We present Hall effect, $R_{xy}(H)$, and magnetoresistance, $R_{xx}(H)$, measurements of ultrathin films of Ni, Co and Fe with thicknesses varying between 0.2-8 nm and resistances between 1 M$\Omega$ - 100 $\Omega.$ Both measurements show that films having resistance above a critical value, $R_{C}$, (thickness below a critical value, $d_{C}$) show no signs for ferromagnetism. Ferromagnetism appears only for films with $R<R_{C}$, where $R_{C}$ is material dependent. We raise the possibility that the reason for the absence of spontaneous magnetization is suppression of itinerant ferromagnetism by electronic disorder in the strong localization regime.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Why Ownership Matters?: Politicization and Entrepreneurship in the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe

This paper, base on a study of mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, examines the sources of performance differences between state and privatized firms, particularly those that may be due to politicization and differences in the degree of entreprenurship. The paper presents empirical evidence that politicization of decision making is responsible for the observed inefficiencies in the cost behavior of state enterprises, but does not explain their inferior revenue performance, which is independent of the degree of state involvement.OWNERSHIP ; PRIVATIZATION ; HUMAN CAPITAL

Why Ownership Matters? Entrepreneurship and the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe

This paper, based on a study of mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, seeks to explain the reasons behind the marked impact of ownership on firm performance which has been observed in a number of studies in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Focusing in particular on the differential impact of ownership on revenue and cost performance, the paper argues that privatized firms controlled by outside investors are more entrepreneurial than those controlled by corporate insiders or the state. The paper provides evidence that all state and privatized firms in transition economies engage in similar types of restructuring, but that product restructuring by firms owned by outsider investors is significantly more effective (in terms of revenue generation) than that by firms with other types of ownership. The paper also examines the impact of managerial turnover on revenue performance, as well as differences among managers of firms with different types of ownership, and concludes that the more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider-owned firms is due primarily to incentive effects, rather than human capital effects, of privatization. More specifically, the authors argue that the success of outsider-owned firms is due to their greater readiness to accept risks (as evidenced by the higher variance of the revenues generated by restructuring) and a lesser need to defend, and account for, their managerial decisions.OWNERSHIP; PRIVATIZATION; POLITICIZATION; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; INCENTIVES; HUMAN CAPITAL