Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standard monetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through which monetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbank market. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed, central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by standard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did not allow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design new channels for liquidity injection.

An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspective of regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justifications of financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failures that make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how the analysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrial organization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be part of banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.Banking regulation, efficiency, financial stability, banking supervision

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry but also the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for banking regulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic points of the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instability and fragility of financial institutions. The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal with systemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail). The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered in other contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. In the future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. This may occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure, adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are two approaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises will occur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of securities markets and banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetary policy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing the aggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.Asymmetric information, liabilities structure, capital regulation, monetary policy, transmission mechanism

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbank market is the existence of asymmetric information between different countries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successful currency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope for international interbank market integration with unsecured lending when cross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibrium with integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does, the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank market segmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guarantee the emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo market which, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be more complex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentation equilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, since the repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of other transnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking, correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks may reduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance against country wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as the introduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank market equilibrium.Banking theory, asymmetric information, financial integration, interbank markets, diamond-dybvig

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect) and, second, it shows that banks’ liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).Banking, Rationing, Monetary Policy

Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy

During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this environment. We summarize here the main contributions that have developed considering this new paradigm and discuss how institutional features relating to bank closure policy influences lender of last resort and other safety net issues. We devote particular emphasis to the analysis of systemic risk and contagion in banking and the role of the lender of last resort to prevent it.lender of last resort, systemic risk, contagion, bank closure, liquidity, discount window

Book vs. fair value accounting in banking and intertemporal smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.Banking, shocks, insurance, intertemporal, Overlapping Generations Equilibrium

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and creative ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple cost benefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, under reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out of the institution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy

Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective Action

We explore the rationale for regulatory rules that prohibit banks from developing some of their natural activities when their capital level is low, as epitomized by the US Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). This paper is built on two insights. First, in a moral hazard setting, capital requirement regulation may force banks to hold a large fraction of safe assets which, in turn, may lower their incentives to monitor risky assets. Second, agency problems may be more severe in certain asset classes than in others. Taken together, these two ideas explain why, surprisingly, capital regulation, which may cope with risk and adverse selection, is unable to address issues related to moral hazard. Hence, instead of forcing banks to hold a large fraction of safe assets, prohibiting some types of investment and allowing ample scope of investment on others may be the only way to preserve incentives and guarantee funding. In particular, providing incentives to monitor investments in the most opaque asset classes may prove to be excessively costly in terms of the required capital and thus inefficient. We show that the optimal capital regulation consists of a rule that a) allows well capitalized banks to freely invest any amount in any risky asset, b) prohibits banks with intermediate levels of capital to invest in the most opaque risky assets, and c) prohibits undercapitalized banks to invest in any risky asset.banking, prudential regulation, moral hazard