Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity, which takes the form of differences in preferences for leisure. All the instruments are ways of limiting the duration of UI benefit receipt and the model can be used to compare them in a coherent fashion. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sanctions; workfare

Do unemployment benefits increase unemployment? New evidence on an old question

We examine the relationship between unemployment benefits and unemployment using Swedish regional data. To estimate the effect of an increase in unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment we exploit the ceiling on UI benefits. The benefit ceiling, coupled with the fact that there are regional wage differentials, implies that the generosity of UI varies regionally. More importantly, the actual generosity of UI varies within region over time due to variations in the benefit ceiling. We find fairly robust evidence suggesting that the actual generosity of UI does matter for regional unemployment. Increases in the actual replacement rate contribute to higher unemployment as suggested by theory. We also show that removing the wage cap in UI benefit receipt would reduce the dispersion of regional unemployment. This result is due to the fact that low unemployment regions tend to be high wage regions where the benefit ceiling has a greater bite. Removing the benefit ceiling thus implies that the actual generosity of UI increases more in low unemployment regions.Unemployment; Unemployment insurance; Unemployment dispersion

Program Evaluation and Random Program Starts

This paper discusses the evaluation problem using observational data when the timing of treatment is an outcome of a stochastic process. We show that, without additional assumptions, it is not possible to estimate the average treatment effect and treatment on the treated. It is, however, possible to estimate the effect of treatment on the treated up to a certain time point. We propose an estimator to estimate this effect and show that it is possible to test for an average treatment effect.treatment effects, dynamic treatment assignment, program evaluation, method of matching

Employment, mobility, and active labor market programs

Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding a job substantially. Moreover, both programs are associated with a locking-in effect: the probability of finding a job outside the home region decreases after program participation. However, this effect appears to stem exclusively from the decrease in the overall job finding rate.Subsidized employment; labor market training; program evaluation; employment; contracted mobility

Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sactions; workfare

Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research

This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.Unemployment insurance; search; monitoring; sanctions; workfare

Is early learning really more productive? The effect of school starting age on school and labor market performance

In Sweden, children typically start compulsary school the year they turn seven. Individuals born just before or just after the new year, have about the same date of birth but start school att different ages. We exploit this source of exogenous variation, to identify the effects of age at school entry on school and labor market outcomes. Using data for the entire Swedish population born 1935-84, we find that children who start school at an older age do better in school and go on to have more education than their younger peers. The longrun earnings effects are positive but small. However, since starting school later entails the opportunity cost of entering the labor market later, the net earnings effect over the entire life-cycle is negative. Exploiting within-school variation in peer age composition, we find that the school starting age effect primarily is due to absolute maturity rather than to the relative age in the class.School starting age; school performance; labor market outcomes; regression-discontinuity design

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity, which takes the form of differences in preferences for leisure. All the instruments are ways of limiting the duration of UI benefit receipt and the model can be used to compare them in a coherent fashion. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.unemployment insurance, search, monitoring, sanctions, workfare

Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures - quasi-experimental evidence

We examine peer effects in welfare use among immigrants to Sweden by exploiting a governmental refugee placement policy. We distinguish between the quantity of contacts – the number of individuals of the same ethnicity – and the quality of contacts – welfare use among members of the ethnic group. OLS regressions suggest that both these factors are positively related to individual welfare use. Instrumental variables estimations yield the conclusion that only the quality of contacts matter. An increase of the fraction of the ethnic group on welfare by 10 percent raises the individual probability of welfare use by almost 7 percent.Ethnic enclaves; welfare use; immigrants

Migration and Local Public Services

Using unique Swedish micro data we examine the impact of local public services on community choice. The choice of community is modeled as a choice between a discrete set of alternatives. The US literature has produced conflicting evidence with respect to the importance of local public services. We find a robust positive (negative) relationship between local public services (local income tax rates) and the residential choices of short-distance migrants (defined as those moving within a local labor market). However, local public characteristics are less important for migrants who entered from other local labor markets. Using information on subsequent mobility, we also investigate whether the last result is due to lack of information about the characteristics of the local public sector. The evidence suggests that this is not the case.Migration; Local public services; Tiebout; Discrete choice; repeat migration