Some Beliefs about Justice

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1961, given by William K. Frankena (1908-1994), an American philosopher

On “Morality and Sex Change”

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/90516/1/3561812.pd

Ought and is once more

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43220/1/11007_2005_Article_BF01249070.pd

Spinoza on the knowledge of good and evil

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47967/1/11406_2006_Article_BF02379990.pd

Lewis' imperatives of right

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43374/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00396669.pd

Some arguments for non-naturalism about intrinsic value

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43364/1/11098_2005_Article_BF02216991.pd

Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others?

Virtue ethics encourages us to judge the actions of others, not merely as right or wrong, but as virtuous (kind, courageous, just, compassionate, etc.) or vicious (cruel, cowardly, unjust, selfish, etc.). In doing so, however, we risk acting viciously ourselves. That is, our judgments of others can be unfair, unkind, insensitive, uncharitable, or hypocritical, even while being accurate. I argue that in order to make good judgments of the actions of others we should turn to virtue ethics for action guidance. That is, our primary aim should not be to make accurate judgments but to act virtuously when judging others