Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic

The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarization-based BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB attack.Comment: 8 pages, 9 figures; references added, 1 new figure, appendix expanded; accepted for publication in Phys. Rev.

Inverse Landau-Zener-Stuckelberg problem for qubit-resonator systems

We consider theoretically a superconducting qubit - nanomechanical resonator (NR) system, which was realized by LaHaye et al. [Nature 459, 960 (2009)]. First, we study the problem where the state of the strongly driven qubit is probed through the frequency shift of the low-frequency NR. In the case where the coupling is capacitive, the measured quantity can be related to the so-called quantum capacitance. Our theoretical results agree with the experimentally observed result that, under resonant driving, the frequency shift repeatedly changes sign. We then formulate and solve the inverse Landau-Zener-Stuckelberg problem, where we assume the driven qubit's state to be known (i.e. measured by some other device) and aim to find the parameters of the qubit's Hamiltonian. In particular, for our system the qubit's bias is defined by the NR's displacement. This may provide a tool for monitoring of the NR's position.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figure

Floodlight Quantum Key Distribution: A Practical Route to Gbps Secret-Key Rates

The channel loss incurred in long-distance transmission places a significant burden on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems: they must defeat a passive eavesdropper who detects all the light lost in the quantum channel and does so without disturbing the light that reaches the intended destination. The current QKD implementation with the highest long-distance secret-key rate meets this challenge by transmitting no more than one photon per bit [Opt. Express 21, 24550-24565 (2013)]. As a result, it cannot achieve the Gbps secret-key rate needed for one-time pad encryption of large data files unless an impractically large amount of multiplexing is employed. We introduce floodlight QKD (FL-QKD), which floods the quantum channel with a high number of photons per bit distributed over a much greater number of optical modes. FL-QKD offers security against the optimum frequency-domain collective attack by transmitting less than one photon per mode and using photon-coincidence channel monitoring, and it is completely immune to passive eavesdropping. More importantly, FL-QKD is capable of a 2 Gbps secret-key rate over a 50 km fiber link, without any multiplexing, using available equipment, i.e., no new technology need be developed. FL-QKD achieves this extraordinary secret-key rate by virtue of its unprecedented secret-key efficiency, in bits per channel use, which exceeds those of state-of-the-art systems by two orders of magnitude.Comment: 18 pages, 5 figure