Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.Rent-seeking; rent dissipation; Tullock's paradox

Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking.

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their pro- ductivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent- seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between "redistributive rent-seeking"and "productive rent-seeking" situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the "lost treasure" effect), since valuable rents are left unex- ploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.Rent-seeking, rent dissipation, Tullock' s paradox.

WASTE MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE STUDY OF UMBRIA (ITALY) AND THE WEST BANK (PALESTINE)

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Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases

Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases

Single-layer graphene modulates neuronal communication and augments membrane ion currents

The use of graphenebased materials to engineer sophisticated biosensing interfaces that can adapt to the central nervous system requires a detailed understanding of how such materials behave in a biological context. Graphene's peculiar properties can cause various cellular changes, but the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Here, we show that singlelayer graphene increases neuronal firing by altering membraneassociated functions in cultured cells. Graphene tunes the distribution of extracellular ions at the interface with neurons, a key regulator of neuronal excitability. The resulting biophysical changes in the membrane include stronger potassium ion currents, with a shift in the fraction of neuronal firing phenotypes from adapting to tonically firing. By using experimental and theoretical approaches, we hypothesize that the graphene\u2013ion interactions that are maximized when singlelayer graphene is deposited on electrically insulating substrates are crucial to these effects

The non-coding transcriptome as a dynamic regulator of cancer metastasis.

Since the discovery of microRNAs, non-coding RNAs (NC-RNAs) have increasingly attracted the attention of cancer investigators. Two classes of NC-RNAs are emerging as putative metastasis-related genes: long non-coding RNAs (lncRNAs) and small nucleolar RNAs (snoRNAs). LncRNAs orchestrate metastatic progression through several mechanisms, including the interaction with epigenetic effectors, splicing control and generation of microRNA-like molecules. In contrast, snoRNAs have been long considered "housekeeping" genes with no relevant function in cancer. However, recent evidence challenges this assumption, indicating that some snoRNAs are deregulated in cancer cells and may play a specific role in metastasis. Interestingly, snoRNAs and lncRNAs share several mechanisms of action, and might synergize with protein-coding genes to generate a specific cellular phenotype. This evidence suggests that the current paradigm of metastatic progression is incomplete. We propose that NC-RNAs are organized in complex interactive networks which orchestrate cellular phenotypic plasticity. Since plasticity is critical for cancer cell metastasis, we suggest that a molecular interactome composed by both NC-RNAs and proteins orchestrates cancer metastasis. Interestingly, expression of lncRNAs and snoRNAs can be detected in biological fluids, making them potentially useful biomarkers. NC-RNA expression profiles in human neoplasms have been associated with patients' prognosis. SnoRNA and lncRNA silencing in pre-clinical models leads to cancer cell death and/or metastasis prevention, suggesting they can be investigated as novel therapeutic targets. Based on the literature to date, we critically discuss how the NC-RNA interactome can be explored and manipulated to generate more effective diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic strategies for metastatic neoplasms