395 research outputs found
Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)
Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important -- yet less discussed -- dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages
Optimally Secure Tweakable Block Ciphers with a Large Tweak from n-bit Block Ciphers
We consider the design of a tweakable block cipher from a block cipher whose inputs and outputs are of size bits. The main goal is to achieve security with a large tweak (i.e., more than bits). Previously, Mennink at FSE\u2715 and Wang et al. at Asiacrypt\u2716 proposed constructions that can achieve security. Yet, these constructions can have a tweak size up to -bit only. As evident from recent research, a tweakable block cipher with a large tweak is generally helpful as a building block for modes of operation, typical applications including MACs, authenticated encryption, leakage-resilient cryptography and full-disk encryption.
We begin with how to design a tweakable block cipher with -bit tweak and -bit security from two block cipher calls. For this purpose, we do an exhaustive search for tweakable block ciphers with -bit tweaks from two block cipher calls, and show that all of them suffer from birthday-bound attacks. Next, we investigate the possibility to design a tweakable block cipher with -bit tweak and -bit security from three block cipher calls. We start with some conditions to build a such tweakable block cipher and propose a natural construction, called G1, that likely meets them. After inspection, we find a weakness on G1 which leads to a birthday-bound attack. Based on G1, we then propose another construction, called G2, that can avoid this weakness. We finally prove that G2 can achieve -bit security with -bit tweak
Side-Channel Countermeasures\u27 Dissection and the Limits of Closed Source Security Evaluations
We take advantage of a recently published open source implementation of the AES
protected with a mix of countermeasures against side-channel attacks to
discuss both the challenges in protecting COTS devices against such attacks
and the limitations of closed source security evaluations.
The target implementation has been proposed by the French ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des
Systèmes d\u27Information)
to stimulate research
on the design and evaluation of side-channel secure implementations.
It combines additive and multiplicative secret sharings
into an affine masking scheme that is additionally mixed with a shuffled execution.
Its preliminary leakage assessment did not detect data dependencies with up to
100,000 measurements. We first exhibit the gap between such a preliminary
leakage assessment and advanced attacks by exhibiting how a countermeasures\u27 dissection exploiting a
mix of dimensionality reduction, multivariate information extraction
and key enumeration can recover the full key with less than 2,000 measurements.
We then discuss the relevance of open source evaluations to analyze
such implementations efficiently, by exhibiting that certain steps of the
attack are hard to automate without implementation knowledge
(even with machine learning tools), while performing them
manually is trivial. Our findings are not
due to design flaws but from the general difficulty to
prevent side-channel attacks in COTS devices with limited noise. We anticipate that
high security on such devices requires significantly more shares
Forgery Attacks on Several Beyond-Birthday-Bound Secure MACs
At CRYPTO\u2718, Datta et al. proposed nPolyMAC and proved the security up to 2^{2n/3} authentication queries and 2^{n} verification queries. At EUROCRYPT\u2719, Dutta et al. proposed CWC+ and showed the security up to 2^{2n/3} queries. At FSE\u2719, Datta et al. proposed PolyMAC and its key-reduced variant 2k-PolyMAC, and showed the security up to 2^{2n/3} queries. This security bound was then improved by Kim et al. (EUROCRYPT\u2720) and Datta et al (FSE\u2723) respectively to 2^{3n/4} and in the multi-user setting. At FSE\u2720, Chakraborti et al. proposed PDM*MAC and 1k-PDM*MAC and showed the security up to 2^{2n/3} queries. Recently, Chen et al. proposed nEHtM_p^+ and showed the security up to 2^{2n/3} queries. In this paper, we show forgery attacks on nPolyMAC, CWC+, PolyMAC, 2k-PolyMAC, PDM*MAC, 1k-PDM*MAC and nEHtM_p^+. Our attacks exploit some vulnerability in the underlying polynomial hash function Poly, and (i) require only one authentication query and one verification query; (ii) are nonce-respecting; (iii) succeed with probability 1. Thus, our attacks disprove the provable high security claims of these schemes. We then revisit their security analyses and identify what went wrong. Finally, we propose two solutions that can restore the beyond-birthday-bound security
A Nearly Tight Proof of Duc et al.\u27s Conjectured Security Bound for Masked Implementations
We prove a bound that approaches Duc et al.\u27s conjecture from Eurocrypt 2015 for the side-channel security of masked implementations. Let be a sensitive intermediate variable of a cryptographic primitive taking its values in a set . If is protected by masking (a.k.a. secret sharing) at order (i.e., with shares), then the complexity of any non-adaptive side-channel analysis --- measured by the number of queries to the target implementation required to guess the secret key with sufficient confidence --- is lower bounded by a quantity inversely proportional to the product of mutual informations between each share of and their respective leakage. Our new bound is nearly tight in the sense that each factor in the product has an exponent of as conjectured, and its multiplicative constant is, where . It drastically improves upon previous proven bounds, where the exponent was , and the multiplicative constant was . As a consequence for side-channel security evaluators, it is possible to provably and efficiently infer the security level of a masked implementation by simply analyzing each individual share, under the necessary condition that the leakage of these shares are independent
Multiplex: TBC-based Authenticated Encryption with Sponge-Like Rate
Authenticated Encryption (AE) modes of operation based on Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBC) usually measure efficiency in the number of calls to the underlying primitive per message block. On the one hand, many existing solutions reach a primitive-rate of 1, meaning that each n-bit block of message asymptotically needs a single call to the TBC with output length n. On the other hand, while these modes look optimal in a blackbox setting, they become less attractive when leakage comes into play, since all these calls must then be equally well protected to maintain security. Leakage-resistant modes improve this situation, by generating ephemeral keys every constant number of calls. However, rekeying is inherently suboptimal in primitive-rate, since a TBC call can only be used either to refresh a key or to encrypt a block. Even worse, existing solutions achieving almost n bits of security for n-bit secret keys have at most a primitive-rate 2/3. Hence the question: Can we design a highly-secure TBC-based rekeying mode with ``nearly optimal\u27\u27 primitive-rate? We answer this question positively with Multiplex, a new mode that has primitive-rate d/(d+1) given a TBC with a dn-bit tweak. Multiplex achieves bits of security for both (i) misuse-resilience CCA security in the blackbox setting and (ii) Ciphertext Integrity with Misuse-resistant and unbounded Leakage in encryption and decryption (CIML2). It also provides (iii) confidentiality with leakage up to the birthday bound. Furthermore, Multiplex can run d+1 calls in parallel in each iteration. The combination of these features gives a mode of operation that inherits most of the good implementation features and flexibility of a Duplex sponge -- therefore paving the way towards sound comparisons between TBC-based and permutation-based AE
Reducing the Cost of Authenticity with Leakages: a CIML2-Secure AE Scheme with One Call to a Strongly Protected Tweakable Block Cipher
This paper presents CONCRETE (Commit-Encrypt-Send-the-Key) a new Authenticated Encryption mode that offers CIML2 security, that is, ciphertext integrity in the presence of nonce misuse and side-channel leakages in both encryption and decryption.
CONCRETE improves on a recent line of works aiming at leveled implementations, which mix a strongly protected and energy demanding implementation of a single component, and other weakly protected and much cheaper components. Here, these components all implement a tweakable block cipher TBC.
CONCRETE requires the use of the strongly protected TBC only once while supporting the leakage of the full state of the weakly protected components -- it achieves CIML2 security in the so-called unbounded leakage model.
All previous works need to use the strongly protected implementation at least twice. As a result, for short messages whose encryption and decryption energy costs are dominated by the strongly protected component, we halve the cost of a leakage-resilient implementation. CONCRETE additionally provides security when unverified plaintexts are released, and confidentiality in the presence of simulatable leakages in encryption and decryption
Simple Key Enumeration (and Rank Estimation) using Histograms: an Integrated Approach
The main contribution of this paper, is a new key enumeration algorithm that combines the conceptual simplicity of the rank estimation algorithm of Glowacz et al. (from FSE 2015) and the parallelizability of the enumeration algorithm of Bogdanov et al. (SAC 2015) and Martin et al. (from ASIACRYPT 2015). Our new algorithm is based on histograms. It allows obtaining simple bounds on the (small) rounding errors that it introduces and leads to straightforward parallelization. We further show that it can minimize the bandwidth of distributed key testing by selecting parameters that maximize the factorization of the lists of key candidates produced by the enumeration, which can be highly beneficial, e.g. if these tests are performed by a hardware coprocessor. We also put forward that the conceptual simplicity of our algorithm translates into efficient implementations (that slightly improve the state-of-the-art). As an additional consolidating effort, we finally describe an open source implementation of this new enumeration algorithm, combined with the FSE 2015 rank estimation one, that we make available with the paper
Give Me 5 Minutes: Attacking ASCAD with a Single Side-Channel Trace
In this note, we describe an attack against the ANSSI Side-Channel Analysis Database (ASCAD), which recovers the full key using the leakage of a single masked block cipher execution. The attack uses a new open-source Side-Channel Analysis Library (SCALib), which allows running the leakage profiling and attacking in less than 5 minutes. It exploits well-known techniques, yet improves significantly over the best known attacks against ASCAD. We conclude by questioning the impact of these experimental findings for side-channel security evaluations
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