Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchases: Implications for mortgage markets

The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a government-sponsored enterprise created by Congress to support residential housing finance. Historically, the twelve regional wholesale banks that constitute the FHLB System have pursued this goal by making loans to their depository institution members secured by residential mortgage loans. In 1997, however, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago began purchasing pools of conforming mortgages under its Mortgage Partnership Finance Program. Today, nine FHLBs offer this program, and the remaining three offer their own Mortgage Purchase Programs. ; The FHLB mortgage programs represent a small but growing part of the secondary conforming mortgage market, which has traditionally been dominated by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). This article examines the various FHLB mortgage programs offered, analyzes the evolving competitive environment in the secondary conforming mortgage market, and identifies implications for this market. ; Consumers could ultimately benefit from lower mortgage costs because of a lower cost of guaranteeing mortgage credit, the author contends, but the savings per borrower would likely be small. He also notes that increased competition may reduce the franchise value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in turn possibly increasing risk-taking incentives for these firms. The author concludes that the evolution of this competitive landscape bears close attention as it could have important implications for mortgage markets.Federal home loan banks ; Mortgage loans

Estimating the effect of mortgage foreclosures on nearby property values: a critical review of the literature

In response to the wave of residential mortgage foreclosures in the past few years, federal, state and local government intervention programs have aimed to reduce the presumed social costs of foreclosures. Before the recent crisis, there was little economic research documenting foreclosure spillover effects. ; This article takes a critical look at the recent literature that seeks to estimate the negative effects of residential mortgage foreclosures. This review suggests that foreclosed properties sell at a discount, likely because such properties are in worse condition than surrounding properties. What's more, very nearby foreclosures appear to depress the sales prices of nondistressed properties, but this effect diminishes rapidly over physical distance and time ; The author suggests that the considerable variation in foreclosure discount and spillover estimates that occurs from study to study may be related to data limitations (specific places and times) and poorly specified empirical models in some studies. He notes that studies using a repeat-sales approach seem to hold greater promise than those using hedonic regressions; the former approach is more likely to hold property and neighborhood characteristics constant and make it easier to examine multiple geographies and longer time periods.

Fussing and fuming over Fannie and Freddie: how much smoke, how much fire?

The roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become increasingly controversial in the modern world of residential mortgage finance. The authors describe the special features of these two companies and their roles in the mortgage markets and then discuss the controversies that surround the companies and offer recommendations for improvements in public policy.

The Federal Home Loan Bank system : the "other" housing GSE.

Founded in 1932, the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) have historically provided long-term funding to specialized mortgage lenders. But legislative changes in the wake of the 1980s’ thrift crises spurred the FHLBs to expand in both size and scope. For example, FHLB balance sheets now also include a substantial investment in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, and the attendant interest rate risk has created financial and accounting difficulties at some of the FHLBs. ; Like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the FHLB System is a government-sponsored enterprise that funds itself largely with federal agency debt obligations that investors perceive to be implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. government. This article identifies some differences in risk-taking incentives between the cooperatively owned FHLB System and investor-owned Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. ; Cooperative ownership itself does not reduce FHLB risk-taking incentives because, unlike many mutuals, the FHLB System does not bundle its equity and debt claims. Also, the joint-and-several liability provision in the FHLBs’ consolidated debt obligations and a lack of equity market discipline may heighten FHLB risk-taking incentives. However, the FHLBs cannot avail themselves of equity-based managerial compensation, which create high-powered risk-taking incentives in investor-owned firms. Thus, it is unclear whether the FHLBs’ risk-taking incentives are necessarily weaker than Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s.Federal home loan banks

The effect of credit scoring on small business lending in low- and moderate-income areas

This paper empirically examines the effect of the use of credit scoring by large banking organizations on small business lending in low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas. Using census tract level data for the southeastern United States, the authors estimate that credit scoring increases small business lending by $16.4 million per LMI area served. Furthermore, this effect is almost 2.5 times larger than that estimated for higher income census tracts ($6.8 million). The authors also find that credit scoring increases the probability that a large banking organization will make small business loans in a given census tract. The change in this probability is 3.8 percent for LMI areas and 1.7 percent for higher income areas. These findings suggest that credit scoring reduces asymmetric information problems for borrowers and lenders and that this is particularly important for LMI areas, which lenders may have historically bypassed because of their questionable economic health.Credit scoring systems ; Bank loans ; Commercial loans ; Small business