The Intuition of Knowing: Its Biological Function and Natural Triggering-Conditions

Over the last hundred years, competing and incompatible positions in relation to basic problems of knowledge and the use of the verb ‘to know’ have multiplied; and the prospect of a consensus solution emerging with respect to any of the problems has not seemed particularly good. We have a Gordian knot. Even so, I suggest that we also have a way to cut it. This will involve identifying why the cognitive mechanism that produces our intuitions of knowing evolved and was maintained (by natural selection), i.e., identifying the ‘teleonomic function’ of that cognitive mechanism. Also, it will involve predicting, on the basis of this teleonomic function, the triggering-conditions of these natural knowledge intuitions. In this thesis, I develop a general theory of the origin, function and triggering-conditions of knowledge intuitions that will allow us to cut that knot. That theory follows basic biological theory (including that which pertains to natural altruism) and also signal detection theory. My theory identifies a number of different circumstances under which the triggering-conditions of knowledge intuitions are different. Strikingly, these different circumstances (and their associated triggering-conditions) map onto the different competing and incompatible epistemological positions to which I referred. This suggests that these positions are all correct within the boundaries of one of the circumstances that my theory identifies; and that the Gordian knot is largely the result of epistemologists claiming universal applicability of a theory that in fact only applies under particular circumstances. We cut the knot by specifying the different circumstances under which each of the different epistemological positions will hold, and the reason we should expect it to hold in just these circumstances, in light of the teleonomic function of knowledge intuitions

Cognitive architecture and the function of human cognition

A number of models of cognitive architecture have been advanced with the intention of providing some sense of the psychological processes that subserve a range of behaviours. For instance, Sober & Wilson (1998), C. Daniel Batson (1988) and Robert Frank (1988 and 1990) attempt to account for contrasting (if not contradictory) behaviours – respectively, hedonistic and altruistic behaviour, self-oriented behaviour and other-oriented behaviour marked by empathetic reactions, and behaviour that reflects rational self-interest in material incentives and behaviour that tends to produce long-term benefits in social interactions. However, the approaches that I have examined encounter difficulties. One difficulty in basing psychological models on empirical data is that the mental states that precede and accompany motivations may be ambiguous or obscure. Those states may be composite states consisting of components that are inextricably linked. For instance, it is not clear whether an altruistic act has some desire for pleasure lurking in the shadows. In Sober & Wilson’s approach, cognitive structure is predicted largely on the basis of general factors in the natural selection of cognitive devices, e.g., their availability for selection, energetic efficiency, and reliability. However, the particular factors that play a role in the aetiology of traits depend upon the function that those traits evolved to perform. For instance, while the reliability of a physical system component may certainly be an important general factor in natural selection, it may be a detriment for a device that has as a particular biological function the production of phenotypic flexibility. To avoid the problems that I identified in these approaches, I derived a model of cognitive architecture that is intended to predict motivations and actions that are consistent with aspects of evolutionary theory about the function of cognition. The theory upon which I depended is advanced in Peter Godfrey-Smith’s book Complexity and the Function of Mind if Nature. He proposes that there is a single overarching adaptive function for the mind: to subserve adaptive plasticity. Accordingly, my model suggests a general pattern in the sequencing of human mental states that would tend to maximize behavioural flexibility as a means of maximizing inclusive fitness.Arts, Faculty ofPhilosophy, Department ofGraduat