The Emotional Consequences of Pro-social Behavior in Markets

Pro-social behavior made when buying private goods is becoming increasingly popular. Several findings from behavioral and experimental economics however emphasizes that people are less pro-social in such situations, compared to pro-social decisions in non-market contexts. This paper suggests that emotional responses are important explanations of this finding. It is first argued that the emotional response to a pro-social decision combined with private good purchase is different from the response to a similar decision in a non-market situation. Through evidence from a laboratory experiment, it is then found, that deciding on a social choice in a market exchange involves a less positive emotional reaction to others, compared to non-market situations. Moreover, subjects in market contexts are found to be less responsive to other subjects’ contribution behavior, relative to the non-market contexts.Emotions; market exchange; pro-social behavior

Promises Undone:How Committed Pledges Impact Donations to Charity

The declining use of cash in society urges charities to experiment with digital payment instruments in their off-line fund raising activities. Cash and card payments differ in that the latter do not require individuals to donate at the time of the ask, disconnecting the decision to give from the act of giving. Evidence shows that people who say they will give mostly do not follow through. Our theory shows that having people to formally state the intended amount may alleviate this problem. We report on a field experiment the results of which show that donors who have pledged an amount are indeed more likely to follow through. The firmer the pledge, the more closely the amount donated matches the amount that was pledged. 45% of all participants however refuses to pledge. This proves that donors value flexibility over commitment in intertemporal charitable giving

Nudge for (the public) good:how defaults can affect cooperation

In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default

I will donate later! A field experiment on cell phone donations to charity

Given the replacement of cash with cell phone payments, people who are asked to donate to charity can easily promise a donation but delay the transfer until a later date. This may be a way to get out of the ask-situation with a positive image while maintaining the flexibility not to donate. This study explores whether charities can make people keep their promises by making such promises more explicit and more formal. In a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment, we vary the strength of the promise that donors make. Besides a control group where people can promise to donate, we apply two treatment groups. In the first treatment, donors are asked to verbally pledge a precise amount. In a second treatment, this amount is in addition put on paper with the solicitor's signature added. Both treatments are aimed at making it morally more expensive not to keep promises. Our results show that: (1) the majority of people do not follow through on their promise to donate; (2) donors who pledge an explicit amount more often keep their promise. The more formal the commitment, the closer the amount donated is to the amount promised; (3) many participants refuse to pledge a donation amount when asked, and those who refuse donate significantly less.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )</p

I will donate later! A field experiment on cell phone donations to charity

Given the replacement of cash with cell phone payments, people who are asked to donate to charity can easily promise a donation but delay the transfer until a later date. This may be a way to get out of the ask-situation with a positive image while maintaining the flexibility not to donate. This study explores whether charities can make people keep their promises by making such promises more explicit and more formal. In a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment, we vary the strength of the promise that donors make. Besides a control group where people can promise to donate, we apply two treatment groups. In the first treatment, donors are asked to verbally pledge a precise amount. In a second treatment, this amount is in addition put on paper with the solicitor's signature added. Both treatments are aimed at making it morally more expensive not to keep promises. Our results show that: (1) the majority of people do not follow through on their promise to donate; (2) donors who pledge an explicit amount more often keep their promise. The more formal the commitment, the closer the amount donated is to the amount promised; (3) many participants refuse to pledge a donation amount when asked, and those who refuse donate significantly less.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across sixteen countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries