Can procurement affect design performance?

There is an emerging view in the construction industry that better performance or better value for money can be achieved by integrating teamwork for planning, design and construction of building projects. There are though, two opposing perspectives regarding how changes in traditional design practices should occur. Advocates of sustainable construction in North America posit that it is a matter of evolving processes, moving from a sequential to an iterative approach to design, whereas the British government supports the view that a change in how projects are procured is required to transform the context that dictates relationships among the members of the team. The objective of the research is to study the influence of procurement on the performance of integrated design teams. It analyses, through case studies representing these two perspectives, the influence of procurement on the performance of integrated teams. The research is conclusive in that it is the context created by contractual relationship, and not the process set up for conducting integrated design, that most influence team efficiency. It demonstrates that traditional procurement processes reinforce socio-cognitive barriers that hinder team efficiency. It also illustrates how new procurement modes can transform the dynamics of relationships between the client and the members of the supply chain, and have a positive impact on team performance

The influence of a collaborative procurement approach using integrated design in construction on project team performance

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to study the influence of procurement on the performance of integrated design teams. Design/methodology/approach – The research paradigm is based on Russian socio-constructivist approach to activity theory. Activity theory, as opposed to natural or social science, is a design science approach that focuses on the context aspect of project. A triangulation of qualitative research methods is used to investigate the dynamic of integrated teams in two different procurement contexts. Findings – The paper is conclusive regarding the influence of procurement on team efficiency. It demonstrates that traditional procurement processes reinforce socio-cognitive barriers that hinder team efficiency. It also illustrates how new procurement modes can transform the dynamic of relationships between the client and the members of the supply chain, and have a positive impact on teamperformance. Practical implications – The paper demonstrates first that problems with integrated design team efficiency are related to context and not process – they are not technical but socio-cognitive; second that fragmented transactional contracting increases socio-cognitive barriers that hinder integrated design team performance; third that new forms of relational contracting may help to mitigate socio-cognitive barriers and improve integrated design team performance, fourth that changing the context through procurement does not address the problem of obsolete design practices. Originality/value – The paper brings together theories of production in lean construction and social learning as a rival approach to traditional project management theory for demonstrating the importance of context on team performance

Information technology as boundary object for transformational learning

Collaborative work is considered as a way to improve productivity and value generation in construction. However, recent research demonstrates that socio-cognitive factors related to fragmentation of specialized knowledge may hinder team performance. New methods based on theories of practice are emerging in Computer Supported Collaborative Work and organisational learning to break these knowledge boundaries, facilitating knowledge sharing and the generation of new knowledge through transformational learning. According to these theories, objects used in professional practice play a key role in mediating interactions. Rules and methods related to these practices are also embedded in these objects. Therefore changing collaborative patterns demand reconfiguring objects that are at the boundary between specialized practices, namely boundary objects. This research is unique in presenting an IT strategy in which technology is used as a boundary object to facilitate transformational learning in collaborative design work

Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --Corruption,inequality,development.

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, financial liberalisation

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government- appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption,development,financial liberalisation

La gouvernance des communautés francophones en situation minoritaire et le partenariat avec l’État

Nous abordons ici des enjeux que pose le partenariat entre les organismes communautaires francophones en situation minoritaire (CFSM) et l’État fédéral canadien. S’il semble répondre aux aspirations des communautés concernant la prise en charge de leur développement, en favorisant notamment une démarche fondée sur le principe de la gouvernance partagée, ce partenariat comporte malgré tout des exigences administratives qui paraissent tempérer l’autonomie et la libre gouvernance des CFSM. La participation des organismes francophones à l’élaboration et à la mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques s’accompagne d’une bureaucratisation de leurs activités communautaires et d’une réévaluation de leurs structures de représentation. Tenus de représenter plus formellement l’intérêt général de la communauté et de collaborer directement avec l’État pour lui permettre d’atteindre ses objectifs, ils sont poussés à une action qui se heurte, constate-t-on, à de nouveaux impératifs de légitimité. Ces derniers ont pour effet de remettre en question l’arrangement corporatiste qui s’est établi entre eux et l’État. C’est cet enjeu de légitimité qui pèse sur le nouveau mode de gouvernance des CFSM que nous avons voulu porter au jour dans notre recherche, dont nous présentons quelques éléments dans le présent article.In this article, we turn to the issues that stem from the partnership between Francophone community organizations in a minority setting and the Canadian federal state. While it seems to respond to the communities’ will of taking charge of their own development, by promoting notably a process based on the principle of shared governance, this partnership nevertheless has administrative requirements that appear to weaken autonomy and the free governance of Francophone communities in a minority setting. The participation of Francophone organizations in elaborating and implementing public policies comes with the bureaucratization of their community activities and a re-assessment of their representative structures. Because they must more formally represent the community’s general interest and must directly collaborate with the state in order to attain their objectives, they are compelled to act in a way that, we note, clashes with new legitimacy imperatives. These have the effect of questioning the corporatist arrangement that has formed between them and the state. It is this legitimacy issue that weighs on the new world of governance among FSMC that we wish to reveal in our research, a few elements of which we present in this article

Foreign Aid - a Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmes; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, foreign aid.