Strategic Concept for the Regulation of Arms Possession and Proliferation

In practice there is still a “piecemeal approach towards proliferation” and argued that a genuinely comprehensive and global approach to non-proliferation would involve the integration of policy “on nuclear and other WMD non- proliferation, arms control, and disarmament with strategy on conventional weapons to implement a holistic approach within a new Strategic Concept for the Regulation of Arms Possession and Proliferation. A major push is needed, not just to control the conventional weapons trade, but also to “reduce holdings of major weapons systems, ordnance stocks and production. There are longstanding legal commitment in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to “general disarmament” of all weapons apart from those needed for internal policing. In terms of timescale, one could look at getting the job done in the course of a decade. If we have timetables for global warming, and if we think that it is practical to get to grips with the entire climate of the planet, we should also see that it is practical to get to grips with weaponry

Chairman Objects to Unilateral French Intervention in Rwanda

Chairman Objects to Unilateral French Intervention in Rwanda, Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africahttps://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rawson_rwanda/1032/thumbnail.jp

Chinese indemnity

https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/eastbooks/1049/thumbnail.jp

Accounting for International Trade and Investment

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides/2014/thumbnail.jp

Foreign Affairs Committee - Atlantic Treaty

Foreign Affairs Committee - Atlantic Treat

United States Court for China : report [to accompany H.R. 21922].

https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/eastbooks/1045/thumbnail.jp

The White House and the CIA: Lessons in Truth and Consequences

Streaming audio requires RealPlayer.The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.Melvin Goodman is widely recognized as an expert on Soviet Affairs and has held powerful positions in the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Goodman is the author of several books on international affairs, including The End of Superpower Conflict in the Third World and National Insecurity: US Intelligence Reform. He has contributed to numerous books and periodicals on Russian policy and has written op-ends for The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor on Russian and American national security and has published in Foreign Policy and USA Journal. He has testified to numerous Congressional Committees, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He has appeared on ABC's "Nightline,"Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security Studiesweb page announcement, streaming audio, phot

Too Secret to Scrutinise? Executive accountability in foreign policy

The scrutiny of Executive action in foreign affairs is a constitutional function for which the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee is primarily responsible. To this end Parliament has, in principle, unlimited inquiry powers. Yet our foreign affairs select committee, and those in other Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions, have in recent years experienced serious and on-going challenges to the fulfilment of their investigatory role. The public interest is being pulled in opposite directions: the Executive relies on national security considerations to justify confidentiality, whereas Parliament can (and should) demand disclosure in order to hold the Government accountable. This tension will be explored through examining if the recent work of FADT achieves the "robust scrutiny" envisaged by the 1985 select committee reforms, followed by a detailed analysis of the validity of one common limitation on inquiry powers, statutory secrecy provisions. Possible options for reform, namely processes for public interest immunity claims, independent arbitration and increased use of secret evidence, will be considered as possible means of strengthening the accountability of the Executive for its foreign policy activities. Political remedies are unsatisfactory to resolve this tension in the context of constitutional obligations and responsibilities