Why do foreigners invest in the United States?

Why are foreigners willing to invest almost $2 trillion per year in the United States? The answer affects if the existing pattern of global imbalances can persist and if the United States can continue to finance its current account deficit without a major change in asset prices and returns. This paper tests various hypotheses and finds that standard portfolio allocation models and diversification motives are poor predictors of foreign holdings of U.S. liabilities. Instead, foreigners hold greater shares of their investment portfolios in the United States if they have less-developed financial markets. The magnitude of this effect decreases with income per capita. Countries with fewer capital controls and greater trade with the United States also invest more in U.S. equity and bond markets, and there is no evidence that foreigners invest in the United States based on diversification motives. The empirical results showing a primary role of financial market development in driving foreign purchases of U.S. portfolio liabilities supports recent theoretical work on global imbalances.

One Cost of the Chilean Capital Controls: Increased Financial Constraints for Smalles Traded Firms

There is growing support for taxes on short-term capital inflows in emerging markets, such as the encaje adopted by Chile from 1991-98. Previous empirical assessments of the encaje conclude that it may have generated some small economic benefits, such as shifting the composition of capital inflows to a longer maturity, but no significant economic costs. Managers of small and medium-sized companies in Chile, however, claim that the encaje made it substantially more difficult to obtain financing for productive investment. This paper assesses whether the Chilean capital controls increased financial constraints for different-sized, publicly-traded firms. It uses two different testing methodologies: a Tobin's q and Euler-equation framework. Results indicate that during the encaje, smaller traded firms in Chile experienced significant financial constraints and these constraints decreased as firm size increased. Both before and after the encaje, however, no group of traded firms experienced significant financial constraints, and there is no relationship between firm size and financial constraints. Although Chilean-style capital controls may also yield benefits encaje could be particularly important in emerging markets where smaller firms can be valuable sources of job creation and economic growth.

Capital Controls: Mud in the Wheels of Market Discipline

Widespread support for capital account liberalization in emerging markets has recently shifted to skepticism and even support for capital controls in certain circumstances. This sea-change in attitudes has been bolstered by the inconclusive macroeconomic evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization. There are several compelling reasons why it is difficult to measure the aggregate impact of capital controls in very different countries. Instead, a new and more promising approach is more detailed microeconomic studies of how capital controls have generated specific distortions in individual countries. Several recent papers have used this approach and examined very different aspects of capital controls from their impact on crony capitalism in Malaysia and on financing constraints in Chile, to their impact on US multinational behavior and the efficiency of stock market pricing. Each of these diverse studies finds a consistent result: capital controls have significant economic costs and lead to a misallocation of resources. This new microeconomic evidence suggests that capital controls are not just sand', but rather mud in the wheels' of market discipline.

Trade Linkages and Output-Multiplier Effects: A Structural VAR Approach with a Focus on Asia

This paper develops a structural VAR model to measure how a shock to one country can affect the GDP of other countries. It uses trade linkages to estimate the multiplier effects of a shock as it is transmitted through other countries' output fluctuations. The paper introduces a new specification strategy that significantly reduces the number of unknowns and allows cross-country relationships to vary over time. Then it uses this model to examine the impact of shocks to 11 Asian countries, the U.S. and the rest of the OECD. The model produces reasonably good short-term forecasts. Impulse-response matrices suggest that these multiplier effects are large and significant and can transmit shocks in very different patterns than predicted from a bilateral-trade matrix. For example, due to these output-multiplier effects, a shock to one country can have a large impact on countries that are relatively minor bilateral trading partners.

The Asian Flu and Russian Virus: Firm-level Evidence on How Crises are Transmitted Internationally

This paper uses firm-level information to evaluate how crises are transmitted internationally. It constructs a new data set of financial statistics, industry information, geographic data, and stock returns for over 10,000 companies in 46 countries to test what types of firms were most affected by the East Asian and Russian crises. Results suggest that a product-competitiveness and income effect were both important transmission mechanisms during the later part of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis. For example, if a firm's main product line competed with a major East Asian export, the firm's average daily abnormal stock return was 13 percent lower during the Asian crisis. The magnitude of this product competitiveness effect during the Russian crisis was 32 percent. Results suggest that a credit crunch was not important during either crisis. Finally, country-specific effects, which are poorly explained by macroeconomic and corporate governance variables, can have a larger impact than all other transmission mechanisms combined.

Why do Foreigners Invest in the United States?

Why are foreigners willing to invest almost $2 trillion per year in the United States? The answer affects if the existing pattern of global imbalances can persist and if the United States can continue to finance its current account deficit without a major change in asset prices and returns. This paper tests various hypotheses and finds that standard portfolio allocation models and diversification motives are poor predictors of foreign holdings of U.S. liabilities. Instead, foreigners hold greater shares of their investment portfolios in the United States if they have less developed financial markets. The magnitude of this effect decreases with income per capita. Countries with fewer capital controls and greater trade with the United States also invest more in U.S. equity and bond markets, and foreign investors “chase returns” in their purchases of U.S. equities (although not bonds). The empirical results showing a primary role of financial market development in driving foreign purchases of U.S. portfolio liabilities supports recent theoretical work on global imbalances

Capital Controls: Mud in the Wheels of Market Discipline

Widespread support for capital account liberalization in emerging markets has recently shifted to skepticism and even support for capital controls in certain circumstances. This sea-change in attitudes has been bolstered by the inconclusive macroeconomic evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization. There are several compelling reasons why it is difficult to measure the aggregate impact of capital controls in very different countries. Instead, a new and more promising approach is more detailed microeconomic studies of how capital controls have generated specific distortions in individual countries. Several recent papers have used this approach and examined very different aspects of capital controls - from their impact on crony capitalism in Malaysia and on financing constraints in Chile, to their impact on US multinational behavior and the efficiency of stock market pricing. Each of these diverse studies finds a consistent result: capital controls have significant economic costs and lead to a misallocation of resources. This new microeconomic evidence suggests that capital controls are not just "sand", but rather "mud in the wheels" of market disciplin

How Do Large Depreciations Affect Firm Performance?

This paper examines how 12 'major depreciations' between 1997 and 2000 affected different measures of firm performance in a sample of over 13,500 companies from around the world. Results suggest that in the year after depreciations, firms have significantly higher growth in market capitalization, but significantly lower growth in net income (when measured in local currency). Firms with a higher share of foreign sales exposure have significantly better performance after depreciations, according to a range of indicators. Firms with higher debt ratios tend to have lower net income growth, but there is no robust relationship between debt exposure and the other performance variables. Larger firms frequently have worse performance than smaller firms, although the significance and robustness of this result fluctuates across specifications.

The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls: No Free Lunch

Macroeconomic analyses of capital controls face a number of imposing challenges and have yielded mixed results to date. This paper takes a different approach and surveys an emerging literature that evaluates various microeconomic effects of capital controls and capital account liberalization. Several key themes emerge. First, capital controls tend to reduce the supply of capital, raise the cost of financing, and increase financial constraints - especially for smaller firms, firms without access to international capital markets and firms without access to preferential lending. Second, capital controls can reduce market discipline in financial markets and the government, leading to a more inefficient allocation of capital and resources. Third, capital controls significantly distort decision-making by firms and individuals, as they attempt to minimize the costs of the controls or even evade them outright. Fourth, the effects of capital controls can vary across different types of firms and countries, reflecting different pre-existing economic distortions. Finally, capital controls can be difficult and costly to enforce, even in countries with sound institutions and low levels of corruption. This microeconomic evidence on capital controls suggests that they have pervasive effects and often generate unexpected costs. Capital controls are no free lunch.

Why do Foreigners Invest in the United States?

Why are foreigners willing to invest almost $2 trillion per year in the United States? The answer affects if the existing pattern of global imbalances can persist and if the United States can continue to finance its current account deficit without a major change in asset prices and returns. This paper tests various hypotheses and finds that standard portfolio allocation models and diversification motives are poor predictors of foreign holdings of U.S. liabilities. Instead, foreigners hold greater shares of their investment portfolios in the United States if they have less developed financial markets. The magnitude of this effect decreases with income per capita. Countries with fewer capital controls and greater trade with the United States also invest more in U.S. equity and bond markets, and there is no evidence that foreigners invest in the United States based on diversification motives. The empirical results showing a primary role of financial market development in driving foreign purchases of U.S. portfolio liabilities supports recent theoretical work on global imbalances.