Religious Capital and Religious Rewards: A Study in the Economics of Religious Life

Religious life is studied by way suggested by the rational choice theory and the religious capital theory. The basic contentions of the theory on the nature of religious life having to do with an exchange upon a religious market, by firms offering compensators and rewards, and consumers, is considered. In the empirical analysis, it was validated that the independent (religious capital) and dependent (religious rewards of two types) were empirically separate constructs. Cross-sectional analysis of survey data indicated a very strong association between religious capital and institutional and ritual experience rewards within religious life, at a cross-cultural analysis, including Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Orthodox, Slovenian Catholics and US Protestants. The association was confirmed as robust at regression inspection with religious socialization. This extends further support for the empirical validity these novel theories of religious life and extensions of economic analysis into religious lifeReligious capital, Economics of religious life, Rational choice, Religious costs, Religious rewards

Slijepe ulice u različitim objašnjenima raspada bivše Jugoslavije

In this paper certain attractive explanations, present in sociological and other scholarship, on the dismemberment of Yugoslavia are considered, by reviewing them in light of certain thus far unpublished survey and census data on the former Yugoslavia, immediately preceding the dismemberment. Particularly one influential, but biased explanation of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is considered. Books by the sociologist Stjepan Meštrović merit particular attention in the depiction of bias towards the Yugoslav break-up. It is refuted that there was an in-depth incompatibility based on authoritarianism of any nationality, on emotional instability\u27 of any nationality, of ethnic stratification, of ethnic distance among the basic groups, which may explain the break-up. Instead, it is proposed that the break-up be explained by a maturation of nationalities, where the former Yugoslavia served as a nation-building institution, but for numerous nationalities.Članak raspravlja o odabranim “atraktivnim” studijama i objašnjenjima raspadanja bivše Jugoslavije. Za preispitivanje i odbacivanje jedne od najraširenijih hipoteza, one Stjepana Meštrovića - da je raspad bivše Jugoslavije povezan s duboko ugrađenim neskladom među nacijama članicama, a koji se nesklad temelji na autoritarizmu, emocionalnoj nestabilnosti, etničkoj stratifikaciji i etničkoj distanci - koristili smo neobjavljene anketne i popisne podatke. Umjesto te, članak predlaže pretpostavku da bi raspad Jugoslavije bilo moguće objasniti sazrijevanjem naroda, pri čemu je savezna država Jugoslavija poslužila brojnim narodima kao institucija građenja nacije (nation-building)

Was Tito’s Yugoslavia Totalitarian?

Sabor Hrvatske 2006. godine i Ustavni sud Slovenije prošle godine označili su celokupno uređenje iz vremena „Titove Jugoslavije“ (1945-1990) kao „totalitarno“, bez vremenskih ili sadržinskih ograničenja svoje kvalifikacije. Slovenački sud je na osnovu toga zabranio dalju upotrebu Titovog imena prilikom davanja naziva ulica i trgova u Sloveniji. Pri tome, nijedno od ta dva tela nije se pozivalo na sistematska razmatranja totalitarizma, niti su analizirali taj pojam niti njegovo prisustvo. Teško je negirati da je Jugoslavija 1945. godine formirana pretežno kao totalitarna država. U ovom razmatranju se negira da bi uređenje u Jugoslaviji posle sredine 60-ih godina bilo totalitarno, u pogledu bilo kojeg od elemenata koje pružaju Fridrih (Friedrich) i Bžežinski (Brzezinski) u svojoj klasičnoj studiji iz 1956. godine. U Jugoslaviji 60-ih godina je izlazilo više miliona primeraka verske štampe godišnje, a privredna preduzeća nisu funkcionisala u okviru naturalne planske privrede. Što se tiče političkog uređenja, koje je zvanično bilo jednopartijsko, republike (a od 1971. i pokrajine) delovale su kao autonomni politički sistemi, brinule su za svoje interese, čak se oko njih i sukobljavale. Iako je Tito bio imenovan za predsednika sa stalnim mandatom i mada se gajio njegov kult, njegova vlast bila je ograničena suprotstavljenim federalnim karakterom države.State entities in Croatia and Slovenia have recently indiscriminately designated Tito’s Yugoslavia as totalitarian without reservations. Neither of these authorities referred to any systematic considerations of totalitarianism, nor did they analyze the manner of the alleged system’s presence and its time limits. As of the middle of 1960’s millions of copies of religious newspapers were published and economic enterprises did not operate under full state control as in command economies of the Soviet bloc. The republics were autonomous players and catered for their interests. The political police (UD BA) operated in a decentralized manner, without unquestionable authority of the center. Although Tito’s cult was promoted, his power was limited by the federal nature of the state. As to other elements of totalitarianism, they also could not be found in the period

National (Ethnic) Identification and Preferred National (Ethnic) Identification Among Youth – the Question of Yugoslavism

Etnički identitet u Jugoslaviji obično se shvata kao pripadnost jednoj od raznih etničkih grupa koje žive u zemlji. Odnedavna se primjećuje blag porast jugoslovenskog etničkog identiteta –za razliku od jugoslovenskog identiteta kao pripadnosti saveznoj državi (u popisu 1981. 5,4% ukupnog stanovništva označilo je svoju etničku pripadnost kao jugoslovensku). Autor iznosi rezultate istraživanja na bazi podataka o omladini iz 1985. godine, koji govore da je jugoslovenski etnički identitet bio prisutniji kod mladih nego u ukupnom stanovništvu u popisu 1981. Prema tim rezultatima 16% ispitanika identifikovalo se kao etnički Jugoslaveni a 36% izjavilo je da lično preferiraju takvu identifikaciju. Geografska distribucija i etničko porijeklo uticali su na prihvatanje jugoslavenstva više nego socijalno-statusne dimenzije, iako je jugoslovenska identifikacija bila prisutnija kod obrazovanijih ispitanika. Autor razmatra strukturalne, istorijske i hermeneutičke izvore ove promene s obzirom na razne postojeće etničke entitete u Jugoslaviji i mogućnost trajnog učinka oživljenog omladinskoga jugoslavenstva. Njegovi zaključci nisu konačni, iako se smatra manje verovatnim da će u celosti doći do pojave konstituisanoga jugoslovenskog etničkog identiteta.Etnički identitet u Jugoslaviji obično se shvaća kao pripadnost jednoj od raznih etničkih grupa koje žive u zemlji. Odnedavno se primjećuje blag porast jugoslavenskog etničkog identiteta – za razliku od jugoslavenskog identiteta kao pripadnosti saveznoj državi (u popisu 1981. 5,4% ukupnog stanovništva označilo je svoju etničku pripadnost kao jugoslavensku). Autor iznosi rezultate istraživanja na bazi podataka o omladini iz 1985. godine, koji govore da je jugoslavenski etnički identitet bio prisutniji kod mladih nego u ukupnom stanovništvu u popisu 1981. Prema tim rezultatima 16% ispitanika izjasnilo se kao etnički Jugoslaveni a 36% izjavilo je da osobno preferiraju takvu identifikaciju. Geografska distribucija i etničko porijeklo utjecali su na prihvaćanje jugoslavenstva više nego socijalno-statusne dimenzije, iako je jugoslavenska identifikacija bila prisutnija kod obrazovanijih ispitanika. Autor razmatra strukturalne, historijske i hermeneutičke izvore ove promjene s obzirom na razne postojeće etničke entitete u Jugoslaviji i mogućnost trajnog učinka oživljenog omladinskoga jugoslavenstva. Njegovi zaključci nisu konačni, iako se smatra manje vjerojatnim da će u cijelosti doći do pojave konstituiranja jugoslavenskog etničkog identiteta.Ethnic identity in Yugoslavia is usually taken to mean the belonging to one of the different ethnic groups that make up the country. A moderate resurgence of the Yugoslav ethnic identity – in counterdistinction to the Yugoslav identity as belonging to the Yugoslav federal state – has been noted recently (5.4% of the general population declared themselves to be ethnic Yugoslavs during the last population census in 1981). The author presents the results of a research project, based on data compiled in 1981 in regard to Yugoslav youth, which found Yugoslav ethnic identification much more prominent than the general population census in 1981 did. It was found that 16% of the respondents had identified themselves as ethnic Yugoslavs and that 36% said they preferred this identification personally. Geographical distribution and ethnic background were found to influence the respondents’ acceptance of Yugoslavism more than did other social status dimensions, even though Yugoslav identification was more concentrated among the more educated. The author examines the structural, historical and hermeneutical sources of this change, bearing in mind the different ethnic entities existing in Yugoslavia and the possibility of a lasting impact of the resurgence of Yugoslavism among youth. His conclusions are not definite, yet the full appearance of a constituted Yugoslav ethnic entity is considered less likely

Religion and the Breakdown of Modernity

Religioznost se u Jugoslaviji uobičajeno promatra kao forma tradicionalne kulture i svetonazora, iako ovaj način mišljenja nije bio često uziman kao metodološka osnova u istraživanju religioznosti. U ovom radu odnos između moderniteta, kao jezgre svetonazorskih vrednosti, i religije izučava se preko intervjuiranja reprezentativnog uzorka odraslih stanovnika Vojvodine (N = 1925.). Religioznost se izučava preko tvrdnji o religioznosti dok se odnos prema modernitetu izučava preko četiri tvrdnje koje se sve odnose na jedan, ali središnji aspekt moderniteta - pozitivan stav prema društvenoj promeni i naučnim i tehnološkim inovacijama. Distribucija odgovora ove četiri tvrdnje nije, nakon provedene faktorske analize, rezultirala jednim faktorom, već širom strukturom vrednosnih orentacija i stavova. Korelacija odnosa među stanovištima prema tvrdnjama u uzorku je niska. Veza između religioznosti i stanovišta prema modernitetu je široka. Religiozni nisu statistički značajno anti- modernistički orentirani od onih koji ne veruju. Prisutnost anti-modernizma, koju možemo nazvati tradicionalističkim stanovištem nađena je podjednako u obe ispitivane grupe (36-37%), dok je prisustvo modernističkog stanovišta bilo nešlo više zastupljeno među ne-vernicima (43% u komparaciji sa 35%). Odsustvo homogenosti u modernističkom stanovištu, odsustvo veze između obrazovnog nivoa i gledišta prema moderniletu kao i odsustvo veze između religioznosti i stanovišta prema modernitetu može biti interpretirano kao upitna uverljivost moderniteta u izučavanoj populaciji općenito.In Yugoslavia religiosity has often been regarded as a form of traditional culture and world-view, though this way of thinking has not often been taken as a method of research of religiosity. In this paper the relationship between modernity, as a core world-view value, and religiosity is studied by means of interviews carried out on a representative sample of the adult Vojvodina population (N=1925). Religiosity is studied through the declaration of religiosity whereas the stance towards modernity is studied through four statements all referring to one central aspect of modernity - the positive attitude towards social change and scientific and technological innovation. The distribution of answers to the 4 statements didn’t result in a single extracted factor, by the method of factor analysis, but in a wider structure of value orientations and attitudes. The correlation of relationships between the stance with the statements in the sample is low moderate. The connection between religiosity and the stance towards modernity is a weak one. Religionists were not significantly more anti-modernistically oriented than nonbelievers. The presence of an anti-modernist which can possibly be called a traditionalist stance was found to be the same in both groups 36-37%, whereas the presence of a modernist stance was found to be somewhat more prominent among the non-believers (43% in comparison to 35%). The lack of homogenity of the modernist stances, the lack of connection between the level of education and views on modernity and the lack of connection between religiosity and stances towards modernity can be interpreted as the questioning of the plausibility of modernity in the studied population in general

Religiosität und Delinquenz: eine Untersuchung unter Mariborer Studenten

Odnos između religioznosti i delinkvencije proučava se na istraživačkom uzorku (1200) studenata Mariborskoga sveučilišta (2003.). Pozivajući se na tvrdnje Hirschija i Starka (1969.) da ne postoji veza između religioznosti i delinkvencije, kao i na postmodernističke transformacije religioznosti u relativističkom smjeru, pretpostavilo se da neće biti poveznice između religioznosti i delinkvencije. To je, međutim, opovrgnuto u ovom radu pronalaskom značajnog odstupanja u omjeru počinjenja delinkventnih djela među onima koji su izrazito religiozni i onih koji to uopće nisu. Utvrđeno je da osobna religioznost svakako ima inhibirajući učinak na opći tip delinkvencije, premda beta-koeficijent nije bio visok (.155, sig. .000). Postoje naznake da religioznost inhibira delinkventno ponašanje kod onih koji žive izvan velikoga grada, u manjim i ruralnim mjestima, što podupire stav Starka i dr. (1982.) o "moralnoj zajednici" kao okruženju u kojemu religioznost ima utjecaja, u našem slučaju samo neznatnoga. Posredovale su i druge varijable, od kojih je spol bila najjača.The relationship between religiosity and delinquency is studied on a survey sample (1200) of Maribor university undergraduates (2003). Ensuing from the Hirschi and Stark assertion (1969) as to a lack of link between religiosity and delinquency, as well as from the transformation of religiosity during post-modernity in a relativistic direction, it was supposed that there would be no link between religiosity and delinquency. This was rejected in this study by a finding of significant variation in the odds ratio as to committing delinquent acts among those who are intensively religious and those who are not religious at all. It was found that personal religiosity does have a definite inhibitory effect upon general type delinquency, even though the beta coefficient was not high (.155, sig. .000). Indications were found that religiosity has a greater delinquency inhibiting impact upon those residing outside a large city, in small town and rural surroundings, supporting the Stark et al. (1982) contention of "moral community", as the environment where religiosity does have an effect, in our case only a minor stimulus. Other variables also intervened, sex being the most potent one.Mit einer im Jahre 2003 durchgeführten Umfrage sollte in einer Gruppe von 1200 Mariborer Studenten das Verhältnis zwischen Religiosität und Delinquenz untersucht werden. Ausgehend von der These von Hirschi und Stark (1969), dass es keinen Bezug zwischen Religiosität und Delinquenz gebe, wie auch vom Umstand der postmodernistischen Transformation der Religiosität in relativistischer Richtung war man davon ausgegangen, dass man keinerlei Berührungspunkte zwischen den genannten Phänomenen würde entdecken können. Mit der vorliegenden Untersuchung konnte diese These widerlegt werden, da man nämlich zwischen ausgesprochen religösen Delinquenten und solchen Gesetzesbrechern, die überhaupt nicht religiös sind, eine wesentliche Abweichung ermittelte. Man stellte fest, dass Religiosität in Bezug auf eine allgemeine Form von Delinquenz ganz klar inhibierend wirkt, wenn auch der Beta- Koeffizient nicht hoch war (.155, sig. .000). Bestimmte Anhaltspunkte lassen darauf schließen, dass außerhalb großer Städte, also in kleineren Orten und auf dem Land, Religiosität inhibierend auf delinquentes Verhalten wirkt, was Stark und andere (1982) vertreten, die von einer "sittlichen Gemeinschaft" sprechen als von einem Umfeld, in dem Religiosität sehr einflussreich ist. In unserem Fall jedoch erwies sich dieser Einfluss als nur wenig bedeutsam. Es kamen dafür einige andere Variablen zum Zuge, darunter die Geschlechtszugehörigkeit als die stärkste Variable

The psychometric properties of the Slovenian translation of the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity : a study among Roman Catholic undergraduate students

In order to contribute to a growing international research programme concerned with the correlations, antecedents and consequences of individual differences in attitude toward religion, the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity was translated into Slovenian. Data provided by a sample of 808 undergraduate students affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church supported the internal consistency reliability and construct validity of this instrument and commended it for further use in studies conducted in Slovenia